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A Note on Transliterations and Currencies 
For the most part, I followed the Iranian Studies scheme for transliterating Persian words, names etc. I 
have slightly modified the system for such popular names as Isfahan, Tehran and so on, which have 
not been changed. All transliterations are mine unless included in a quotation, or otherwise noted.  
As for the currency, during the period under study the tuman, qran and shahi were the units of 
currency in Iran; a tuman equalled to 10 qrans and qran equalled to 20 shahis.
1
 Qran was the main unit 
until it was changed in March 1930 to rial. By the turn of the 20
th
 century the rate of pound sterling in 
qran was around 51.1 in Tehran while in the eve of the First World War it was about 55.5.
2
 Until early 
1920’s it remained more or less the same and in 1923 it slightly rose to 56.56 but in 1929 it dropped to 
54.76.
3
 By late 1930’s the rate of pound sterling in qran it rose as high as 80.
4
   
List of Abbreviations 
LMDCIP: Library Museum and Document Center of the Iran Parliament 
NLAI: National Library and Archive of Iran 
FO: Foreign Office 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In February 1922 the tanners of Kashan wrote a petition to the Iranian Parliament, henceforth 
the Majles, in which they complained about excessive taxes and their deteriorating business. 
In their supplication, the tanners referred to the gap between ‘high politics’ and their own 
humble concerns in the following words:  
To the deputies of the sacred Majles, may God empower its pillars, 
Our opinion as the helpless members of the tanners’ guild and of the felt-capped [kolay-namadi] 
and the ordinary people in general who are involved in trade and agriculture is that the honourable 
deputies and the ministers of the country should not only deal with foreign affairs but they should 
also pay attention to domestic issues. Political debates make sense to the clergy and to the wise 




It is as if the tanners were addressing later generations of historians. Iranian history-writing 
has, for a long time, been haunted by elitist perspectives and a top-down approach which 
stemmed from several causes two of which, I believe, are of particular importance. The first is 
the modernization paradigm which suggests that from the 18
th
 but especially the early 19
th
 
century onwards, such Middle Eastern countries as Iran and the neighbouring Ottoman 
Empire entered a modernization process in which they adopted European military and 
administrative technologies as a solution to their military and administrative problems. 
Modernization served in this respect as an umbrella term used with a variety of different 
measures, the realization of which depended primarily on high-level politics. In such 
narratives the aspirations of the ruling classes and their projects were overemphasized, while 
ordinary people were considered important when and as much as their paths crossed with 
those of the elites. To put it differently, ordinary people arouse interest only when they were 
involved in major political processes. For the case of Iran, the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution can be cited as an example. For instance, guilds, as major manufacturing and 
social entities, attracted the attention of historians for the period between 1905 and 1909, 
                                                          
1
 LMDCIP. d4/k49/j24/2/p62, “The complaint of the tanners of Kashan”, 4 February 1922. For the documents 
LMDCIP the numbers refer to the following: ‘d’ the parliamentary term; ‘k’ the folder where the documents is 
found; ‘j’ the file which contains the document; and ‘p’ the  term  from  Emphases here and in any of the 
petitions used in this work are mine unless stated otherwise. Following an official request issues in 1935 to the 
countries with which it had diplomatic relations, ‘Iran’ became the generally accepted name of the country and 
‘Persia’ fell into relative disuse. Yet, throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth the use of 
Persia was commonplace. In this chapter and other I use Iran and Persia interchangeably.  
2 
 
because of their active role in the making of the revolution, their representation in the First 
Majles, and the role they played in the civil war which was fought from 1908 to 1909 between 
Mohammad Ali Shah and the constitutionalists.
2
 Nonetheless, with guilds no longer 
represented in the Majles starting in 1909, due to the new electoral law which was produced 
in 1909 and which abolished class-based representation, attention to guilds noticeably 
vanishes after this date.
3
 The second factor which, I believe, paradoxically reinforced a top-to-
down perspective on Iranian history is the Iranian Revolution of 1979. To many, the 
revolution came as a surprise which called for an explanation. Attention was mostly paid, in 
the subsequent literature, to political parties, organizations and collective movements which 
arguably contributed to the making of the Revolution in various ways. When ordinary people 
were addressed, their experiences were often dealt with within the framework of revolutionary 
history, which resulted in the revolutionizing of Iranian historiography. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, much of the scholarship on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 in 
the post-1979 period often strove to explain the ‘roots’ of the revolution which took place in 
1979.
4
 One has the impression that at least from the Tobacco Protest (1891-1892)
5
 until the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iranian history steadily progressed towards the Revolution that 
                                                          
2
 The electoral law produced for the first elections in 1906 specified the following six classes (tabaqat) of the 
electorate who were to send to the Majles a certain number of deputies to serve for two years: Princes and the 
Qajar tribe; mullahs and theology students; the nobility; merchants; landholders and smallholders; and guild 
members. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1966. 355. 
Among the 160 deputies 26 percent were guild elders while 20 percent were clergymen as opposed to 15 percent 
of merchants.  
3 
The following study is a notable exception: Hojjat Fallah Tootcar, “Social and Political Activities of Guilds and 
Artisans from the Iranian Constitutional Revolution to the Rise of Reza Shah, 1906-1925.” PhD diss., (in 
Persian), Tarbiyat Modarres University, 2003. Based on numerous primary sources Dr. Tootcar cogently deals 
with the activities of the guilds during this period by also referring to the relationship between guild members 
and the broader Iranian working class. 
4
 The following are only a few and well-known examples: Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982; Said Arjomand, (ed.). From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam: 
Essays on Social Movements in the Contemporary Near and Middle East. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1984; Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981. At times even when the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not the main concern, links were 
established between this revolution and previous historical developments. For instance, writing in 1996 Janet 
Afary makes, in the Introduction to her seminal work, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, the following 
observation: “The Legacy of the Constitutional Revolution and the fight between [Shaikh Fazlullah] Nuri and the 
constitutional forces, is alive to this day. Ayatullah Khomeini, upon coming to power in 1979, declared Nuri the 
ideological father of the Islamic Republic and made every effort to rehabilitate him”. The Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy and the Origins of Feminism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 1.   
5
 In 1890 Naser al-Din Shah granted a complete monopoly over the production, sale and export of all Iranian 
tobacco to a British subject, Major Gerald Talbot, for fifty years. The concession triggered a series of protests, 
some of them rather bloody, which took place in various cities of the country until the concession was finally 
abolished early in 1892 with a cost of £ 500,000 to be paid as compensation to the company which the 
government borrowed from the British owned Imperial Bank as the first Qajar foreign loan. This protest is 
regarded in much of the literature as a ‘prelude’ to the Constitutional Revolution. Ann K. S. Lambton, Qajar 
Persia, London, I. B. Tauris, 1987 P. 223. 
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was its ultimate destination, and that the developments which took place in between 
functioned as the components of the revolutionary machine. We need to de-revolutionize 
Iranian history and focus on its other aspects which did not necessarily and directly relate to 
the revolutions.     
The insufficient attention paid to the experiences and perceptions of ordinary people may also 
result from a lack of sources, or their inadequacy. Social historians, particularly those who 
work on the Middle East, who venture to wrestle with questions regarding the experiences of 
ordinary people face many challenges from their source material, for the obvious reason that 
their subjects hardly leave an extensive trail of documents. In order to overcome this problem, 
many historians either choose not to risk such an adventure, or rely on sources recorded by 
those who were hostile, or at best indifferent, to the concerns of ordinary people. Or else, the 
uneven attention paid to the lower classes in Iranian history-writing could have possibly 
emanated from a controversial understanding of social history. It is tacitly, and somehow 
legitimately, claimed that social history can only be written if and when other histories, 
namely political and economic, have been sufficiently studied. However, I think it is truer to 
the dynamic of history to recognize social history as a method of writing about the past rather 
than categorizing it as an autonomous branch of the historian’s craft. In other words, the 
history of any period is better understood when due attention is paid to social developments. 
Since the past was at least as complex as the present we should reconsider the previously held 
dogmatic and clear-cut division of history into political, economic, military, and social 
spheres, and so on, and should instead try to produce a more comprehensive narration of the 
past. This is certainly easier said than done, but it is worth trying.  
Thus, my main aim in this research is to present a social history of Iranian industrialization 
and labour by referring, inter alia, to the textile industry and as such to enrich the scholarship 
on the period. I do so based on the petitions sent by workers which provide insights into the 
various dimensions of workers’ perceptions and experiences that remained understudied in the 
existing literature. Thus, for instance instead of discussing structural political and economic 
developments at length, I try to examine how ordinary people, particularly the labouring 
people, perceived and participated in these processes. Further, especially in chapters 4 and 5, 
which deal with industrialization and labour issues respectively, I use petitions to present a 
rather complex engagement and interaction between the state and the society. Throughout the 
work but particularly in Chapter 5, petitions are used for questioning the validity and the 
scope of the narratives which almost invariably focus on formal labour organizations and 
4 
 
collective labour actions in investigating how workers coped with labour-related and other 
problems. By doing this I intend to enrich the existing scholarship on Iranian history by 
restoring the agency of those people who have so far remained peripheral to the main 




Some Theoretical Considerations 
When I set out to investigate the history the Iranian workers during the period under study, I 
encountered on more than one occasion the following perplexing question: ‘did any workers 
exist in early twentieth century Iran?’ Apparently, the question had its origins in a narrow 
understanding of “worker” and its reduction to factory labour exclusively. It was suggested 
that workers could only become subjects of historical inquiry if they were employed at 
factories, or else once they gained visibility by participating in labour organization and 
collective action. But I gradually realized that this misunderstanding was also caused by 
erroneously equating labour history with that of leftist movements—in Iran, and elsewhere. 
Supposedly, the Iranian modernization trajectory, which started in the 19
th
 century and 
continued into the twentieth, resulted in the establishment of a state machine which imposed 
capitalist relations upon a passive and recipient society. This establishment was politically 
and economically hostile, or at best oblivious, to the interests of the wider population as it 
protected those of a small, privileged group. It was due to leftist parties and organizations that 
the deadlock was solved and state’s authoritarian tendencies were mended.
7
 Many studies of 
labour history promoted this idea in one way or another. This tendency was also the main 
reason for the incomparably higher attention paid to labour in the post-1941 period, when 
communist and socialist organizations were strongest in Iran. Paradoxically, by positioning 
                                                          
6
 This metaphor, as I have encountered it so far, has been used on several occasions albeit in different contexts. It 
was used, for instance, by Tarık Zafer Tunaya, the famous Turkish historian, as a book title, Medeniyetin 
Bekleme Odasinda (In the Waiting Room of Cvilization), which was published in 1989. Interestingly enough the 
metaphor was used, in the same year, by the German playwright, Heiner Müller who used it of the ‘Third 
World’. See: Amit Chaudhuri, “In the Waiting-Room of History”, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 12 · 24 
June 2004. pages 3-8 (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n12/amit-chaudhuri/in-the-waiting-room-of-history-last access 
2.2.2015). More recently and in a closer context to my usage, however, the metaphor was used by Dipesh 
Chakrabarty to describe how J. Stuart Mill, the 19
th
 century British philosopher, consigned Africans, Indians and 
other ‘rude’ nations to an ‘imaginary waiting room of history’. See: D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: 
Political Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8. For further 
discussion on the metaphor in Turkish literature see: Meltem Ahiska, Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of 
Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 38. 
7
 A similar teleological argumentation can also be observed in the nationalist and Islamist historiographies.    
5 
 
the struggle against the state’s pervasive power at the official level, i.e at the level of formal 
politics, no space was left for informal politics and everyday forms of resistance.
8
  
Consequently in addition to many puzzling questions, I am mainly preoccupied with three 
basic issues. First of all, I wonder how Iranian workers came to see themselves primarily as 
workers since ‘workerness’ was one of the several identities and affiliations that people had.
9
 
What Katznelson observes for the French, American and German cases is true for non-
Western cases as well. That is to say much of the variation between different working-class 
experiences ‘consists of variations in the ways working people, confronting changes in the 
conditions of life […], mapped and interpreted these changes at the level of dispositions’.
10
 
This process can only be investigated by dealing with the discursive formation of the Iranian 
working-class as has been done for other working-classes, but which is insufficiently 
addressed in the existing literature.
11
 Thus as Dipesh Chakrabarty remarks, “an analytic 
strategy that seeks to establish a ‘working class’ as the ‘subject’ of its history must also 
engage in the discursive formation that makes the emergence of such a subject-category 
possible.”
12
 The delineation of workers’ discursive formation is or should be an indispensable 
part of any labour history but especially in non-Western contexts, for the following reason. 
Without due attention paid to how, in a particular non-Western context, workers—the ‘flesh-
and-blood human actors’
13
—came to perceive themselves as such, one not infrequently has 
                                                          
8
 Barbara Misztal defines informality as “a form of interaction among partners enjoying relative freedom in 
interpretation of their roles’ requirements.”. Barbara A. Misztal, Informality: Social Theory and Contemporary 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2000), 8. James Scott’s Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Froms of Peasant 
Resistance, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985) provides a good illustration how everyday forms of 
resistance work among the weak groups. The book is a thoughtful and informed study of the social, economic 
and political relations and conditions of a Malay rice growing village in Kedah. Yet for years it stood as a 
landmark not only in South-East Asian or peasant studies but also in working class studies especially in 
understanding class consciousness. 
9
 I took ‘workerness’ from Zachary Lockman, “Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class 
Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914,” Poetics Today 15, not. 2 (1994): 157-190. Here 161. 
10 
Ira Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons”, in Working-Class 
Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, Ira Katznelson & Aristide R. 
Zolberg, (eds.) (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), 18. 
11
 Touraj Atabaki’s following article is a notable exception: “From ‘Amaleh (Labor) to Kargar (Worker): 
Recruitment, Work Discipline and Making of the Working Class in the Persian/Iranian Oil Industry”, 
International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 84, Fall 2013, pp. 159–175. By concentrating on oil 
workers employed in the Iranian oil industry in the south Atabaki attempts to trace the development of workers’ 
self-consciousness as to their ‘workerness’. For two other studies, on Egypt and Turkey, which stress the 
importance of the discursive making of the working class in the Middle East see: Zachary Lockman, “Imagining 
the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914,” Poetics Today 15, not. 2 
(1994): 157-190; Yigit Akin “The Dynamics of Working-Class Politics in Early Republican Turkey: Language, 
Identity, and Experience”, International Review of Social History, Vol. 54, Issue S17. 167-188. 
12
 Dipesh Cahkrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History in Bengal 1890-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), 6. 
13
 Scott, James, C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1985), 43. 
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the impression that ‘worker’ is used as a cumbersome, author-imposed concept. It is as if the 
Western European trajectory is universally applicable, and the concept of worker denotes the 
same meaning irrespective of the socio-cultural, linguistic, political or economic variables 
which not only determines the course of the workers’ struggle but also their self-perception.
14
 
To avoid these pitfalls and to challenge an objective understanding of class, the discursive 
formation of the Iranian working class should be adequately addressed. In short, as 
Katznelson succinctly puts is, ‘class is discursive’.
15
  
Secondly, I want to go beyond the traditional concerns of what is known as ‘old labour 
history’ whose focus was on organized labour and labour institutions as well as on workers’ 
collective actions.
16
 While I was aware of the fact that even such aspects of Iranian labour 
remain understudied, the existing literature, despite its significant contribution to our 
knowledge of the subject, fell short of answering some basic questions which had preoccupied 
me. In much of the literature on Middle Eastern labour history a teleological role is attributed 
to the working classes. It is explicitly or implicitly claimed that workers in such countries as 
Iran, Turkey, or Egypt, as elsewhere in the world, acted as a progressive force in markedly 
reactionary political settings. It is further argued that workers would almost inevitably reach a 
point where they would overthrow the obsolete and exploitative productive relations for a just 
and egalitarian substitute. In this classical Marxist approach, factory workers, more than any 
other workers, were supposed to be the agents of this revolutionary mission. This not only 
resulted in what D. Quataert calls ‘the factory orthodoxy’,
17
 which refers to the excessive and 
disproportionate attention given to factory labour, but also distracted attention from those 
                                                          
14
 I use “the Western European trajectory” only to refer to the familiar Eurocentrism problem and to an assumed 
universal model which portrayed factory workers as the agents of industrialization. Otherwise I am aware that 
such an unvarying model fails to describe even the diverse Western European experiences. In Europe too as a 
rule the development from artisanal labour to factory labour and the resulting development in the self-perception 
of workers took place gradually. For example, in his seminal work, The Making of the English Working Class, E. 
P. Thompson challenges the established idea that factory workers were the "eldest children of the industrial 
revolution" and instead suggests that they in fact were ‘late arrivals’. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English 
Working Class, London: V. Gollancz, 1963. 193. William H. Sewell, too, makes a similar observation for 
France. He argues an important ‘consequence of the French pattern of industrialization for French class 
formation was that artisans rather than factory workers long remained the overwhelming majority of the French 
industrial workers’. Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789-
1948”, in Working-Class Formation, Katznelson & Aristide (eds.), 49. Various chapters in this jointly edited 
volume describe the varying Western experiences in the making of working-classes and their discursive 
formations. 
15
 Ira Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons”, Working Class Formation, 
Katznelson and Aristidi (eds.), 34. 
16
 For a discussion on old and new labour history see: Marcel van der Linden, “Labour History: the Old, the New 
and the Global”, African Studies, 66, 2-3, August-December 2007, pp.169-180. 
17
 Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of Industrial Revolution, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993. 14. 
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aspects of labour history which did not necessarily relate to this mission. Evidence attests to 
the fact that ‘there has never been a working class with revolutionary consciousness in the 
fullest and most demanding sense of the term’.
18
 Motivated by my own methodological and 
analytical unease with such a teleological reading of labour history, this study employs the 
new labour history approach and is informed by a Thompsonian conception of the working 
class and its formation. Thus, instead of overemphasizing organizational developments, 
collective labour actions as well as political debates and leadership emphasis is put in this 
study on contextualizing workers’ struggles. The strength of Thompson’s approach for the 
current study stems from the fact that, to quote Meiksins-Wood, ‘it is capable of recognizing, 
and giving an account of, the operations of class in the absence of class consciousness’.
19
 
Attempt was made, therefore, to seek the formation of the Iranian working class in more than 
merely objective and structural processes. In other words, class formations should be sought 
in circumstances when ‘men and women live their productive relations and experience their 
determinate situations, within the “assembly of social relations”, with their inherited culture 
and expectations, as they handle these experiences in culturally-specific ways’.
20
 From my 
own understanding of social history I aim to show how this process worked in the Iranian 
context.      
The third issue with which I am preoccupied is the establishment of a proper link between the 
workers’ agenda and political processes. I needed to relate workers’ experiences to the state, 
and vice versa, without necessarily suggesting a tug-of-war between the two. My experiences 
show that for the most part workers chose to avoid direct engagement with the state, at the 
central as well as local levels, unless they regarded it as necessary for their survival. Thus, I 
had to find a way to describe this cautionary engagement without suggesting either a blind 
political quietism or an imaginary revolutionism. This proved to be more complex than I 
initially assumed. In traditional labour historiography, formal labour organizations such as 
trade unions and syndicates have long served as a conventional means to link labour issues to 
politics, with politics being narrowly defined in such narratives. According to this narrow 
view, politics is what takes place within the government and state departments in which only 
politicians, government officials and members of the political parties participate. Thus, being 
                                                          
18
Ira Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons”, Working Class 
Formation,Katznelson & Aristidi (eds.), 7. 
19
 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79.  
20
 E. P. Thompson, “Eighteenth Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?”,  Social History 3 (2) 
May 1978, p. 150. Quoted in Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical 
Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 80. Emphases are in the original. 
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a political actor simply required partaking in this predefined sphere as deferential participants 
to ensure its working, or as revolutionary actors to topple it. In either case, a dubiously narrow 
understanding of politics is the result.
21
 Alternatively, in connection with such a view of 
politics and the state, in some studies on the social history of labour, labour issues are 
virtually split off from political processes in order to claim an autonomous space for working 
people. By overemphasizing shop floor experiences or regional dimensions of labour without 
relating either to the broader range of working class experiences and political developments, 
labour is confined to an artificial cell which is almost entirely cut off from the outside world. 
It is as if the controversial state model is reproduced on a smaller scale in which the factory 
manager or the governor of a town acted as the supreme authority. Either of these approaches, 
I believe, needs to be challenged.    
Furthermore, my impressionistic view of the erroneousness of looking at the state in Iran, as 
elsewhere for that matter, as, in Migdal’s words, ‘a stand-alone organization with firm 
boundaries between it and other social forces’ was reinforced as I delved further into the 
experiences of working people.
22
 I argue instead that state-society relations in Iran were 
mutually transformative.
23
 As far as state-society relations are concerned much of the existing 
literature on the first four decades of twentieth century Iranian history seems to suggest a 
clear-cut rupture between the pre- and post-1925 periods. Arguably while the first period is 
characterized by a freer political atmosphere tainted with a marked economic backwardness, 
the second period witnessed a rather repressive political environment which was accompanied 
by impressive economic growth. Such a clear-cut periodization is, needless to say, not without 
problems. Seen through the lens of working people, if the first two decades of the twentieth 
century were characterized by ever-increasing foreign economic domination, the economic 
policies adopted during the 1920’s and 1930’s made rapid industrial development a priority 
and paid insufficient attention to the working and living conditions of the workers. In both 
periods, however, workers negotiated their interests, in one way or another, with the ruling 
classes.  
                                                          
21
 The reduction of labour struggle to a uniform labour movement can lead to quite problematic conclusions as 
that of Floor who argues that the primary goal of the Iranian labour movement ‘was the destruction of 
imperialism and capitalism’. Labour and Industry in Iran (Washington: Mega Publishers, 2009) 30. (Emphasis 
added). Such a teleological role attributed to organized labour does not only miss different types of labour 
actions but also significantly obscures, if it does not altogether dismiss, other forms of labour activism. This 
point will be discussed below.  
22
 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 





From the beginning to the end of the period investigated in this study, the Iranian state 
remained open to negotiating with workers and with other social movements. However, the 
nature of this negotiation did not remain unchanged, nor did working people pursue unvaried 
interests and agendas. Generally speaking it is safe to suggest that from 1906 to the late 
1920’s the Iranian state was willing to regard formal labour organizations and collective 
labour actions as forms of negotiation while throughout the 1930’s they were effectively 
suppressed and banned. Yet informal labour organizations and non-organized labour actions 
continued to exist.
24
 For instance, throughout the period under study, the state encouraged and 
welcomed workers’ petitions as yet another and more controllable form of negotiation. Also, 
in some cases while a group of workers were concerned about immediate labour-related 
problems, such as wages and unfavourable working conditions at their worksite, others could 
pursue more far-reaching and fundamental agendas such as siding with the wider working-
class throughout the nation, or toppling the political establishment which they regarded as 
reactionary and exploitative. Jonathan Zeitlin touched upon part of this problem when he 
argued that ‘the future of labour history should be sought in its redefinition as the history of 
industrial relations, understood as the changing relationships between worker, trade unions, 
employers and the state’.
25
 To this one should also add civil society, which workers were a 
part of. For such a redefinition, labour historians should not only be more receptive to new 
theoretical orientations but should also get used to employing new types of documentation 




Petitions, as the principle sources of this study, belong to this type of documentation, and they 
have helped me to overcome, if only partially, the aforementioned problems. By using 
petitions I describe the discursive formation of the Iranian working class, in order to provide a 
                                                          
24
 “Formal” and “informal” are used in this work as analytical tools although the distinction between the two, as 
Van der Linden argues, is not always entirely clear. Based on Tom R. Burns and Helena Flam. The Shaping of 
Social Organization: Social Rule System Theory with Applications (London [etc.]: Sage, 1987) he makes the 
following remarks about the two types of labour organizations: “Some scholars think that an organization needs 
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Towards a Global Labour History (Brill: Leiden, 2008), 11 footnote 17. 
25
 Jonathan Zeitlin, “From Labour History to the History of Industrial Relations”, Economic History Review, 2dn 
ser. XL, 2 (1987), 159-184. Here 178. 
26
 Jim Sharpe, “History from Below,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), 30. 
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social history of Iranian textile labour and to discuss workers’ relations with the state. Written 
by working people, as others, to the Majles and to other central and local authorities, petitions 
offer a genuine opportunity to trace the development of workers’ self-perceptions, as well as 
an uninterrupted channel in state-society relations. Thus, before going into the use of petitions 
for the current study firstly a theoretical discussion of their use-value will be provided.  
 
Blurring the Boundaries: Petitioners and their Addressees  
 
To the Sacred Majles may God Empower its Pillars, 
Before we begin our petition we entreat the retainers of the President of the Majles, may God 
make his power endure, and the honourable deputies to read this petition loudly in the Majles and 
to pay due attention to the situation of these craftsmen. Admittedly the purpose for the 
establishment of this national regime and the basis of the constitutional system is to attain the 
means of security and welfare for all as well as to obtain advantages and dispose of disadvantages 
to Iranians. This can only be obtained by making laws for the good of the country and for 
providing peace and revenues to people from which the general populace will benefit without 
discriminating between various crafts therein. You should not forget the principle of egalitarianism 
(mesdaq-e vaqe‘-e mosavat).  As shoe makers we have always made sacrifices and become 
forerunners for the establishment of the sacred constitution while at the same time we have, in the 
last years, significantly developed our craft and made our handiwork far more beautiful and 
attractive. However, in return for our efforts, some of the deputies totally disregarded this craft in 
their debates concerning the use of native fabrics and home manufactures and they were oblivious 
to our craft and showed a humiliating attitude towards us. Their pretext was that home-made shoes 
hurt and injured their feet [..]. Of course our words are about a number of deputies who wear 
foreign shoes and not those who from the beginning of their lives wore home-made shoes. In the 
meantime we urge those deputies who did not help us to study history in order to see what the 
Japanese Emperor did and said. You should have already heard that the Emperor, Mikado, 
declared that until shoes were produced in his country he would go around barefooted which he 
really did for a while until shoes were produced in his country. This is what great men and persons 
who are interested in promoting and developing a nation do. We would like to gain the attention of 
you gentlemen and request that you pay attention to native shoes like you did to native textiles. In 
this way we request that you add an article about native shoes to the supplement of the law, and 
promote this craft too.
27
 
Petitions can be defined as “demands for a favour or for the redressing of an injustice directed 
to some established authority”.
28
 Petitioning, both in its written and verbal forms, is a 
                                                          
27
 LMDCIP. d4/k25/j12/p14, “From the Shoe-Makers”, 4 March 1923.  
28
 The definition is taken from: Lex Heerma Van Voss, “Introduction”,  International Review of Social History 
46, Supplement 9 Petitions in Social History (2001): 1-10, here P. 1. The volume contains many articles on the 
use of petitions for studying social history. For instance, in “Voices from Among the "Silent Masses": Humble 
Petitions and Social Conflicts in Early Modern Central Europe” Andreas Wiirgler discusses the use of collective 
and individual petitions for research on social conflict. In early Modern Europe while Cecilia Nubola deals in 
“Supplications between Politics and Justice: The Northern and Central Italian States in the Early Modern Age”  
with petitioning as a ‘privileged form of communication between subject and authority’ in early modern Italian 
states (p. 36). Also, in “The Power of Petitions: Women and the New Hampshire Provincial Government, 1695-
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universal and centuries-old tradition which acted as a major channel between the rulers and 
the ruled in Iran as elsewhere.
29
 Attending the petitions has been considered throughout the 
centuries as indispensable to just kingship. Many of the issues which people could not be 
openly express could be addressed through petitions. As such, petitioning served as ‘a 
privileged communicative space’.
30
 There are several reasons why ruling elites took notice of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1700” Marcia Schmidt Blaine analyzes female agency by examining ‘the rights associated with petitioning, the 
procedure involved, and the variety of applications for petition use’. (p.57) while Oleg G. Bukhovets analyzes in 
“The Image of Jews in Byelorussia: Petitions as a Source for Popular Consciousness in the Early Twentieth 
Century” ‘the attitudes towards Jewishness’ (p.173) in Byelorussia where Jews made up to 54 percent of the 
urban population.  
29
 Petitions remain an underexploited source in the Middle Eastern historiography in general and in Iranian 
history writing in particular. Yet, there are a number of good studies which analyse petitioning and petitions or 
else use them as their source material. The following are the works which I located: Irene Schneider, The 
Petitioning System in Iran: State, Society and Power Relations in the Late 19th Century (Wiesbaden: 
HarrassowitzVerlag,, 2006). Focusing on 19
th
 century petitions from Iran Schneider deals in this study with 
petitions sent between 1883 and 1886 to The Council for the Investigation of Grievances (Majles-e Tahqiq-e 
Mazalem) founded in 1882. As Schneider also points out some of these petitions had previously been published 
in Fedirun Ademiyet and Homa Natek, eds. Efkar-e Ejiemai va Siyasi-va Eqtesadi dar Asar-e Montasher 
Nashodeh-e Dowran-e Qajar (Essen: NimaVerlag, Essen, (n.d).  Mansoureh Ettehadiyeh Nezam-Mafi also has 
an article which focuses on The Council for the Investigation of Grievances: Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-
Mafi, “The Council for the Investigation of Grievances: A Case Study of Nineteenth Century Iranian Social 
History”, International Society for Iranian Studies 22, no. 1 (1989): 51-61. On the Constitutional Period I have 
come across two articles both in Persian: Ali Tatari, “Bar rasi-ye Jayghah-e Arizehdar Pajuhashha-ye Asnadi”, 
Payam Baharestan 2, no. 4 (2009): 465-476; Siavash Shohani, “Ghozari bar Arayez-e Eanat”, Payeme 
Baharestan, 2, no. 3 (2009): 315-329. While Tatari analyses petitions in terms of their place in conventional 
documentations categories Shohani investigates demands, financial and otherwise, as a specific type of petitions; 
in “From Amaleh (Labour) to Kargar (Worker): recruitment, Work Discipline and Making of the Working Class 
in the Persian/Iranian Oil Industry”, Atabaki also uses petitions especially to discuss workers’ self-perception. 
30
 ‘A privileged communicative space’ is taken from D. Zaret, "Petitions and the 'Invention' of Public Opinion in 
the English Revolution', American Journal of Sociology, 101 (1996), pp. 1497-1555. Here 1512. Quoted in Ken 
Lunn & Ann Day, “Deference and Defiance: The Changing Nature of Petitioning in British Naval Dockyards”, 
in Lex Heerma Van Voss, ed., International Review of Social History 46, Supplement 9 Petitions in Social 
History (2001): 131-150. Here 132. Petitions are sometimes dealt within a perspective of popular protest of 
which the following edited volume is a good example: Popular Protest and Political Participation in the 
Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi Eleni Gara, M. Erdem Kabadayi and Christoph K. 
Neumann (eds.) (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2011). In “Coping with the State’s Agents “from 
Below”: Petitions, Legal Appeal, and the Sultan’s Justice in Ottoman Legal Practice” Eyal Ginio examined the 
petitions dated between 1694 and 1768 from Salonica to demonstrate how Salonicans used petitioning to further 
their interests. Also, in “Popular Protest and the Limitations of Sultanic Justice” Eleni Gara investigates the 
popular protest which occurred in Veroia in 1627 among a groups of Christians and shows how the petitioners 
successfully involved with the official discourse which presented the sultan as ‘protector of the common people 
and guarantor of justice’ (p.103). More importantly in “Petitioning as Political Action: Petitioning Practices of 
Workers in Ottoman Factories” M. Erdem Kabadayi examines workers’ petitions in order to questions the 
general understanding of strike in the literature and calls to widen our perception of what constitutes labour 
resistance (p. 66). For this, he insightfully examines Ottoman workers’ petitions from late nineteenth century. 
Kabadayi’s PhD dissertation (“Working for the State in a Factory in Istanbul: The Role of Factory Workers’ 
Ethno-Religious and Gender Characteristics in State-Subject Interaction in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Munich 
University, 2008) is also mainly based on petitions of the workers at Feshane Factory which was one of the 
earliest Ottoman state-owrned factories. Gorkem Akgoz too bases her investigation of an early Republican state 
factory on workers’ petitions. See: “Many Voices of a Turkish State Factory: Working at Bakirkoy Cloth 
Factory, 1932-1950”, Ph.D Dissertation, Amsterdam University, 2012. As for the Egyptian case: Juan Ricardo 
Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement 
(Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), which deals, especially in chapter 2, with this movement of 
the late 19
th
 century based on petitions; John Chalcraft “Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on 
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the opinions brought forward by petitioners. Two reasons are of particular significance. 
Firstly contemporary statesmen were informed through petitions about the opinions and 
feelings of the general population which even the most authoritarian governments took 
seriously.
31
 Petitions sent directly to the central authorities, especially, provided central 
governments a chance to by-pass local intermediaries and to take action, before a source of 
popular distress, which might have been swept under the rug by local administrators who 
wanted to avoid putting their posts at risk, turned into overt acts of resistance.  Secondly, 
there was always the threat of a revolt if a justified demand went unattended to. “The right to 
petition thus worked as a safety valve."
32
 If petitioning provided people with the opportunity 
to express their demands and grievances it at the same time enhanced the legitimacy of the 
rulers.  After the Constitutional Revolution in Iran this privilege was claimed by the nascent 
parliament as the new basis of legitimate power. 
33
 The number of petitioners, as well as 
spectators, pouring into the newly established parliament was so high that Seyyed Hasan 
Taqizadeh, a deputy and a leading constitutionalist, commented: “here not even rowzeh can be 
recited”.
34
 During Reza Shah’s reign, too, petitioning remained an encouraged practice. Thus 
upon his rise to power Reza Khan unsurprisingly made the following declaration: “I am 
obliged to look after the oppressed and to liberate them from the oppressors. I will permit all 





A typical petition presented to the Majles starts with a display of respect to the authority in 
question often in a rather obedient and deferential language. Then the petitioner introduces 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Eve of Colonial Rule” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37 (2005), 303-325. This study 
discusses how during the 19
th
 century Egyptian peasants engaged with the Ottoman rulers.    
31
 Van Voss, “Introduction”, 4. 
32
 K. Tenfelde and H. Trischler (eds), Bis vor die Stufen der Tbrons. Bittschriften und Beschwerden von 
Bergarbeitem (Munich, 1986), p. 14. Quoted in Van Voss, “Introduction”, 4.  
33
 Mansureh Ettehadiyeh Nezammafi, Majls va Intikhabat (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1996), 23. 
34
 Feridoun Adamiyat, Idi`uluzhi-yi Nahzat-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, (The Ideology of the Constitutional Movement) 
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 Habib Ladjevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran, Syracuse (New York: Syracuse University Press, 
1985), 12. This held true for such countries as Turkey too. For a discussion on petitions during the Republican 
years in Turkey see: Yigit Akin, “Reconsidering State, Party and Society in Early Republican Turkey: Politics of 
Petitioning”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 39 (2007), 435-457. In this article by using 
petitions sent to the Republican Turkish Party by people from various social groups Akin discusses state-society 
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recipient society. For a comparative analysis of the petitions from Iran and Turkey during 1930s as sources of 
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(Corresponding with the State: Petitions in Turkish and Iranian Social History), (in Turkish), Turkiyat 
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himself or herself, a part which at times provides detailed information as to petitioner’s 
environments and social as well as political settings in which he or she lived. This part usually 
provides historians invaluable information which can help reconstruct many of the details 
regarding the lives and working conditions of workers. This part is followed by the statement 
of the request or complaint in question. In order to prove the accuracy of their claims the 
petition sometimes includes a supporting document called a Letter of Testimony (Esteshhad 
Nameh). This could be a letter from a prominent person, a leading merchant, governor, a 
cleric etc., or a photograph which was infrequently used as a testimony to demands for 
financial aid due to physical disability.  
Workers’ petitions almost unexceptionally employ a carefully balanced wording 
sophisticatedly stated so as not to outrage the authorities in question, while at the same time 
making the point sufficiently clear. During the constitutional period workers often referred to 
the merits of the constitutional regime and the sacrifices they made for its realization while 
after Reza Shah’s coronation in 1925 they use a rather patriarchal language by emphasizing 
the protective role of the Shah over his people as well as his supremacy as their just King and 
father. Similar to Chalcraft’s remarks about Egyptian peasants, Iranian workers too ‘made 
strategic use of the figure of the just ruler and lodged sometimes assertive appeals to the rule 
of law and new and old rights in a dangerous and power-laden context’.
36
 For their conflicts 
with their managers or factory-owners or for their complaints about local authorities they 
apparently knew how to draw the Shah or the Majles into their disputes, though they were not 
always successful. Yet, in some cases petitioners did not hesitate to use rather sarcastic 
language. In other cases workers use decidedly aggressive wording, such as the above-quoted 
petition of shoe-makers dated 1923 that criticized “the law for the use of national clothes” 
(qanun-e este`mal-e albaseh-e vatani) passed by the Majles in February 1923. The law made 
it compulsory for all state employees, including the military, to wear clothes produced using 
native fabrics, and of Iranian make. Shoe-makers were disappointed by being left out of the 
law, and they sarcastically put this point in their petition. The petition, which is only one 
example of this sort, most clearly shows how skilful labouring people were in their discursive 
engagement with rulers. They were apparently disappointed by the privileged position given 
to the textile industry, but at the same time clever enough to not accuse all deputies, by 
distinguishing between those who wore native shoes and who did not. We see sometimes that 
these kinds of petitions were sent anonymously, but this particular one, and several others, 
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had tens of stamps on it. Apparently, the authoritarian Pahlavi government tolerated such 
criticisms as long as they did not turn into outward collective action. Thus, workers’ petitions 
call for a reconsideration of the boundaries between state and society as well as to rethink the 
limits of the authoritarian nature of the state in Iran, as elsewhere.    
Petitions provide first-hand information about many of the details of workers’ lives and living 
conditions which can rarely be found anywhere else. They also display the changing self-
perceptions of workers and their changing attitudes toward the ruling classes. But there is a 
reliability problem involved in petitions. Since petitioners’ top priority was to ensure 
responses to their cases they may at times use dissimulation. That is to say, petitioners may 
manipulate certain facts and ‘adjust’ them to fit their cases. Thus, petitions should always be 
cross checked by other sources, official and otherwise.  
 
A Brief Assessment of the Current Literature on Iranian Labour History 
Among the existing studies of this subject, Willem Floor’s Labour Unions, Law and 
Conditions in Iran, 1900-1941 is the most important work in English.
37
 By using a wide range 
of primary and secondary sources in various languages, Floor cogently describes labour 
organizations, strikes, unions and the Parliamentary discussions regarding labour regulations 
in Iran. He also touches upon such labour issues as working hours, occupational safety and 
health as well as wages and costs of living. Floor’s study is particularly important for 
providing an ample analysis of the situation of various industries in Iran between 1850 and 
1941 and the attempts at industrialization especially during the 1930’s. For example, he 
discusses in detail Iranian craft industries, the challenge posed to them by European ready-
made imports as well as the factories which have been erected in different periods. However 
Floor does not dwell on the discursive formation of the working class and bases his analysis 
on a deterministic conception of class formation and a predefined class consciousness. Thus, 
unsurprisingly Floor’s workers tended to fall short when it came to acting as a class. For 
instances he remarks: ‘the workers in general had neither the time and energy, nor the 
understanding and capability to organize labour activities let alone a labour movement’.
38
 
Thus according to him it was the Marxist intelligentsia who ‘considered labour problems as 
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being an integral part of the socio-economic and political system’.
39
 Paradoxically, although 
Floor makes repeated references to non-factory workers, which as he admits outnumbered 
factory workers, he does not recognize the same diversity when it comes to the labour 
movement. Floor seems to attribute a teleological role to the Iranian working class and to the 
labour movement whose ‘primary aim’, he argues ‘was the destruction of imperialism and 
capitalism’.
40
 Floor’s study provides an ample top-down analysis of Iranian labour by also 
emphasizing regional differences and similarities. His book continues to be an influential and 
pioneering study in the field.   
Habib Ladjevardi’s, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran is another study which should be 
mentioned.
41
 This ten-chapter volume is primarily concerned with the post-1941 period and 
only the first chapter, The Genesis of the Labour Movement, deals with the period prior to 
1941. As is clear from its title, the book is mainly concerned with organized labour. 
Ladjevardi, too, overstates the political aspects of labour and labour organizations and leaves 
hardly any room for other and non-confrontational forms of labour struggle. Yet, Ladjevardi 
not only overemphasizes the role of the labour organizations but also seems to disregard non-
organized labour and the workers who did not participate in collective actions. It is mainly for 
this reason that he draws the following conclusion about the period between 1906 and 1941: 
‘[…] without political power – as exercised in independent trade unions- the workers could 
not influence the content of economic and social reform programs nor could they ensure that 
they would receive their appropriate share in the fruits of progress.’
42
 This analysis is based 
on a recognizably reductionist perception of politics as well as on a narrow understanding of 
labour struggle.  
Mention should also be made of two studies written in Persian, namely, Farhang Qasemi’s 
Sandikalism dar Iran  (Trade Unions in Iran 1905-1941);
43
 and Jalil Mahmudi and Naser 
Sa‘idi’s joint study, Shuq-e Yak Khiz-e Boland (Towards a Subtle Rise).
44
 Qasemi’s study, 
like those of Floor and Ladjevardi, mostly deals with factory-based organized labour but he 
too, like Floor, touches upon such important issues as nutrition, sanitary conditions and 
wages. Mahmudi and Sa‘idi’s book consists of seven chapters along with an introduction and 
a conclusion. Although they refer to extra-factory labour more often, their work is also 
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another example of the old labour history paradigm written from an institutional perspective. 
Neither in these two studies nor in the other two mentioned above can we hear the voices of 
the labouring people of Iran. When workers do appear it is almost exclusively in the programs 
of leftist parties and organizations or in the lists of demands of striking workers. At any rate, 
they provide a solid groundwork upon which new studies dealing with previously 
understudied aspects of labour and using previously unexploited new sources can be 
undertaken. 
  
The Focus of the Study 
This study deals with the social history of industrialization and labour in Iran from the 
inception of the Constitutional regime in 1906 until the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. 
Along the way, special attention is paid to the textile industry and textile workers.  This study 
aims to show how workers negotiated their demands and grievances with the state and how 
petitioning functioned as the main channel of this interaction and negotiation. Although 
references are made throughout the study to workers who were employed in various 
industries, emphasis is placed, to the extent possible, on the textile industry. This was the 
largest manufacturing sector, both in terms of the total output and the workforce involved, in 
Iran, and it remained so well into the twentieth century. With the exception of the nascent oil 
industry in the south, the textile industry was among the most developed industries in Iran. 
Also, the textile industry provides a suitable case to study and question the process of 
transformation from craft industry to factory-based manufacturing. Although formal labour 
organizations and organized labour activities are discussed in this study, unlike in much of the 
existing literature on Iranian labour history, emphasis is put on informal types of labour 
organizations as well as on labour which was not organized in the format of unions. Also, 
workers’ self-perception and their perceptions about and engagement in political and 
economic processes are dealt with in this study.   
The periodization of this study calls for justification too. The starting point was defined by the 
source material used in this work, namely, petitions. Although petitioning, both written and 
verbal, was a centuries-old and accepted tradition in Iran, it was with the opening of the First 
Parliament in 1906 that it was established as a legal right and received relatively systematic 
treatment. The decision to end this research with the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 
stemmed from two interrelated reasons. First, the political, social and economic landscape in 
17 
 
the post-1941 period was recognizably different from the period prior to it. Roughly from 
1906 to 1925, Iran remained a non-industrialized country, but workers, as well as other 
classes, enjoyed relative freedom, while from 1925 until 1941, things started to develop in the 
other direction. Thus when Mohammad Reza Shah replaced his father in 1941 Iran had made 
significant progress towards industrialization, but more than a decade had passed with highly 
authoritarian policies which left little, if any, space for open protest and collective labour 
action. However the post-1941 period witnessed an immense proliferation of political and 
labour organizations. It is because of the great quantity of sources produced by and about the 
organizations and movements which flourished during this period that it happened to attract 
the greater part of attention from historians who concentrated on Iranian labour history. And 
this constituted the second reason to stop at 1941.  
 
The Plan of the Study 
The study consists of four chapters. Chapter-2 presents an historical background of the 19
th
 
century, insofar as it relates to the period investigated in this work. Here, mention is made of 
the reform movement which mainly started in the military sphere as a reaction of successive 
defeats at the hands of Russia, but then extended, in the following decades, to include the 
political, economic and social spheres as well. The economic and social aspects of the reforms 
are particularly emphasized here. It is argued in this chapter that the popular support for the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1906 was due to epidemic diseases, famines, unpopular 
economic policies of the Court as well as stifling foreign economic domination. A coalition of 
merchants, tradesmen, craftsmen, religious groups and intellectuals were responsible for the 
uncompromising movement against arbitrary Qajar rule. This was most clearly reflected in the 
Tobacco Protest of 1891. The significance of this protest for labouring people stemmed from 
the fact that the craft workers experienced or witnessed for the first time the possibility of 
affecting the Government’s policies through resistance. 
Chapter-3 deals with an overview of the period extending from the Constitutional Revolution 
in 1906 to the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. Here attention is especially paid to the 
emergence of a new political community in Iran, particularly among labouring people, in its 
shifting forms. In the First National Assembly opened for the first time in country’s history in 
1906, six classes (tabaqat), including guild members, were represented in the Parliament. 
Their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities are discussed in this chapter. The class-
18 
 
based election system was abolished before the elections for the Second Parliament in 1909. 
This however did not mean the end of the participation of the labouring people in the making 
of the political community in Iran. To this end, mention is also made of petitioning a peculiar 
channel of state-society interaction in Iran from the Constitutional Revolution onwards, 
although petitioning as such had been a centuries-old established tradition in the country. 
Also, the failure of the constitutional experiment in 1911 and the emergence of authoritarian 
modernization within about a decade are analysed from a grassroots perspective. In the main, 
it is argued in this chapter that, disillusioned by the constitutional experiment's failure to 
provide employment, establish security and form a national economy with minimum foreign 
influence, Iranian subaltern groups, along with other classes, had become receptive to a 
strong, though not necessarily despotic, state. The steady rise to power of Reza Khan from 
1921 until his coronation as the Shah in 1925 partly met some of these expectations. However 
his uncompromising centralization policies claimed the previously more or less autonomous 
realms from which Iranian subalterns made their living with little state intervention. 
Combined with the mechanized factory-based economic policies from the mid-1925s on, 
Iranian subalterns increasingly felt uneasy with the new regime and enjoyed almost no 
betterment in their living and working conditions.  
Chapter-4 examines Iranian industrialization between 1906 and 1941. It first analyses popular 
perceptions of economic development and reactions to foreign ready-made imports. 
Following this, Iranian industries until the industrial leap-forward of 1903s are discussed by 
emphasizing small-scale and artisanal industries. The tension between promoting the craft 
industries and introducing factory-based industrialization is referred to in the chapter. It then 
discusses the factory-based industrialization which started in the late 1920’s and gained 
unprecedented speed during the 1930’s. Along the way, however, attention is paid to how 
workers, as well as other classes, were involved in this process and how they perceived 
industrialization policies. Throughout the chapter, emphasis is pun on the textile industry, 
while other industries are also mentioned when relevant.  Chapter-5 deals with the discursive 
formation of the Iranian working class and labour issues. The chapter first examines how 
workers came to see themselves primarily as workers and how they gradually developed a 
language of their own. Following this discussion, such issues as the nature of Iranian labour, 
labour legislation and working and sanitary conditions are also discussed in this chapter. 
Throughout the chapter not only central politics, but also provincial politics are considered. In 
the process, attention is paid to workers’ impact on and reactions to the labour policies 
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adopted by the state. Chapter 6 contains some concluding assessments and suggestions for 




Chapter Two: From the Consolidation of the Qajar Monarchy to the 
Constitutional Revolution: Iran in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Introduction   
Political, economic and social developments which took place throughout the 19
th
 century in 
Iran paved the way for the Constitutional Revolution at the turn of the 20
th
 century and played 
major roles in shaping the subsequent history of the country. It is thus necessary to provide an 
overview, albeit a brief one, of this period. This chapter outlines the 19
th
 century historical 
background of Iran, emphasizing its economic and social and political aspects. In the 
following pages, economic developments are handled with a special emphasis on the crafts 
industries and their development in the context of European economic penetration. Following 
this discussion is a consideration of social developments and the state of Iranian society at the 
turn of the 20
th
 century, when our narrative of the social history of Iranian textile labour 
begins. The chapter ends with concluding remarks about the 19
th
 century.   
Under Qajar rule, the foundations of modern Iran were laid. Thus, ‘the history of nineteenth 
century Persia forms a bridge between the medieval and the modern periods’
1
. The century 
was marked by political, economic and social developments out of which several ideological 
currents emerged. Due to both internal circumstances and external influences, several 
ideologies emerged in Iran which ranged from nationalism to socialism and from Islamism to 
anti-clericalism. Yet it was, above all else, constitutionalism that changed the course of the 
Iranian history. Rather than being a distinct ideology, constitutionalism was an amalgam of 
many ideologies, and it brought together otherwise conflicting groups. The outbreak of the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1905 significantly weakened the Qajar monarchy, which was to 
disappear at the end of the first quarter of the century. All of these developments had 
important societal consequences and significantly transformed Iranian society.  
 
Reforms under the Shadow of Arms: Military, Politics and Reforms in Iran 1813-1848 
With the decline of Safavid rule in 1736, a period of tribal conflict ensued in Iran during 
which several tribes struggled for power. Throughout the period, the country remained 
disturbed and fragmented and the main power bases changed hands at relatively short 
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intervals between the Afsharids, Zands and Qajars. The instability ended a few years before 
the turn of the 19
th
 century, with Agha Mohammad Khan’s rise to ultimate power in 1796 as 
the founder of the Qajar dynasty. The Qajar tribe had been one of the original components of 
the Safavid Qizilbash confederacy.
2
 Having remained a hostage of Karim Khan Zand in 
Shiraz, the capital of the Zand dynasty (1751-1794), for almost twenty years, Agha 
Mohammad Khan closely observed the advance of Zand power which he was soon to replace 
with his own. The turning point was in 1779, when upon Karim Khan’s death Agha 
Mohammad Khan escaped from Shiraz to his homeland, Mazandaran. After gradually 
consolidating his power in the Alborz region he moved further to central Persia and captured 
Fars and Kerman. He reached to the peak of his rule by extending his control over Georgia 
and Khorasan. Soon after he became the almost undisputed ruler of Iran, Agha Mohammad 
Khan was stabbed to death by his servants in 1797. In 1798 Fath Ali Khan, Agha Mohammad 
Khan’s nephew, crowned himself Shah and became the second Qajar Shah, after his uncle, 
who had been castrated in boyhood by the enemies of his father and thus had no male heir.  
By the time Fath Ali Shah died after his nearly four decade-long reign, the country had 
suffered the devastating consequences of two bitter defeats at the hand of Russians, and the 
burden of subsequent treaties. The first war between Iran and Russia started with the Russian 
invasion of the Caucasian parts of Iran in 1804 and lasted, though intermittently, for nine 
years until 1813. Even though Fath Ali Shah personally took part in the battles, the greater 
part of the war was commanded by Abbas Mirza, the heir apparent and the prince-governor of 
Azarbaijan. He was deservedly regarded by many European observers ‘as the one man 
capable of initiating a national revival’.
3
 In 1809 the Shah obtained a fatwa from the mullahs 
who declared holy war (jihad) against the Russians and proclaimed that ‘the king of the 
Muslims is in this battle a ghazi fighting the Holy War’ and urged Muslims to take part in this 
war claiming that the participants in the war would merit remission of their sins on the Day of 
the Judgement.
4
 The war was not a complete military disaster for Iran from the beginning 
until the end. Quite to the contrary, Iran proved successful from time to time during long-
lasting fights. However in 1812, the defeat of Napoleon, whom the Russians had been 
fighting for some time, enabled Russia to allocate greater resources to the Caucasian front. 
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The difference between the modern, well-equipped and disciplined Russian troops and the 
tribal forces of Iran was decisive. In the end, Iran had to accept a humiliating peace treaty 
known as Treaty of Golestan signed in 1813. According to the treaty Iran lost many of its 
Caucasian provinces: Qarabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku, Georgia and parts of Talesh. Also, 
Russia gained the exclusive right to have warships on the Caspian Sea, which left Iranian 
shores vulnerable to Russian attack. In addition to these conditions, Russian recognition 
would be necessary for legitimate succession to the Persian throne. 
The treaty satisfied none of the parties and Abbas Mirza, who did not consider it as a 
definitive settlement, prepared for the next war. News about Russian misconduct against 
Muslims in the lost territories drove large numbers of Muslims, and even Georgian Christians, 
into exile in Iran.
5
 Finally in 1826 a new fatwa was issued which declared that opposition to 
the jihad was a ‘sign of unbelief’.
6
 Abbas Mirza was confident in his newly organized army, 
under the nezam-e jadid (The New Order). Yet, Iranian troops could not hold out for long 
against the Russians who secured a decisive outcome after a short struggle. The subsequent 
Treaty of Turkomanchai signed in 1828 only added to the disaster brought about by the 
previous treaty. On top of the previous territorial losses, the khanates of Erivan and 
Nakhchivan were lost to Russia. Iran had to pay Russia a huge sum, 20,000,000 roubles, as a 
war indemnity. Further diplomatic and economic privileges given to Russia were also among 
the terms of the treaty. The economic aspects of this treaty will be dealt with in the following 
sections. Suffice it to say, however, that the treaty determined for a long time the basic frames 
of Russo-Iranian economic relations. In political terms, the wars fought against Russia and the 
two treaties dealt major blows to Iran and its newly founded dynasty. The last but not the least 
important consequence of the post-Turkomanchai status quo was the ever-increasing 
influence of Russia over Iran, a phenomenon which was to bring about far reaching 
consequences in the political, economic and cultural spheres in the decades to follow.     
Despite his ambitious military reforms, Abbas Mirza’s army fell short of expectations during 
the fights against the Russians. The defeats at the hands of the Russians were both the reason 
for and the result of the strikingly inadequate attention given by Qajar Shahs to the creation of 
a modern military force similar to those created by the neighbouring Ottomans from late 18
th
 
century onwards, or by Mohammad Ali of Egypt in early 19
th
 century. Russian-officered 
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Cossack Brigades, formed rather late in the century, remained the only serious and disciplined 
military force for a long time. Nonetheless, Abbas Mirza’s reform program was not restricted 
to the military sphere and his legacy was to leave its mark on the rest of the century. He was 
the first Iranian ruler to send students abroad. Their goal was to professionalize mostly 
military-related affairs and institutions, but the graduates also brought back with them 
European ideas and material culture, such as the printing press and the newspaper. 
Westernization had made its way into Iran, but how it could be accommodated to the native 
culture was yet to be determined. Fath Ali Shah’s death and that of the heir apparent one year 
earlier secured Mohammad Mirza a peaceful accession to the throne with the support of the 
British and the consent of Russia. Mohammad Shah reigned from 1834 until 1848. Russia had 
already made their power felt in Iran and Britain was soon to join it. With the two treaties 
signed in 1836 and 1841 between Iran and Britain, the British gained the same privileges 
previously conceded to the Russians, plus the status of one of the ‘Most Favoured Nations’. 
The rivalry between the two Great Powers of the time for exercising influence on Iran brought 
about two diverse consequences. On the one hand it prolonged the life of the Qajar dynasty, 
whose ruling elite came to excel in balancing one power against the other.
7
 Although Iran has 
never officially become a colony of either of the two powers the degree of the foreign 
presence in this country made its independence, especially in economic terms, questionable. 
Consequently the Qajar dynasty fell further into disfavour once the patriotic, and later 
nationalist, feelings merged with heightened anti-imperialism amongst the higher and lower 
classes of society. This paved the way for a number of major political, social and economic 
developments which characterized Naser al-Din Shah’s reign (1848-1896).  
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From Reform to Revolution: The Age of Ambivalent Reforms and the Coming of the 
Constitutional Revolution 1848-1905 
 
Naser al-Din Shah’s reign, particularly in its early years, was marked by a series of reforms 
mainly launched by his prime-minister Mirza Taqi Khan, who was also known as Amir Kabir. 
During his tenure between 1848 and 1852 Amir Kabir undertook a series of reforms similar to 
those of Abbas Mirza which the former had personally witnessed during his early career in 
Tabriz.
8
 He opened modern schools, and in 1851 founded the dar al-fonun, (the House of 
Sciences), and took several initiatives to promote native industries.
9
 Amir Kabir’s reforms 
were multidimensional and included almost every aspect of the political, military, economic 
and cultural spheres. In many respects he was a typical ambitious modernist Muslim 
statesman like Sultan Mahmud II in Istanbul or Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt. The 
implementation of his far reaching reform program required the adoption of sound economic 
measures to ensure economic development and directing extra revenue to the state treasury. In 
the mid-19
th
 century another important development took place in Iran and it brought about 
many important long term consequences. A young merchant from Shiraz named Sayyid 
Mohammad Ali using reinterpretation of Traditions concerning the Hidden Imam, proclaimed 
the coming of a new age and himself as the Bab (Gate) to the Hidden Imam, the Twelfth 
Imam in Twelver Shiism, whom he promised was soon to arrive.10 Despite clerical opposition, 
Naser al-Din Shah did not take any attempt against the movement in the beginning. The Bab 
was executed in 1850, yet the turning point came in 1852 when a few of his followers were 
accused of an assassination plot against the Shah. Babis were persecuted and many were 
executed, including the female poet-leader Qorrat al-Ayn. Out of Babism emerged Bahaism, 
preached in 1860s by Baha-Allah, who claimed to be ‘He whom God shall make manifest’ as 
promised by the Bab. In some respects, the movement had reformist ideas but from an Islamic 
point of view their teaching triggered severe criticism.  
When Amir Kabir was first dismissed in 1851 and then executed in 1852, his reform program 
was also set aside. The unpopular Mirza Agha Khan Nuri was appointed as prime minister 
until 1858 when he was dismissed by the Shah, who was dissatisfied with his lax conduct in 
office. From this time until the early 1870s Naser al-Din Shah ruled without a prime minister, 
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first through a number of ministries and then through a consultative body he established in 
1859 which included princes, notables, mullahs, clerks and officials.
11
 In 1871 the Shah 
appointed Mirza Hosayn Khan, Moshir al-Dawleh the Sepahsalar as prime minister. Coming 
from a successful career at the Iranian Foreign Service he had closely observed the Ottoman 
reform movement from 1856 onwards and was in close contact with such reformists as Fath 
Ali Akhundzadeh and Malkom Khan. A true successor to Amir Kabir, Moshir al-Dawleh 
undertook a series of reforms, mostly administrative, in order to secure a rational 
administration and end corruption that was very common both in the centre and the provinces. 
His reform program faced resistance from courtiers as well as from the clergy, and his 
opponents finally succeeded in having him dismissed in 1873. Following the dismissal of 
Moshir al-Dawleh, a period of more arbitrary rule by the Shah started.  
Unpopular policies, particularly those related to the economy, further alienated diverse 
segments of society and intensified discussions about restricting the despotic powers of the 
monarch. A number of concessions granted to foreign nationals from the early 1870s onwards 
were what pulled on the trigger. In fact, this economic policy was not the creation of Naser al-
Din Shah alone. After the attempts to promote native industries by Mirza Abbas and Amir 
Kabir failed to amount to much, a period began when the main financial policy was to secure 
as much cash as possible from customs duties and foreign investment. This policy was the 
major point of contention not only between Abbas Mirza and Naser al-Din Shah, but also 
between the two reformist chief ministers, namely Amir Kabir and Moshir al-Dawleh. As 
Nikki Keddie observes, although Amir Kabir believed in and acted to provide a development 
policy independent of Britain and Russia, Moshir al-Dawleh favoured British involvement in 
Iran’s protection and development.
12
 He was a strong supporter of the famous Reuter 
Concession, granted to the British subject Julius de Reuter, which he helped persuade the 
Shah to sign in 1872.
13
 This concession described by Lord Curzon, himself an economic and 
political imperialist, as “the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial 
resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that had probably ever been dreamed of”.
14
 He was 
hardly exaggerating. As a matter of fact the concession mainly granted Reuter the right to 
build a railway from the Caspian ports southward, but it also included exclusive rights to the 
erection of factories, processing minerals, undertaking irrigation works, launching agricultural 
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improvements, and developing new forms of transport.
15
 Internal opposition, Russian 
hostility, and the lack of British support brought about the end of the concession. Apart from 
political and economic implications, the movement against the concession was in a sense a 
dress-rehearsal of the Tobacco Protest which was to take place less than two decades later. 
Maybe for the first time in modern Iranian history a heterogeneous group ranging from the 
notables to mullahs and from intellectuals to common people united, though on a small-scale, 
for a common cause.
16
  
A similar oppositional coalition came on the scene again in early 1890s. This time the Shah 
granted in 1890 a complete monopoly over the production, sale and export of all Iranian 
tobacco to a British subject, Major Gerald Talbot, for fifty years. This concession was not 
essentially different from the previous concession attempts of the Shah. Yet the ensuing mass 
opposition movement, which is justifiably described as ‘a prelude to the Constitutional 
Revolution’
17
 was not only broader in scope than the movement against the Reuter 
concession, but was also operationally more effective. The concession was kept secret for a 
while until late in 1890, when the newspaper Akhtar, published in Istanbul, disclosed the 
agreement. Tobacco was widely grown in Iran, profiting many cultivators, landlords, 
shopkeepers, and exporters, along with mullahs who had close contacts with many of these 
groups. On the strength of the Treaty of Turkomancahi, Russia protested against not only this 
particular concession but any concession to be given to foreigners.
18
 From early 1891 
onwards a series of protests, some of them rather bloody, took place in various cities of the 
country. Clerical opposition was further emphasized by a subsequent fatwa by Hajj Mirza 
Hasan Shirazi, a prominent mullah, which denounced the concession in the following words: 
“In the name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tobacco in whatever 
fashion, is tantamount to war against the Imam of the Age [the Hidden Imam], may God 
hasten his glad advent.”
19
 
With protests already underway, the fatwa further contributed to the agitation. Smoking was 
abandoned altogether, reportedly even by the wives of the Shah and by non-Muslims too, and 
the bazaars closed down. The concession was finally abolished early in 1892 with a cost of £ 
500,000 to be paid as compensation to the company which the government borrowed from the 
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British-owned Imperial Bank as the first Qajar foreign loan. The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92 
was a turning point in many ways. From a societal viewpoint, Iranians were once again 
convinced that ‘the Shah and his government were selling the country to unbelievers’ and thus 
they should keep an eye on the government's policies.
20
 Besides, the common ‘enemy’— the 
foreigner—became more manifest than ever, a phenomenon which was to become one of the 
main components of the oppositional discourse in almost every major disturbance in Iran in 
the decades to follow. Finally, although a relatively quiet period followed the protests, the 
government’s tobacco policy further paved the way for constitutionalist demands and the 
success of the protests reinforced popular perception as to the utility of collective action. 
Naser al-Din Shah was assassinated in 1896 and his son Mozaffar al-Din succeeded him to the 
throne. The discontent accumulated especially during the last decades of the 19
th
 century 
could find during Mozaffar al-Din’s reign a rather favourable atmosphere for collective 
action, which brought about the Constitutional Revolution in 1905.     
 
Economy and Society in 19
th
 Century  
Geographical factors had an immense influence on Iran’s demographic and economic 
development. A lack of navigable rivers and lakes, shortage of rainfall, and a vast central 
desert surrounded by four formidable mountain ranges—the Zagros, the Alborz, the Mekran 
and the Uplands—fragmented the population into secluded villages, isolated towns and 
nomadic tribes.
21
 Although there are no reliable demographic statistics on 19
th
 century Iran, it 
is estimated that while the population was around 5-6 million in the beginning of the century, 
by the early 20
th
 century it had increased to some 10 million.
22
 It is obvious that greater part 
of the population lived in rural areas and the nomadic portion of the population was 
significant. Tribal nomadic population, on the other hand, fell from perhaps as high as 50 
percent in 1800 to 33 percent by 1850 and to 25 percent by 1914.
23
 In the absence of any 
significant transportation or communication facilities, geographic and demographic factors 
had important political and economic consequences. They prevented the emergence of a high 
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degree of centralization similar to what took place in the contemporary Ottoman Empire or 
Egypt.
24
 This left tribal elements enough space not only to manage their own internal affairs 
but also to rule over the villages within their territories.
25
 Geographic fragmentation also 
made the creation of an efficient country-wide market impossible. Thus even at the turn of the 
twentieth century ‘Iran could in no way be regarded as a single economic unit’.
26
 The most 
disastrous consequences of the physical isolation of the region were to be seen in the 
catastrophic famines during which while, in one region, thousands lost their lives to hunger, 
another region enjoyed relative prosperity.    
Iran remained an agricultural economy well into the twentieth century. The population was 
divided into various classes, mainly the landed upper class, propertied middle class, urban 
wage-earners, and rural population.
27
 As for the third and the fourth classes, and for the 
second also to some extent, major dislocations took place throughout the century for several 
reasons. Most importantly the increasing commodification of agriculture displaced many 
peasants from their lands and deprived them of even the essentials for their living. On the 
other hand, in the absence of any effective tariff protection or any notable economic policy to 
promote native production, increasing European economic penetration destroyed many 
handicrafts industries and native manufactures. As a result, the number of the urban 
unemployed increased during the century. 
 
Land, Industry and Labour 
Nineteenth century Persia is sometimes loosely described as feudal. Although it was, strictly 
speaking, a medieval European phenomenon, the term feudalism is used for Persia because it 
effectively explains the power structure based on the possession of land and the fragmentation 
of authority, leading to disorder, that was common in Qajar Iran. Yet Iran’s feudalism was 
more apparent than real. In principle “feudalism is a form of clientage that has been given 
sanction in law”.
28
 Therefore, although the Qajar Iran did carry some of the characteristics of 
a feudal society it was not feudal in the technical sense.
29
 Nonetheless, both the economy of 
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the country and the livelihood of the populace continued to be land-based. Suffice it to say 
that more than four fifths of the total population was engaged in agriculture.
30
 Four main 
categories of land were recognized according to the nature of ownership or the mode of its 
exploitation. The first was private property (melk, pl. amlak), second was the crown land 
(khaleseh pl. khalesat), the third category was the land immobilized for charitable or other 
purposes (waqf, pl. awqaf) and the fourth and the last was dead land (mavat) with no owner or 
abandoned land (bayerat) which was fallen out of cultivation.
31
 Unsurprisingly, the changes 
in the land regime as well as the shifts in the cultivated crops had remarkable economic and 
social consequences. Also large landowners, whether they inherited or purchased their land, 
or obtained it by dubious means, played important roles throughout the century and later. 
Peasants worked the land and paid a rent in cash or kind. Or otherwise, they cultivated it 
under a crop-sharing agreement (mozara‘eh) details of which were largely determined by 
local customs. If a landowner rented his land or farmed it on a moqata‘eh contract or he was 
granted a toyul, without tax-immunity, he was responsible for the payment of the government 
tax. Otherwise the taxes were collected by provincial governors.
32
  
Throughout the nineteenth century considerable demographic fluctuations occurred in Iran. 
Cholera and plague, which appeared several times in several regions during the century, along 
with other epidemic diseases, famines and other natural calamities were both the causes and 
results of poor agricultural methods.
33
 They in turn resulted not only in the depopulation of 
many villages and districts, but also severely hurt non-agricultural activities, particularly those 
based on agricultural produce. Thus, the workforce released from agriculture fell into further 
misery without any viable prospect in urban industries, which did not fare any better.   
The concept ‘industry’ is, at least in the Iranian context, far from self-explanatory. If we 
follow the division of industrial vs. pre-industrial we should then be cautious as to how to 
describe Iranian manufacturing before the introduction of factory-based production to the 
country, which took place through the end of the period covered in this study. Generally 
speaking, in Persian literature, the native manufacturing was called san‘at/industry or 
herfeh/craft. Iran had a historically and technically well-established system of traditional 
artisanal industry, mainly concentrated in such cities as Isfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kashan, 
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Kerman, Tabriz, Hamadan and Rasht. Production mostly took place in enterprises employing 
less than 10 persons
34
 using manual power or very simple equipment. The workforce 
consisted, almost as a rule, of a master, a few journeymen, and some young unskilled 
assistants. The product was usually sold where it was produced. This type of manufacturing 
was organized around guilds (senf- pl. asnaf) which can be defined as “group[s] of 
townspeople engaged in the same trade or craft, who elect their own chief and who pay guild 
taxes; this group having economical, social, fiscal and political functions”.
35
 The main 
characteristic feature of a guild is the guild tax or collective tax which a guild’s members 
collectively paid to the Government. As Willem Floor also points out, despite their 
significance, there is not adequate literature on guilds compared to, for example, the Egyptian 
or Ottoman cases, even though guilds attracted the greater part of attention given to Iranian 
manufacturing history.
36
 Furthermore, as Donald Quataert rightly observes for the Ottoman 
case, in their study of Ottoman manufacturing most observers considered only two forms of 
industrial activities. “To them”, says Quataert, “manufacturing was visible only when it was 
urban-based and either guild-organized or located in a factory setting.”
37
 The same holds true 
for Iran. Leaving aside the discussions of factory-based manufacturing for later sections, one 
can argues that the reason for and the consequence of this approach was the underestimation 
of the manufacturing capacity of rural settings which, needless to say, is very hard to 
investigate.  
A comprehensive analysis of guilds falls outside of the scope of this study, as do the technical 
aspects of manufacturing history in Iran. Nonetheless, the crises in industrial manufactories 
had significant social, economic, and political consequences, requiring a further discussion of 
this transformation. It is important to emphasize from the beginning that when guild-based 
production was gradually losing ground to foreign ready-made imports especially from the 
mid-19
th
 century, manufacturing as a whole found survival strategies via different avenues. 
Before moving on to the analysis of these strategies we should first investigate the nature of 
this foreign economic penetration.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
It is often stated that European economic penetration was the main cause of Iran’s economic 
misfortune and the further decadence of its native manufacturing. Although the genesis of this 
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penetration is hard to determine, the assertion seems to have gained universal acceptance.
38
 
Not only did later generations of historians hold this view but also, as Charles Issawi states, 
contemporary accounts attest to it.
39
 In order to be able to judge European impact on the 19
th
 
century Iranian economy as a whole and on the traditional crafts in particular we should first 
draw a picture of economic activities during the century. As a matter of fact, determining the 
European impact is important in order to trace the production capacity of artisanal 
manufacturing in Iran during the 19
th
 century. This latter point is usually dealt with in terms 
of the decline of Iranian crafts. A perception of decline in the face of European imports seems 
to exist among the contemporary Iranians. Thus, European economic penetration gradually 
produced some sort of an anti-foreigner attitude amongst Iranians who in time came to accuse 
Europeans (farang) for the economic misfortunes and later for the political evils befalling 
them. This perception became widespread, and endured through the rest of Iranian history. 
Nevertheless instead of looking for the traces and the effects of economic decline, it is better 
to investigate how Iranian manufacturers survived this increasing European economic 
penetration. The fact that Iranian crafts continued to exist well into the 20
th
 century calls for 
special attention to the survival strategies of craftsmen who somehow maintained their 
position in the domestic market.   
Iran’s economic contact with Europe did not start in the 19
th
 century, nor was it a peculiarity 
of the Qajar era. Yet, following the relatively chaotic atmosphere of the post-Safavid period, 
the country achieved some stability under Qajar rule in a time which coincided with the 
increasing economic role of Europe worldwide. The European economic impact was 
consolidated with the Treaties of Golestan and Turkomanchai, which provided that both 
Russian imports into Iran and exports from it would pay a 5% ad valorem duty. These treaties 
determined the administrative framework of the expansion of Iran’s trade.
40
 Russia was soon 
followed by Britain which with the two treaties signed in 1836 and 1841 gained the same 
privileges, and furthermore became one of the ‘Most Favoured Nations’.
41
 Along with their 
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economic aspirations in Iran, both Russia and Britain did not hesitate to block Iran’s 
development in order to curb each other’s influence over the country. For example, when the 
famous Reuter concession had to be cancelled by Naser al-Din Shah due to Russian and 
Iranian opposition, the British in return used this cancellation as a pretext to block Russian 
railway concessions. The Russians then signed a secret agreement with Iran blocking the 
construction of railways in that country for ten years.
42 
Although European imports did not take control of Iranian markets overnight, and for a time 
Iranian merchants benefitted from the low customs duties on imports, especially to Russia, 
Iranian handicrafts were soon to be badly hurt by the increasing inflow of ready-made goods. 
Tariff protection could no longer be used to shelter native manufactures against the unequal 
competition of European machine-made goods. During the rest of the century a sharp rise was 
experienced in imports. Textiles came at the top of the list of imports, particularly cotton 
goods which by the 1850s accounted for some two-thirds of total imports.
43
 Both Russian and 
British, and later on Indian, merchants increasingly adapted themselves to Iranians’ demands 
and started to produce manufactures to local taste, while on the other hand, “a taste for 
European goods [was] but arising” as Fraser observed as early as 1820s.
44
 Since textiles were 
most affected by European competition, it is useful to analyse the state of the industry during 
this period.  
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Textile Industry during the 19
th
 Century 
Textile basically refers to any industrial activity that involves spinning, weaving, or both. The 
textile industry, with its various branches, has historically been among the most widespread 
and the most developed industries in Iran. It was not only a source of livelihood for 
professional craftsmen but it also provided a substantial additional income for many Iranian 
cultivators. Wool and linen were the fibres that have been used in the Iranian textile industry 
for ages, whereas cotton was a relative newcomer to the industry, coming into widespread use 
only in the early medieval period.
45
 The finest of all fibres used in the Iranian textile industry, 
however, was silk.
46
  Each fibre had its own phases of processing until it was spun and 
became ready for weaving.
47
 Once a fibre was spun into thread it was then dyed by either 
natural or by aniline dyestuffs. The transition from natural to aniline dyestuffs late in the 19
th
 
century was at first a painful one which reduced the quality of Iranian textiles. Yet, with the 
improvement of synthetic dyestuffs and the increasing ability of Iranians to use them 
properly, synthetics became more and more widespread.
48
 Between 1500 and 1925 some 90 
textile crafts were operative in Iran.
49
 Kashan, Yazd, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad were the 
main textile centres as far as urban production is concerned.      
Based on the Bourgin model of production activities in pre-industrial Europe, Floor classifies 
each type of manufacturing activity for Qajar Iran as follows: 
a. The small, mostly, family operated workshop which was the most frequent industrial 
activity that one found in Qajar Iranian cities. These workshops usually had one 
master with 2-3 journeymen and some unskilled helpers. There was neither division of 
labour nor specialization in the process. All parts of a product were made inside the 
workshop and put together to make a final product. Often the workshop was not only 
the site of production but also the location of sale of the product. In Isfahan, in the 
1850s, there were many hundreds of workshops located in the covered bazaars, the 
total length of which was 3 miles. 
b. Scattered, but interconnected, workshops. Here there was specialization of process and 
one artisan produced only an intermediate product, for another artisan, and the last one 
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in the production line would make the final product. The textile industry is a good 
example of this type of workshop. After the wool (or cotton or silk) had been 
purchased, it was carded, spun, washed, dyed, and then woven. Finally, the cloth 
would get a final processing such as printing or tailoring.  
c. Concentrated manufactories were less prevalent in Iran. This type of manufacture was 
basically a large building where all parts of the production process and its labour force 
were brought together. This allowed an increase of productivity and better quality 
control. Also, the use of mechanical devices such as water or animal operated 
mills/machinery was possible. This applied, for example, to the leather industry where 
all processes were as a rule carried out in the same workshops.  
d. Finally, factories that were equipped with machinery that allowed even higher 
productivity and better quality control than the previous industrial categories. In fact 
they allowed, comparatively speaking, mass production of the final product. As of the 
1850s, we see that a number of such factories were established in Iran.
50
  
These four categories coexisted during the 19
th
 century. Besides, although the first two were 





 The textile industry was among the few in which division of labour prevailed as a 
crucial principle. The industry was organized around guilds in towns. Despite regionally and 
professionally variant features, guilds commonly enjoyed some fundamental characteristics. 
Namely, a guild protected the monopoly of its members’ occupation, with certain rules being 
established for those who practiced this occupation. A newcomer held his training within the 
guild and workmanship was standardized in a certain way. Also, there was a sense of 
solidarity among the members of a guild, who assisted each other in times of need. Apart 
from these professional functions, a guild also was a channel of communication between its 
members and political bodies. Lastly, socially speaking, guilds played religious and 
ceremonial functions in Iranian society.
52
      
The internal structure of a guild was based on certain rules which were not always clear, and 
thus showed variation. For example, a master would receive the right to set up a shop (haqq-e 
bonicheh) from a city’s mayor (qalantar). The Kalantar held monthly meetings with the head 
of certain crafts such as bakers, butchers and grocers to set the minimum prices of the 
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products sold by these guilds. The elders of a guild (rish safidan) were responsible for the 
smooth functioning of guilds. Throughout the nineteenth century guilds maintained a tenuous 
and fluid position in the face of political and economic developments to which they proved 
highly vulnerable. On the one hand, they continued their regional economic activities, while 
on the other hand wider economic developments, such as increasing foreign imports, 
developed among guildsmen a certain sense of common action. However, the more federated 
the guilds became, the more political their roles turned out to be. During the early twentieth 
century, for example, guilds constituted themselves into anjomans which were to play 
important political roles during the Constitutional Revolution and for a short while in its 
aftermath. In Tehran alone seventy anjomans were established by guilds and later formed into 
a central council (anjoman-e markazi-e asnaf).
53
   
The observations of E. K. Abbot in the mid-19
th
 century show not only that Iranian 
handicrafts were not in a state of decay despite the setbacks caused by increasing imports, but 
also that textiles played a major role in urban handicraft industry.
54
 Main artisanal Iranian 
towns enjoyed, at that time, a relatively lively economic atmosphere. The following examples 
from his report suffice to illustrate this point: Kashan with its 30,000 inhabitants had 27 
caravanserais, 770 shops, 130 merchants; 80 coppersmiths, 800 silk looms; `a great deal` of 
cotton twist spun, 1,500 mule-loads having been sent to Astrakhan alone in 1848. Isfahan had 
28 caravanserais, 340 traders; 200 silk looms, `the manufacture of cotton goods is carried to a 
great extent, and affords occupation to many of the inhabitants of the town and surrounding 
villages`.
55
 Yazd with its 35,000-40,000 inhabitants had 250 merchants; 2,200 shawl 
manufacturing looms, 220 woollen looms, producing £40,000-45,000 worth of goods 
“exclusive of that about 325 looms belonging to 9 villages around, valued at Tomans 15,000 
(£7,000) more”.
56 
Also, writing in 1889, Curzon states that there were in Mashad 650 silk looms and 320 shawl 
looms and in Tabriz 116 caravanserais and 3,922 shops while in 1870 Kerman had 80 cotton 
factories and 6 “really good carpet factories” and in the mid-nineteenth century had had “as 
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many as 1,800 silk factories employing 9,000 hands …”
57
 At the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth there were 1,000 shawl looms in Kerman with an 
annual export of 300,000 tumans; 200 woollen looms in Nain and 300 in Kerman. Kashan had 
200 silk looms with a monthly output of 400 pieces while there were in Yazd 400 workshops 
with 2,000 looms. Mashhad had 100 shops with 200 looms. Nishapur had 16 shops with 3 to 4 




We need detailed monographs on the history of guild-based labour about which we currently 
know only a little. It is safe to suggest, however, that generally speaking their living 
conditions escalated during the nineteenth century and many guildsmen lost their jobs and 
turned into labourers.
59
 For example in Yazd in 1895 the bulk of weavers received from ½ 
qran to 2. ½ qrans for a twelve-hour working day.
60
 Thus, the average purchasing power of a 
worker was as follows: 
Table 1.1: The Daily Purchasing Power of a Weaver in Yazd in 1895
61
 
                                                                    Daily Wage 
                                                         ½ qran                                           2. ½ qrans 
 
Rice                                                   0.5 lb.  [0.23 kg.]                  2.7 lb.  [1.22 kg.] 
Bread                                                 2 lb.     [0.91 kg.]                  10  lb.  [4.54 kg.] 
Meat                                                  0.8 lb.   [0.36 kg.]                 4  lb.    [1.81 kg.] 
Sugar                                                 0.35 lb. [0.16  kg.]                1.8 lb.   [0.82 kg.] 
Cheese                                               0.65 lb. [0.29 kg. ]               3.25 lb   [1.47 kg.] 
Eggs (no.)                                             20                                         100  
  
Source: J. R Preece, CR ‘Isfahan and Yazd’, in PAP 1869 lxxxviii, quoted by Ahmad Seyf, “Iranian Textile 
Handicrafts”, 56.  
 
Apart from urban-based production the manufacturing of textiles in rural settings was also 
significant, and was gradually integrated into more organized and disciplined manufacturing 
processes via putting-out networks. Yet, considering the inadequate documentation of guilds 
there is little chance of finding any notable data on rural manufacturing activities. Thus in 
                                                          
57
 Curzon, Persia, I: 167, 521 and 2: 242, 245; see also Tomara pp. 26-27. Quoted in Issawi, Economic history of 
Iran,  268. 
58
 Issawi, Economic history of Iran, 268. 
59
 Keddie, Nikki, Roots of Revolution, P. 63 
60 
About 2.5 old pence and about 12 old pence or one shilling respectively. Ahmad Seyf, “Iranian Textile 
Handicrafts in the Nineteenth Century: A Note”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 49-58, 
here  P. 56  
61 
Kgs are added by me and 1 pound is calculated at 0.454 kilo grams.   
37 
 
most cases we have to base our arguments on impressionistic evidence rather than sound hard 
data. However, bearing in mind the predominantly agrarian nature of Iranian society which 
endured throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, mention should be 
made of this production. Quite late in the 19
th
 century a report by the British political agent in 
the Gulf shows the critical role of textile manufacturing as non-farming employment for many 
cultivators. Writing in 1899 he says: “poverty of the cultivators who are the principal 
customers of cotton goods, caused transactions to be limited. The failure of the crops for three 
successive years on the Persian coast led many cultivators to resort more largely to weaving 
for a livelihood, a demand thereby created for yarn and twist.”
62
 Cultivators did not 
necessarily spin or weave as an income producing activity but they also did so for their own 
use. In Tabriz for example, Consul Jones reports in 1873, “the lower classes make use of the 
produce of their domestic looms”.
63
 When threatened by cheaper imports, Iranian textile 
industries could maintain their position and reduce expenses by largely employing the 
workforce in waiting in rural areas. Even in the carpet industry, rural spinning and weaving 
hands played an important role. Persian carpets were already among the export items of Iran 
by the early 19
th
 century. Yet, interest in Persian carpets increased in Europe after the World 
Trade Fair in 1851. The World Trade Fair in Vienna in 1873 substantially added to the 
demand for Persian carpets.
64
 Carpet industry was important mainly for two reasons. Firstly, 
rather than solely relying on modern methods of manufacturing, the carpet industry 
functioned to a great extent through a putting-out system where an extended chain of village 
production played an important role.        
Iranian entrepreneurs played a decisive role in the functioning of this system. For example 
Tabrizi merchants took almost complete control of carpet trade in Kashan, which was the 
main carpet weaving centre.
65
 Some merchants even specialized in the trade of peasant and 
tribal rugs. Secondly, the carpet industry constituted the major field of direct foreign 
investment which contributed to the development of the industry in Iran. To realize 
sustainable and high quality production, foreign companies, such as the British-Swiss 
Ziegler&Co. and the Dutch Hotz&Zoon, directly invested in the carpet weaving business. 
Soltanabad near Farahan district is a good example of this type of investment. While there 
were in the region some 40 looms around 1870, ten years later the number of the looms in the 
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town reached 1,200 and 5,000 with weaving villages around it. 10,000 persons were 
employed in their operation.
66
 By the turn of the 20
th
 century 65,000 persons were employed 
in carpet weaving, whereas the number had been a mere 1,000 around 1860. The rising 
production was also reflected in the volume of output. While in the 1870s estimated total 
exports of carpets was about £ 75,000, it was estimated to be around £ 100,000 in 1889. In 




The integration of the urban and rural types of manufacturing brought about a more intricate 
industrialization process in Iran. As Rudolf Braun observes: 
When an urban and bourgeois industry spreads out from the city into the surrounding countryside, 
it penetrates an unfamiliar environment and economy which receives industrialization on its own 
terms. For those involved in the industrialization process it meant that the country inhabitants 
experienced industrialization not merely as passive recipients but also by actively shaping it.
68
  
Information regarding the details of this integration is lacking. Neither do we know how 
peasants living in 19
th
-century Iran received this transformation and how they actively shaped 
the process in their own way. At any rate, throughout the 19
th
 century, European economic 
penetration became increasingly visible by either challenging the existing manufacturing 
methods or by adding new dimensions to them. This was a slow and gradual process. For the 
simple fact that throughout the 19
th
 century, and for some time into the 20
th
, a country-wide 
market did not exist in Iran but rather the country consisted of isolated provincial markets, the 
effects and the extent of this penetration was not the same throughout Iran. The textile 
industry provides the best opportunity to investigate the varying effects of imports in Iran. 
Ahmad Seyf states that the fact that the areas more easily accessible to foreign imports such 
as the Caspian shores, Azarbaijan and the Persian Gulf shores produced few or no cotton and 
silk goods attests to the effect of foreign competition as the chief contributing factor to the 
decline of Persian handicrafts.
69
 Yet, even at the end of the 19
th
 century in Isfahan—a 
favourite centre of importing companies, especially British ones—artisans could produce a 
particular cotton product, qalamkar, for export, as the business escalated thanks to the use of 
cheap aniline dyes.
70
 Therefore, if urban production appears to decline, we should look for 
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other production methods, mainly to putting-out industry, to see how Iranian industries coped 
with imports. However, this in no way implies a complete denial of the negative role imports 
played in the fate of Iranian crafts. What is important here is to see that the process was more 
complex than how it is often depicted.        
After providing statistical information on Iranian handicrafts in several cities, Abbot refers to 
the great injuring role of European competition on the crafts. He also mentions the increasing 
numbers of shops selling foreign goods.
71
 On the other hand, writing about the Persian 
industry which he cautioned was not comparable with that of most European states, Jakob 
Polak observed that it was “not insignificant and meets domestic needs.” He makes the 
following important point:  
When one considers that nothing is done by the government to raise the level of industry that on 
the contrary an irrational tariff system encourages import of foreign goods to the detriment of 
domestic products, that roads and means of communication are lacking, that metal deposits lie 
buried in the womb of the earth and that all iron must be brought in from abroad, at high prices; 
when one contemplates the imperfection of tools and machines, the shortage of capital, the high 
rate of interest and the lack of development of credit facilities – one must truly wonder how many 
domestic products manage to compete with foreign.
72
  
Several factors added to the undermining of the Iranian economy and its crafts industries in 
the 19
th
 century. First, natural conditions were unfavourable. While the northern parts of the 
country enjoyed abundant rainfall, the southern and central regions were blessed with only a 
little. Additionally, despite the relatively stable political atmosphere of the Qajar era, the 
country was still far from centralized and a country-wide market was absent. Irrational tax 
policies also severely hurt economic activities. A dispatch from the British Consul in Tabriz 
in 1851 attests to this. According to the dispatch, whereas a European merchant paid 5% on 
his imports, an Iranian had to pay 7,7% on textiles and 14% on sugar plus he paid rahdarlik 
(road tax) every time his goods passed through an Iranian town.
73
 Also, the insecurity of 
private property and the absence of proper protection impeded creativity and demotivated 
investment in production techniques.
74
 The situation was further complicated by increasing 
imports of foreign goods into Iran. From the early 19
th
 century onwards, economically 
speaking Iran found itself in an unequal competition vis-à-vis European, mainly Russian and 
British, states. Apart from such products as sugar and tea, textiles were the most desired 
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imports. Nevertheless, dressing habits and traditions were difficult to change. Thus, foreign 
firms tried to adopt to Iranian taste while Iranians showed in time a certain interest in foreign 
costume. Fraser observed in mid 1820s that “a taste for European goods is but arising”.
75
 By 
the end of the century the change became more visible and foreign imports were now almost 
everywhere in the country. 
The ever-increasing imports drew attention very early in the century. In the subsequent 
decades two main attitudes prevailed: protectionist and developmentalist. The first groups 
argued that foreign goods, especially luxury articles, should simply be prevented from 
entering the country. They used two different supporting arguments. According to some, Iran 
had enough productive capacity to meet domestic demand. Therefore there was no need for 
foreign goods. Others argued that Iranians did not need those imported items, simply because 
they were unnecessary and created bad consumption habits among the populace. This view 
was particularly voiced by some in the early twentieth century, and its supporters held big 
merchants responsible. Developmentalists on the other hand admitted, though grudgingly, that 
Iran did not have enough productive capacity, which caused the inflow of foreign goods. 
However, as far as a remedy was concerned, they divided into two camps. Some of them 
argued that Iranian craft industries could meet domestic demand if promoted and supported by 
sound protective measures. Yet, others opted for factory-based large scale industrialization 
and claimed that traditional methods of production were obsolete and unable to meet even 
domestic needs properly. These two attitudes were not mutually exclusive, and as a matter of 
fact throughout the nineteenth century neither approach produced the desired outcome: the 
curtailing of imports. Still, considering the diverse and heterogeneous segments involved in 
the discussions, they provide us invaluable insights into popular perceptions of the economy 
and politics, and enrich our understanding of state-society relations in Qajar Iran.  
Roughly until the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, the protectionist attitude was favoured, the only 
exception being Abbas Mirza’s attempt at pursuing developmental economic policies. From 
Naser al-Din onwards some steps were taken to industrialize Iran, especially by Amir Kabir, 
and the Constitutional Revolution furthered hopes in this regard. However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, in the aftermath of the First World War protectionist voices were 
again raised though to no avail. With the consolidation of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 1930’s, 
developmental policies, mixed with protectionist measures, were pursued and a period of 
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industrial leaping forward was launched. Leaving the constitutional and Pahlavi periods to the 
second part of this dissertation, here I will analyse the period up to the early twentieth 
century.  
Already during Fath Ali Shah’s reign manufacturers are reported to have petitioned the Shah 
for the prohibition of further imports.
76
 Likewise, in 1836 Mohammad Shah commanded his 
subjects to wear cloths of Iranian make. Furthermore he instructed all his courtiers to adopt a 
new style of dress consisting of European trousers and redingote. His intention was to 
disseminate this change to the rest of the population. The attempt soon ended in failure and 
the Shah gave up the effort, but the merchants did not.
77
 In 1844, merchants of Tabriz 
petitioned the crown prince to prohibit European imports “on the ground principally of the 
ruin Persian manufacturers are reduced to by the constant and immense importation of foreign 
goods”.
78
 In the same year the traders and manufacturers of Kashan presented a memorial to 
Mohammad Shah Qajar in which they prayed “for protection of their commerce which they 




Already in the 1810’s, Abbas Mirza sent groups of Persian students to Great Britain declaring 
that “they shall study something of use to me, themselves and their country”.
80
 They studied, 
among other things, chemistry, engineering and gunsmithery. However, Abbas Mirza’s 
attempts were mainly aimed at military modernization. In the following decades, further 
efforts to introduce modern industries were made. For example in 1829, the Persian 
ambassador in London was instructed to engage a superintendent of iron works, two furnace 
men, a glass worker, two miners, and a cloth manufacturer, and a steam engine was sent from 
England to Iran.
81
 Amir Kabir’s economic reforms provided the first country-wide attempts at 
economic development. The main components of his economic policies was “to end the 
economic regression in the country, the establishment of small industries for this purpose, the 
development of agriculture, decreasing the imports and increasing the exports as well as 
preventing the outflow of ‘the golden suns’ [gold coins] in his own words”.82 Yet, being well-
aware of the industrial developments in the West his economic program, like those of many of 
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his successors, also included the significant and explicit objective of “introducing new 
industries” to the country.83 The tension and the gap between promoting crafts industries on 
the one hand and introducing European-type factories on the other remained, from this period 
on, one of the main challenges of modernist economic policies in Iran. At any rate, Amir 
Kabir’s economic policies provided in Iran the first organized attempt at import-substitution.  
In the second half of the century a number of factories with varying capacities and financed 
by both domestic and foreign capital were erected in Iran. A series of popular ventures should 
be mentioned alongside the developmentalist efforts. In 1897 the Anjoman-e Sharqi (Oriental 
Society) was founded in Isfahan with the explicit aim of promoting the consumption of 
Persian goods. Likewise, in 1890 the Anjoman-e Eslami (Islamic Society) was founded for the 
same purpose. The two societies established a company named Sherkat-e Eslami (Islamic 
Company) and produced a cloth named Parcheh-e Eslami (Islamic Cloth).
84
 In order to 
promote the use of the home-made textiles Seyed Jamal al-Din Va‘ez Esfahani, a cleric and 
promoter of the Sherkat-e Eslami, wrote a treatise in 1900 titled Lebas al-Taqwa (Cloth of 
Abstinence) by using the Quranic metaphor of ‘the cloth of abstinence’ Esfahani calls on his 
fellow countrymen to wake up from the heedless sleep and to unite in order not to depend on 
foreigners for their textile needs.
85
  
Especially from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, several large-scale industrial projects 
were undertaken.
86
 However, we lack any reliable statistical data on these initiatives. The lists 
available on some sources not only display a fairly poor industrial scene for a country of such 
magnitude as Iran, but should also be met with a certain degree of suspicion since many of 
these industrial enterprises had to shut down after some time, for a variety of reasons. Poor 
planning, high transport costs, inability to compete with imports, and inadequacy of raw 
materials were the main causes of the failure of early industrial enterprises. Moreover as far as 
textiles were concerned, such additional factors as the use of aniline dyes, manufacturing of 
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inferior products, and change in fashion, further handicapped national industries.
87
 Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the following pessimistic judgment about industrialization in Iran could be 
made by a British mission as late as 1905: 
It is hopeless for any Indian or English manufacturer to think of establishing works in Persia at 
present. If he embarks on such an enterprise, he will but add another item to the long list of 
industrial ventures that have failed in that land. The difficulties that stand in the way of such 
enterprises are at present too great. There is first the Government. No foreigner is allowed to own 
land or house in Persia except under very stringent rules and if he becomes a Persian landholder he 
must, as a rule, first become a Persian subject. If he becomes a Persian subject he must expect 
continually to be “squeezed”. Then there is the cost of transporting machinery, which is 
prohibitive, and at present no heavy machinery could be got up at all. Labour, too, in Persia while 
fairly cheap (though dearer than India) is inefficient and undisciplined to a degree hard to 
conceive.  
Lastly, any factory setting up would have to be on a small scale, only large enough to use local 
supplies, for once you have to carry raw material any distance the present cost of transport renders 
it prohibitive. This means hopelessly expensive working as having small factories scattered all 
over the country would make the cost and task of supervision prohibitive.
88  
Factory-based production was regarded by many contemporaries as an extension and 
prerequisite of modernization, i.e. westernization, in the industrial realm. It was believed that 
the rationalization of production along European lines would sooner or later replace the 
‘obsolete’ methods of production. Put differently, modernization required a country to 
modernize its military forces on European terms. This in turn necessitated equally modernized 
industries. Such a country would be able to withstand its enemies—particularly Russia, in the 
case of Iran—and would protect its sovereignty. Several Iranian and foreign contemporary 
observers refer in their writings to the lack of factories in Iran, their observations usually 
being accompanied by derogatory remarks about the country and its inhabitants. In what 
follows, a sketch of the late 19
th
-century Iranian society will be provided by referring to the 
effects of the political and economic developments discussed above.    
  
Iranian Society on the Eve of the Constitutional Revolution: A People in Flux 
The nineteenth century was a period of transformation for Iran, in various ways. Caught 
between the two rival superpowers of the time, namely Britain and Russia, the country 
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developed its economic and political path within a context of semi-colonialism. At first the 
British were particularly interested in Iran in political terms, i.e. securing their interests in 
India and preventing any Russian advance to the south. Later on however, both Britain and 
Russia developed economic interests in the country which initially entailed the supply of raw 
materials from it but later on evolved into regarding it as an open market for their industrial 
products. It is hardly an exaggeration that "Iran thus had all the disadvantages of being a 
colony without any of the few advantages, such as the creation of industries either to the 
direct benefit of the colonizers or for their military purposes, improvements in the juridical 
system, and so forth."
89
 The military defeats at the hands of Russia and the ever increasing 
influence of both this northern neighbour and the southern, Britain, in time paved the way for 
a series of military, economic, and political reforms. Once the practical-minded reforms in 
these fields failed to produce the desired outcomes, a perception prevailed among intellectuals 
and dissatisfied groups that the problem actually lay deeper in the political system, which 
should be thoroughly reformed. This gradually paved the way for the Constitutional 
Revolutions of 1905-1909. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, epidemics, mainly cholera and plague but also small-pox, 
malaria and typhoid fever, were prevalent all around the country; so were famines. Recurring 
epidemics had disastrous consequences. Several factors contributed to this. Ahmad Seyf lists 
five such factors.
90
 Firstly, the country had almost no hospitals and public health 
administration during the entire century. Secondly, the quarantine arrangements to isolate the 
sick from the rest of the population were insufficient. Thus, epidemics travelled freely from 
town to town, adding to the number of casualties. Thirdly, flowing water was believed to be 
always safe, and this contributed to the spread of disease. Fourthly, the dead, even those who 
perished in epidemics, were carelessly washed before burial, and this polluted the clean water. 
Fifthly there was the custom of temporary burial which was particularly practiced by wealthy 
individuals. Out of a desire to be buried in such holy towns as Mashhad, Qom, Najaf, and 
Karbala, the body of a wealthy Iranian, even if he died in an epidemic, would be removed 
from his temporary grave where he would stay for a few months to be carried on mule back to 
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his eternal grave in one of these towns. Between 1800 and 1905 twenty six outbreaks of 
cholera and ten outbreaks of plague seem to have taken place in Iran.
91
       
The plague of 1830-31 was the most devastating epidemic of the century in terms of the 
casualties it caused. Spanning almost the entire country with the exception of Khorasan and 
Kerman, the plague hit the northern regions particularly hard. For example, after the plague, 
Mazandaran was in a state of ruin, with some the cities being largely depopulated. According 
to Fraser, Rasht, a prominent trade and handicraft center, which had more than 60,000 
inhabitants in 1822, contained around 15-20,000 people including non-residents.
92
 Again, 
about the Caspian province at large, he observed that “… of all districts which have been 
visited in Persia… I knew that Gilan and Mazandaran had suffered most, and I was prepared 
to find a diminution of population in both provinces, but I was not prepared for what I did see 
here…”
93
 According to Abbot, a full two-thirds of the population of Gilan have apparently 
been carried off by the calamity.
94
 Also the most destructive cholera epidemic broke out in the 
last decade of the century between 1892 and 1893. As many as 1,037 people are reported to 
have died in Tehran alone, with an average of 148 deaths per day. The average number was, 
according to E‘temad al-Saltaneh, a contemporary Iranian, 200 per day.
95
 The cholera claimed 
thousands of lives outside of the capital too. In Gilan, for example, 20,000 people are reported 
to have died from cholera.
96
  
Apart from epidemics, famine was another ultimate cause of death in nineteenth century Iran. 
Caused mainly by inadequate rainfall and partly by unplanned agrarian practices, once it 
occurred, the disastrous consequences of a famine would be doubled by the inhospitable 
landscape of the country in the absence of insufficient transport facilities. To illustrate this 
point, suffice it to say that “even at the end of the [19
th
] century the important road between 
the southern port of Mohammereh (Khorramshahr) and Tehran was so slow that to get from 
the latter to the former it was quicker to travel from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea by boat, 
from Erzerum to the Caspian Sea by land, from Baku to Enzeli (Pahlevi) by boat again and 
finally from Enzeli to Tehran by land.”
97
 Not infrequently, therefore, while some parts of the 
country suffered severely from a famine, other parts could enjoy relative prosperity. The 
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greatest of famines in modern Iranian history was experienced between 1870 and 1871. 
Almost no rain had fallen during the previous year and this continued to be the case during 
1870-71 with the exception of the western and southern regions. Khorasan, Isfahan, Yazd and 
Fars suffered particularly from the drought, which brought about a sharp rise in grain prices 
and bread riots in several towns. In Mashhad, for example, the price of wheat reached 100 
tumans per kharvar which was more than twenty times the former price.
98
 The famine and the 
enormously rising prices of essential foodstuffs produced horrible consequences in people’s 
daily lives. Reportedly, those who failed to afford bread ate dogs, cats, rats and even dung and 
grass. There were also reports of cannibalism in some towns where ruffians are said to kill 






The Constitutional Revolution broke out in 1905 against this historical background. Economic 
dissatisfaction, internal disorder and recurring calamities deepened the sense of dissatisfaction 
among the populace. This dissatisfaction was to be formulated within the vocabulary of the 
spirit of the age: the call for a constitution and a parliament. The underlying objective, 
however, was rather simpler: to secure justice. As will be discussed in the following chapter, 
the greater part of the Iranian population who supported the establishment of a parliament, 
even the bulk of the clerical support in favour of it, came from equating it with the House of 
Justice, an institution associated with the culture of kingship.
100
 Safeguarding the lives and 
property of the subjects were the main pillars of kingly justice. As long as these were secured, 
Iranian society cared little about central policies, let alone risking an open confrontation with 
the authorities. Dissatisfaction started and disseminated once increasing numbers of Iranians 
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felt threatened by the existing political and economic developments. After all “… when the 
shah’s urban subjects (and perhaps others too) were displeased with him, they cared not for 
divine grace, hereditary right nor the epithet of Pivot but for his duties as an Islamic ruler to 
regulate, equalize and maintain the balance.”
101
 Such diverse classes as the mullahs, 
merchants, princes, intelligentsia and subaltern groups were involved in constitutional 
uprisings. The revolution was in this sense a collective action of various social strata, but the 
traditional structure of Iranian society was to transform in its aftermath. 
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Chapter Three: Iran from the Constitutional Revolution to the End of Reza 
Shah’s Reign: 1905-1941 
 
Introduction 
Demanding a constitution with established rights and duties was a common reaction at the 
turn of the twentieth century in despotic regimes in various parts of the world, and in the 
Middle East in particular. The constitutional revolutions in neighbouring Russia (1905) and 
the Ottoman Empire (1908) were the two examples which were most relevant to the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909.
1
 The Iranian Constitutional Revolution should be 
analysed within this context. Notwithstanding the apparent commonalities with other similar 
revolutions, however, Iran had distinct characteristics which originated from its social 
structure and historical development and which in turn determined the course of the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution as well as subsequent developments. This chapter investigates this 
revolution by emphasizing the roles played by various social groups and by analysing the 
consequences of this revolution for working people in Iran, and the changing class positions 
during this period. I then proceed to discuss the Pahlavi modernization initiatives in the same 
framework. For a complete discussion of the revolution and the decades following it, the roles 
and the perceptions of such classes as trade guilds, intellectuals, the labouring poor, 
merchants, and the clergy will also be addressed. Overall, the chapter aims at exploring the 
grassroots dimensions of these developments during this period of nearly four decades. 
 
From Mobilization to Revolution: The Making of the Constitutional Revolution 
The first part of the above title is borrowed from Charles Tilly’s book which deals with social 
movements and revolutions.
2
 Apart from the title, his conceiving of revolution in terms of 
collective action provides a useful framework for investigation of the making of the Iranian 
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Constitutional Revolution. Tilly suggests five major components which he regards as 
necessary for the analysis of a collective action: interest, organization, mobilization, 
opportunity and finally collective action.
3
 While interest is simply put as “the gains and the 
losses resulting from a group’s interaction with other groups”, by organization Tilly refers “to 
that aspect of a group’s structure which most directly affects its capacity to act on its 
interests”.
4
 Mobilization starts once a group reaches an interest-based coalition and the 
various elements which constitute it bring together their resources, such as manpower, goods, 
weapons etc. Nonetheless, these can only produce the expected outcome if the third 
component, i.e. opportunity is present. According to Tilly, opportunity “concerns the 
relationship between a group and the world around it”.
5
 Once the above components are 
materialized they produce a collective action which “consists of people’s acting together in 
pursuit of common interests”.
6
 The process of the making of a collective action is obviously 
not as neat and schematic as the above illustration might suggest. Quite to the contrary, not 
only are the steps not strictly sequential, but also, there are ideological, personal and other 
factors involved. Nonetheless, the model is useful for a structural analysis of the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution.      
The outbreak of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution cannot be explained only by the 
despotic rule of the Qajar monarchs, even given the deep dissatisfaction it created especially 
among the urban and educated classes. The existing scholarship on early twentieth century 
Iranian history aptly emphasizes the significance of the political and ideological processes on 
the path to the Revolution. Notwithstanding their significance, however, the larger population 
was rather concerned with economic developments and their deteriorating living conditions 
for which ‘the foreigners’ and the ever-increasing European economic penetration were 
blamed. Moreover, guild members, merchants and labourers, and other social groups, were 
frustrated by the unpopular economic policies of various Qajar governments in the face of 
distressing economic conditions. Against the background of arbitrary concessions granted to 
foreigners and the excessive ready-made European imports, the new tariff treaty signed with 
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Russia in 1903 furthered the unrest. The treaty brought new tariff rates on certain articles. 
Accordingly, Russian sugar would pay 2 percent ad valorem determined by weight, while 
petroleum and matches would pay 4 percent each.
7
 As Entner suggests, the treaty had a 
positive impact on Iran’s unfavourable trade balance due to the new tariffs on exports of raw 
materials and foods. However it damaged non-Russian enterprise even though “this was not 
necessarily its sole purpose”.
8
 Textiles were among the crafts most severely hurt by the new 
regulations.  
Russia was soon to be followed by other countries, primarily Britain, which also revised its 
customs treaty with Iran. The treaty had various negative consequences but two proved to be 
particularly significant. First of all, Iran was no longer able to unilaterally revise its customs 
tariffs, so that it practically lost control over much of its foreign trade. Secondly, Iranian 
industries were further damaged, for Russia was interested in importing raw materials from 
Iran and exporting industrial products.
9
 There were reports regarding the protests organized 
by artisans and guilds members in order to “force the government to encourage home 
industries, and to protect them against growing competition from Russian industrial 
products”.
10
 Mullahs reportedly agitated against the employment of non-Muslim foreigners 
for collecting land-taxes from Muslims.
11
 Protests took place in several cities such as Tehran 
and Yazd. Agha Seyyed Ali Yazdi, a leading cleric from Tabriz, was arrested and banished 
for preaching against the treaty and inciting people to resistance.
12
  
Along with the treaty the Prime Minister Amin al-Soltan Atabak and Joseph Naus, the 
Belgian Director of the Customs was harshly attacked ‘for selling’ the country to Russians, 
and their dismissal was requested by the protesters. Amin al-Soltan resigned and was replaced 
by Ain al-Dowleh. The opposition insisted on the dismissal of Naus too. However, not only 
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that he was not dismissed but quite to the contrary his influence increased even further during 
Ain al-Dowleh’s premiership. Naus had practically assumed the Ministry of Posts and 
Telegraphs as he also became High Treasurer, Head of the Passport Department, and Member 
of the Supreme Council of State.
13
 Apart from these developments increasing critiques of 
Iran’s backwardness and corrupt officials were written and circulated, which contributed to 
popular agitation. Fath Ali Akhundzadeh (an Iranian-Azari intellectual living in Russian 
Caucasia), Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, Zayn al-Abedin Maragha’i, Jamal al-Esfahani and 
Malek al-Motakallemin were among the most prominent figures of this growing literature. 
Akhundzadeh’s Kamal al-Dowleh va Jalal al-Dowleh (Kamal al-Dowleh and Jalal al-
Dowleh); Maraghai’s Siyahatnameh-e Ebrahim Beg (The Travel book of Ibrahim Beg); and 
Ruya-yi Sadeqeh (True Dream) co-authored by Jamal al-Esfahani and Malek al-Motakallemin 
were among the prominent examples of such literature.
14
   
Thus, the elimination of the arbitrary rule constituted the common interest which brought 
diverse groups together. The close relations between the bazaaris and the clergy provided the 
organizational groundwork of the opposition. A number of developments which took place in 
1905 created a suitable atmosphere and the pushing factors for mobilization. The first one was 
the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The victory of an Asian 
constitutional power, Japan, against a European absolute monarchy, Tsarist Russia, had 
significant consequences in Iran. For many reformists Japan was believed to have all the 
graces of progress by at the same time preserving their genuine national identity and 
traditions. By their victory they allegedly showed that a European Great Power could be 
defeated by an Asian power. On the other hand Japan being the only Asian constitutional 
power while Russia was the only major European non-constitutional power further reinforced 
the message as to the advantages of a constitutional regime.
15
 Apart from its political 
significance, the war further deteriorated Iran’s economy and increased inflation in the 
country.
16
 Protests broke out again. On the night of 9 Muharram 1323 (16 March 1905) 
Seyyed Abdollah Behbehani, a prominent mojtahed of the period, gave a harsh sermon 
against Naus and Ain al-Dowleh. By showing a picture of Naus and his colleagues in a 
mullah’s attire taken at a costume party two years earlier he called him ‘corrupt’ 
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(haramzadeh) and ‘cursed’ (mal‘un) and demanded his dismissal.
17
 He then added that 
despite the insistent demand for issuing a fatwa for the killing of Naus he did not consider it 
necessary since, he argued, by his disrespect to the Prophet and mullahs he already deserved 
to be killed by any Muslim.
18
 The protesters insisted on the dismissal of Naus and took 
sanctuary (bast) in Abd al-Azim Shrine near Tehran. Reportedly the number of bastis reached 
five hundred.
19
 Upon the arbitration of Mohammad Ali Shah, the heir apparent, who promised 
the bastis that once the Shah arrived back from his European tour he would try for the 
dismissal of Naus, they left the Shrine and ended the sanctuary. 
Nonetheless, arbitrary rule continued in both the capital and the provinces. In such regions as 
Fars, Mashhad and Qazvin, among other, news of oppressive rule added to the existing 
dissatisfaction.
20
 Yet, the move to trigger the discontent in Tehran came from the Governor 
Ahmad Khan ‘Ala al-Dowleh. Due to the rising sugar prices caused by the Russo-Japanese 
War the Governor asked in 1905 two prominent sugar merchants, Seyyed Hashemi Qandi and 
Hajj Seyyed Isma‘il Khan, to reduce their prices. In response, Seyyed Hashemi told the 
Governor that the rising prices came as a result of the reduced sugar imports caused by the 
Russo-Japanese war and the revolution in Russia. ‘Ala al-Dowleh insisted, but Seyyed 
Hashemi did not retreat. The governor consequently ordered these two respected merchants 
bastinadoed.
21
 As a matter of fact such arbitrary disciplinary actions were not exceptional in 
contemporary Iran. Yet, for bazaaris and the clerics associated with them this penalty was the 
straw that broke the camel’s back, and they reacted decisively. Backed by the two prominent 
mullahs, Seyyed Mohammad Tabataba’i and Seyyed Abdullah Behbehani, the protesters took 
sanctuary in the Shah Mosque in the city of Tehran, but the bastis were dispersed by ‘Ain al-
Dowleh. At the suggestion of Seyyed Mohammad Tatatabai a number of mullahs, including 
Behbehani and the influential cleric Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, decided to retire to the shrine of 
Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim in the south of Tehran where two thousand theology students joined 
them.
22
 This is known in Iranian history as Hejrat-e Soghra, i.e. the Minor Exodus. When 
increasing numbers of bazaaris supported the bastis and began to join the sanctuary, the Prime 
Minister ‘Ain al-Dowleh threatened any shopkeeper who shut his shop and joined the 
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sanctuary with a legal sanction permitting people  to plunder his workplace. A few shops were 
indeed plundered, but the bastis refused to obey. Their major demands were the dismissal of 
Naus along with the governor of Tehran and the establishment of an adalatkhaneh or a House 
of Justice.  
The Shah dismissed the governor and agreed to the adalatkhaneh upon which action the 
sanctuary-seekers returned to Tehran. However, the Shah did not keep his promise. Towards 
the end of April the mullahs sent a letter to the Shah requesting that he enact his promised 
reforms. Yet, the petition produced no effect. Besides, people were no longer allowed to go 
out into the street after three hours following sunset.
23
 Also, several prominent opposition 
leaders were arrested or exiled. For example, Seyyed Jamal al-Din Va‘ez was expelled to 
Mashhad, while Majd al-Eslam Kermani was arrested. When Sheikh Mohammad Soltan al-
Va‘ezin was imprisoned in the Soldiers’ Quarters, the building was attacked by theology 
students by the order of Seyyed Abdollah Behbehani. In the incident a young seyyed 
(presumed descendent of the Prophet) student was shot to death. During his funeral another 
fifteen, including another seyyed, were killed too.
24
       
This consequently gave way to the bast in the Masjed-e Jame', the main mosque in the city 
centre, from where the bastis moved to Qum, a town near Tehran. This was the start of what 
is known in Iranian history as Great Exodus or Hejrat-e Kobra. Fearing another government 
intervention the protesters decided to take sanctuary in a safer place. There was among the 
protesters a deliberate conviction about the British sympathy for a constitutional movement in 
Iran while Russia was largely believed to be hostile to it. This point was reported in later 
years by C. Spring-Rice, the British minister at Tehran during 1906 and 1908.
25
 This was 
expressed by the following lines written on the top of cobblers’ tent: “In the Embassy of His 
Britannic Majesty / Iranian people came together weeping and asking for justice”.
26
 
Consequently after some correspondence with Evelyn Grant Duff, Secretary of the British 
Legation and the acting charge d’affairs, the protesters obtained permission to move to the 
legation compounds in Tehran. This should be regarded, to follow Tilly’s model, as part of 
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the opportunity for restive unrest. On the one hand there was the rivalry between Britain and 
Russia for the control of the region while on the other, the personal enmity among prominent 
figures such as ‘Ain al-Dowleh and Amin al-Soltan provided an advantageous atmosphere for 
the opposition. Based on his correspondences with the eyewitnesses E G. Browne provides a 
lively description of bastis and their organization in their stay in the legation garden. Bastis 
were organized along guild-lines with each guild having its tent. The number of tents was 
reportedly more than five hundred.
27
 There are varying estimates as to the number of bastis 
but evidently they were more than a thousand.
28
 The basic needs of the bastis were provided 
for by wealthy merchants. Faridun Adamiyat names intellectuals, mullahs and merchants as 
the three principal elements of the constitutional movement.
29
 According to him students of 
modern and classical schools, guilds members and ordinary people later on took part in the 
agitations. However although the movement was first launched by the merchants and the 
mullahs, guild members played more than marginal roles in the process and in its outcome.   
At first there was much confusion about the protesters’ basic demands. Adamiyat argues that 
the mullahs were primarily concerned with the dismissal of the Prime Minister, ‘Ain al-
Dowleh, while theology students asked for the “establishment of a House of Justice which 
would implement the Muhammadan laws”.
30
 Security and confidence about the future were 
among their basic objectives.
31
 Such demands were in time translated into a call for a National 
Assembly. The legation premises turned into a school where many issues but especially 
politics were discussed. The poems written on the top of almost each tent provides valuable 
insight about the popular perception of the protests and its expected outcomes. There were in 
their slogans an emphasis on promoting Islam and compliance with its principles along with a 
request for a House of Justice. The sock weavers, for example, foretold the good news that 
“out of His justice the Shah of shahs will soon erect a House of Justice”.
32
 Yet the bastis 
appear to have paid special attention to not to outrage the Shah and make a clear distinction 
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between him and the oppression they complained about. This is put by tailors as follows: “In 
order to obtain justice Iranians put their tents in the Embassy. To praise the just Shah people 
hastened to come together. We are not querulous towards our Sultan, may the glorious God 
bring him help and victory”.
33
 In the face of these determined protests, Mozaffar al-Din Shah 
finally proclaimed the constitutional system a short time before his death in 1906. The Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution has been the subject of various studies which emphasized various 
aspects. Instead of providing a standard account of the revolution and its aftermath, this 
chapter will concentrate on its neglected dimensions by emphasizing the perceptions and 
attitudes of the wider population throughout the process. Petitions, along with printed media, 
memoires etc., provide us with invaluable insights into subalterns' reflections on the 
constitutional system, its performance and later developments. Therefore, the coming section 
deals with the history of petitioning in Iran and concentrates on how petitions functioned as 
an uninterrupted channel of interaction of state and society in Iran.  
 
“Do You Want me to Go and Present this to the Majles?”: Petitioning in Iran 
Petitioning, both written and verbal, has a long history in Iran and it has been considered 
throughout centuries an indispensable part of a just monarchy, as it was in other parts of the 
world. In pre-Islamic Iran the king would personally appear before the public, mostly in 
bazaar squares, at periodic intervals to attend to people’s grievances and demands. Islam 
further reinforced this practice and petitions continued to be one of the most effective 
channels between the rulers and the ruled. Yet it was during the 19
th
 century, particularly 
during Naser al-Din Shah`s reign (r. 184-1896), that several measures were taken for the 
institutionalization of petitioning. In 1860 the Shah declared by a decree that he saved 
Mondays exclusively for giving audience to the aggrieved and to those with demands. It was 
further added in the decree that the Shah would not meet any of his ministers on those days to 
attend exclusively to the issues of his subjects.
34
 Apparently this practice did not last very 
long. Thus in 1874 another decree announced the establishment of the Box of Justice in 
Tehran in which supplicants would drop their petitions and the practice was, one year later, 
enlarged to cover the provinces too.
35
 These boxes were protected by special guards to secure 
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the necessary comfort and trust for the supplicants and they were to be emptied twice a week 
by a trustee of the Shah who would deliver him the petitions in a sealed bag. The guard would 
even suffer the death penalty should he deny access to petitioners.
36
 So too any petitioner 
submitting false petitions would suffer the death penalty.
37
 In 1882 the more institutional and 
structured Council for the Investigation of Grievances (majles-e tahqiq-e mazalem) was 
founded for the administration of justice.
38
 The petitions from this council provide invaluable 
information about late 19
th
 century Iran particularly regarding the social issues aspects of the 
period. Yet they are mostly summaries of the original letters which apparently have not 
survived to this day. This is the main difference between them and the ones sent to the Majles 
following the Constitutional Revolution.  
Figure 1: A collective petition from Shiraz dated 27 February 1927 requesting an 
increase in the municipal budget. 
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Source: LMDCIP. d6/k31/j17/ p97, ‘To the Ministry of Interior’. 
 
When petitioning was established as a legal right in the Constitution of 1906 the Majles found 
an enthusiastic public who eagerly presented their cases to the extent that “even the grocer 
and greengrocer thought himself a Commander, and everybody has problems with everybody 
and wants to scare him by saying: ‘do you want me to go and present this to the Majles?”.
39
 It 
is not always clear who actually wrote a petition.  Those who did not show up personally sent 
their petitions directly to the Majles even though the issues concerned specific ministries or 
directories. To this effect several announcements were made urging the petitioners to address 
their grievances and demands to the relevant state department but apparently to no avail. The 
amount of petitions soon reached such numbers that the Commission of Petitions was founded 
exclusively to administer supplications and to forward them to the relevant ministries and 
other state departments. Sent by men and women, rich and poor, workers and employers, 
peasants and urban dwellers, petitions can be individual or collective with more than one, in 
some cases tens or even more than a hundred names, signatures or stamps on them. (see 
Figure-1) They typically started their petitions by showing their respect to the authority in 
question, often the Majles, where they emphasized their obedient and deferential attitude. 
They then introduced themselves, a part which at times gives detailed information as to the 
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environments and social as well as political settings in which they lived, and then, stated their 
cases. This is finally followed by the statement of the request of a favour or the redressing of 
an injustice. In order to prove the accuracy of their claims and increase their chance of 
attendance to their cases petitioners sometimes included a supporting document called Letter 
of Testimony (esteshhad-nameh). As this could be a letter from a prominent person, a leading 
merchant, governor, a cleric etc., attaching a photo of, for example, a disabled person was also 
an option though not a frequently used one.  (See figure 2). These petitions provide insight not 
only into the experiences of ordinary people but also their perceptions regarding the political 
processes and the issues discussed at the Majles.    
 
Figure 2: The Petition and the esteshhad-nameh (a photograph) of Hosayn ‘Abbas, a 
former worker at AIOC (APOC), in which he asked for financial help for not being able 
to work after he lost his right arm in a work-related accident, 20 July 1939. 
 
 
Source: Documents of the Eleventh Parliament, 20 July 1939, National Library and Archive of Iran. 
 
Parliamentary Politics: The First Majles, 1906-1908 
It is safe to argue that the opening of the Majles fundamentally altered the political realm in 
Iran. Politics had in this era become a popular topic and the court politics of the absolute 
monarchy was replaced by parliamentary politics. The reforms which have been launched in 
Iran during the nineteenth century determined the course of the Constitutional Revolution as 
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well. Unlike the neighbouring Ottoman Empire or its quasi-independent province, Egypt, the 
reforms undertaken in Iran throughout the nineteenth century failed to sufficiently strengthen 
the central government and to produce well-established institutions. Apart from the Cossack 
Brigades which had troops only enough to protect the capital, the country had no notable 
armed forces, with the exception of armed tribal groups. Not only were the tribes were 
practically autonomous in their tribal and regional affairs but also other social groups like the 
clerics enjoyed extraordinary financial and political powers. Therefore, on the eve of the 
Constitutional Revolution, “Iran could be characterized as having a weak state that coexisted 
with a strong society where the clerics, merchants, statesmen and other social groups were 
serious challengers to the state’s authority”.
40
 Thus, while the relatively well-organized and 
trained Ottoman armed forces played a decisive role in the inception and the consolidation of 
the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution of 1908, the revolution in Iran was a result of urban 
social protests. As Nader Sohrabi rightly argues, “the ambiguities in the reformist political 
discourse of the early twentieth century provided a chance for broad mobilization”.
41
 This 
ambiguity along with inadequate institutional support for the revolution came to play a 
decisive role in its fate. The First Majles opened in October 1906 and lasted until 1908. This 
Majles deserves a separate mention not only because it was the first in Iranian history but also 
it was the one with the highest representative capacity of the Constitutional Era.  
The electoral law produced for the first elections in 1906 specified six classes (tabaqeh pl. 
tabaqat) of the electorate which consisted of the princes and the Qajar tribe; mullahs and 
theology students; the nobility; merchants; landholders and smallholders; and guild 
members.42 Each tabaqeh was to send the Majles certain numbers of deputies to serve for two 
years. Also, the electorate was supposed to possess the following qualifications: to be Persian 
subjects; to be at least twenty five years old; to be known in their locality; to possess at least a 
thousand tumans (about £200); merchants and guild members were to have a definite office 
and to belong to a recognized guild.43 Women, criminals, foreign subjects, and those ‘who are 
notorious for evil doctrine, or who live in open sin’ were among those who were debarred 
from electoral rights.44 Some of the prerequisites for candidacy were as follows: the 
candidates should be able to speak, read and write Persian; they should be aged between thirty 
and seventy years old; they should not be employed in government service; and they should 
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be renowned persons. Overall while Tehran obtained 60 seats; the provinces together received 
only 96. Also among the 160 deputies 26 percent were guild elders while 20 percent were 
clergymen as opposed to 15 percent who were merchants. The First Majles has been subject 
of various studies. The intellectual debates during this period; several organizations, called 
anjomans, established in various cities in order to monitor elections but which continued their 
existence even afterwards; and external factors determining the future of constitutional 
experiment in Iran have been dealt with in several works. In what follows, the presence of 
guilds in this parliament and their activities will be analysed.  
The Iranian Constitutional Revolution did not originate as a result of a class-oriented struggle. 
Quite to the contrary, the otherwise-conflicting groups such as the clerics, merchants, 
aristocracy, guild members, intellectuals etc., made an ambiguous and ‘populist alliance’ for 
overthrowing the absolute monarchy.
45
 This alliance was emphasized by some contemporary 
observes as well as later historians.
46
 The fact that guild members sided with big merchants 
calls for explanation, since they hardly shared common interests. Guilds’ participation in the 
constitutional agitation clearly reflected its economic aspects. The negative impact of foreign 
economic presence drew guild members to anti-imperialist and even anti-foreign lines.
47
 The 
ambiguous discursive engagement of constitutionalists' and guilds' ties with mullahs and 
merchants led them into revolutionary cadres. Therefore the class-based structure of the First 
Majles was more apparent than real even within the confines of the Persian word for class 
(tabaqeh). The nobility was largely represented by state officials or politicians; among the 
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representative of landholders and smallholders there were those who fell outside this 
category; the representative of bath-attendants and ice-sellers was a school teacher, just as 
some guilds were represented by the clergy.
48
 That ‘the electors [were] not absolutely 
compelled to elect (a deputy) out of their own class or guild’ allowed for this flexible 
representation.
49
 The comments of Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, a leading constitutionalist and a 
deputy to the Majles, on the First Majles should be read against this background. He argues 
that “political parties did not exist in the First Majles but there were Radicals and Moderates 
with the former having ideas similar to socialism”.
50
 Thus Adamiyat observes that “within 
each social group different and at times conflicting political ideas existed”.
51 
The First Majlis was a Constituent Assembly and the constitution drafted by it remained in 
effect throughout the Pahlavi period. The Majles had the final say on all laws, decrees and any 
economic decisions from treaties to monopolies.
52
 An Upper House (Majles-e A‘yan) was also 
proposed consisting of sixty senators, thirty of whom would be nominated by the Shah. The 
functions of this house, however, were to be determined by the National Assembly. The Shah 
was virtually reduced to a figurehead. Even his right to determine half of the proposed sixty 
senators did not mean much since no senate was convened during the Qajar period.
53
 
Mohammad Ali Shah, who ascended the throne upon his father’s death, quickly made it clear 
that he would not easily submit to the new situation. He successfully manipulated frictions in 
the capital as well as in the provinces to undo many of the constitutional achievements. The 
Supplementary Fundamental Laws produced in 1907 provided him the proper opportunity for 
his anti-constitutional manoeuvres. This also marked the beginning of the disintegration of the 
ambivalent alliance among constitutionalist forces.          
The proposed oath made by the deputies suggested that every deputy would swear on the 
Quran that they would “with the utmost truth, uprightness, diligence and endeavour” 
discharge the duties conferred on them.
54
 The position of the Sharia, or Islamic law, was not 
clear especially as far was the legislative process was concerned. The Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws brought some clarification on this point. Accordingly, five members of the 
clergy, to be elected by the Majles from a list of twenty, would scrutinize all legislative 
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attempts no prevent any law which contradicted the Sharia.
55
 Alienated by the constitutional 
forces, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri became the outspoken leader of mashru‘eh (rule according to 
Sharia) as opposed to mashruteh (rule according to the constitution). As the Shah, meanwhile, 
refused to ratify the Supplementary Laws he also denounced such leading constitutionalists as 
Malek al-Motekallemin, Jamal al-din Esfahani, Mirza Jahangir Khan of Sur-e Esrafil and 
Mohammad Reza Shirazi of Mosavat as ‘heretical Babis’ and ‘republican subversives’.
56
 The 
assassination of Amin al-Soltan, however, shook the Shah who ratified the laws and 
expressed his reluctant respect for the constitution. Once the opportunity arouse, however, he 
was to launch his final attack on the Majles.   
Another notable aspect of the First Majles was the high degree of representation of the trade 
guilds. Thirty two deputies, both from Tehran and provinces, represented the trade guilds in 
this majles.
57
 (Appendix 1). Defined as “group[s] of townspeople engaged in the same trade 
or craft, who elect their own chief and who pay guild taxes; this group having economic, 
social, fiscal and political functions”
58
 guilds (senf- pl. asnaf) have historically been an 
integral part of the Iranian society. Although their economic importance showed more or less 
a steady decline during the nineteenth century, they largely maintained their political and 
social position.
59
 By the electoral law of 1906, they attained a prominent position in central 
politics between 1906 and 1908 for the first and the last time. According to Adamiyat such 
representatives of the trade guilds as Mashhadi Mohammad Baqer Baqqal and Mirza Ebrahim 
Khayyatbashi were known “for their sound understanding and progressiveness”.
60
 Taqizadeh, 
too, credits Baqqal, Hosayn Tehrani Saqatforush, Mohammad Taqi Bonakdar, Mohammad 
Khunsari Ketabforush and Hosayn Borujerdi “as the most consistent supporters of the 
majles”.
61
 Yet not everyone agreed on this point. The historian Kasravi, for example, 
criticizes the presence in the Majles of such guild representatives as Hajj Ali Akbar Parviz 
and Baqqal.
62
 Indeed it is safe to suggest that like many of the deputies in the First Majles, 
                                                          
55
 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 90. 
56
 Ibid., 90. 
57
 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruteh-e Iran (Tabriz: Akhtar, 2006), 190. 
58
 Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh, 111. 
59
 The decline in the economic position of guilds continued during the early twentieth century too. Nonetheless, 
as will be discussed in the 3
rd
 chapter, this decline in economic activities organized around guilds does not 
necessarily entail an overall decline in crafts or ‘traditional’ industries. Quite to the contrary, it originated from 
the fact that the putting-out system organized largely in rural settings and large scale ‘modern’ manufactures 
were responsible for the declining economic significance of guilds.     
60
 Adamiyat, Idi`uluzhi, 369. 
61
 Afary, Iranian, 72.    
62
 Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh, 191. Also one of the contemporaries, Moghis al-Saltaneh, makes similar 
negative observations on two other guild representatives, namely Mirza Mahmud Ketabforush and Me'marbashi. 
63 
 
guild representatives too lacked any notable political experience and were hardly informed on 
theoretical issues such as constitutionalism and parliamentary rule. However, their 
background and their ties with their electoral districts can shed important light on the social 
dimensions of politics in this period. Also, in terms of their demands and activities, guild 
members were the closest to the working class and most attentive to labour issues.  
Backed by the Central Committee of Guilds, the guilds played a major role during this period. 
The Central Committee was a typical one in its advertised aim of reinforcing the 
constitutional form of government. Yet, in addition to this, it regulated guilds’ affairs, 
attended to the needs and the demands of craftsmen, and organized charity 
activities.
63
Anjoman-e Asnaf was the official organ of the Committee of which no issues are 
available. After a while the name of the newspaper was changed to Bamdad but from that too 
only three issues are available.64 From an analysis of the available issues it appears that 
Bamdad was rather preoccupied with the prevalent concerns of the period such as the 
consolidation of the constitutional system, comments about the parliamentary discussions, 
education of girls, reforming the bureaucracy etc. For example, the editorial of the ninth issue 
titled “A Petition to His Excellency may His Reign be Infinite” and authored by Yahya al-
Hosayni (Dowlatabadi), the alleged compiler of the Committee’s code,
65
 the typical 
distinction between the Just King and his corrupt entourage is highlighted. The Shah is 
requested not to give credit to those “ignorant and ill-intentioned” persons who tried to 
provoke the Shah against His people. He is instead advised to read the well-intentioned 
newspapers whose only goal was to give good advice to the Shah as well as to the public, and 
awaken them.  
The relationship between guilds and the emerging Iranian working class is unclear. The 
electoral law made no mention of workers as a distinct class with a privileged right to vote. 
This was a result of, more than anything, the traditional structure of Iranian society. As will be 
discussed in the Fourth Chapter, in the early twentieth century many of the contemporaries 
equated workers with those labouring in large-scale industrial establishments, of which Iran 
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did not have many at that time. Although the assumptions as to the existence of fatherly and 
egalitarian relations between the guild masters and their employees are problematic enough, 
among the constitutionalist forces workers seem to regard guilds as their closest allies. To 
understand the course of the relations between the two it is important in order to be able to 
follow the trajectory of Iranian the working class. 
66
 Guilds have historically been an 
important social group who not only took active part in social projects but also functioned as 
an important actor in local politics. Their representation in the First Majles had added to this 
role. In this way, they exercised political power both in the capital and the provinces.  
The link between the capital and the provinces is illustrated by an incident which occurred in 
Hamadan in 1906. Hoarding of food staples, especially of grain, constituted one of the main 
causes of sporadic famines in Iran. When Hamadan suffered from a scarcity of wheat, in 
1906, guild members who were backed by the governor, Zahir al-Dowleh, along with the 
population of the town, attacked the landlords they considered responsible for hoarding. To 
this effect they sent a petition to the Prime Minister Moshir al-Dowleh in which they stated 
that while Hamadan had an annual wheat production of two hundred thousand kharvars and 
while the annual need of the town was only twenty five thousand kharvars the landlords 
horded grain, pushing people to hunger.
67
 A few days later on 11 September 1906 they sent 
another petition this time to the Shah in which they complained that “mercy is removed from 
the hearts of wheat dealers”.
68
 In the ensuing meeting between the Governor and the landlords 
the latter insisted on a free price system for wheat. Zahir al-Dowleh, on the other hand, read 
the telegraph of the Prime Minister which also contained the order of the Shah as to the 
release of necessary wheat to the market. Yet the landlords proved reluctant to comply with 
the order. Subsequently two hundred guild representatives sent another petition to the Shah 
which read as follows: 
Our khans need money to spend in the theatres of Paris and other cities of Farangestan, [Europe] 
while our beloved children paled out of hunger. Where is the Sultan of the Muslims and their 
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Honourable Ruler? Where is the justice of Anushirvan
69
 which passed to the ruling dynasty of 
Iran? How can justice allow for the hungry people to cry out of hunger in spite of this benevolence 
of glorious God, and how can it allow an ‘ashura
70
 to take place in this city? How can the 
Excellent Shah of shahs of the Muslims enjoy ten different foods in his meal while we are hungry 
and miserable?
71
        
Their demand was the release of each kharvar at ten tumans and Zahir al-Dowhleh promised 
them that he would ensure the release of twenty five thousand kharvars at that price.
72
 
However, no viable solution was reached and the guilds members closed their shops in 5 
October and took sanctuary in the telegraph office. They sent Hajj Sheikh Taqi Vakil al-
Ro’aya to Tehran to discuss the issue with the Prime Minister. Subsequently he acted as a 
deputy in the First Majles. The incident is important in several respects. First of all, it clearly 
shows the local power centres, the landlords, guilds, the notables, the governor, and the 
relatively weak authority of the central governments in the provinces. Secondly, it adds to our 
understanding of the already problematic class-based representation in the First Majles. Vakil 
al-Ro’aya was a leading merchant and later the head of Hamadan Union of Merchants. 
Therefore, there is a disagreement as to whether he represented the guilds in the First Majles 
or not.
73
 It is safe to suggest then that even if we leave aside the ambiguities of the Persian 
word tabaqeh for class, the pattern of representation in this Majles was determined by 
subjective class identification more than objective class positions. Therefore one should first 
reveal the specific class structure inherent in a given class habitus to disclose the structural 
dimension of what are seemingly inexplicable alliances. The third point concerns the issue of 
free-price system versus protectionism or some sort of self-subsistence. The last point endured 
through the Qajar period and well into the Pahlavi years. In the lack or viable of transport 
facilities, the free-price system was not regarded a suitable option since it could lead to 
famines in one region while another enjoyed a good harvest. Yet, on the other hand the 
country was long under foreign economic domination and the treaties signed with various 
states rendered price control practically infeasible. 
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The twelfth article of the Fundamental Laws stated that “no one, on any pretext or excuse, 
shall have any right, without the knowledge and approval of the National Consultative 
Assembly, to molest its members”. Furthermore, even if a deputy committed a crime he could 
not be arrested or punished without “‘the cognizance of the Assembly”.
74
 Mohammad Ali 
Shah, however, did the unthinkable and subjected the parliament to bombardment in 1908, 
badly shaking the basis of the ‘populist alliance’. Thus started what is known in Iranian 
history as Lesser Despotism which ruled for almost a year between 1908 and 1909. It once 
again became clear that the Iranian Majles, unlike the Ottoman one, lacked any substantial 
armed backing in the capital, hence it dissolved rapidly. Iran was now the arena of provincial 
politics and forces. A full-fledged assault on the constitutionalists was launched, leading to 
the execution of several of them such Jamal al-Din Va‘ez and Malek al-Motekellemin, to 
name two prominent figures, and to the exile and escape of many others. Royalism mixed 
with a discourse based on reaction against the so called bed‘at or reprehensible innovation in 
Islam constituted the core of the anti-constitutionalist movement. Although the resistance, 
mainly centred in Tabriz, against Mohammad Ali Shah’s absolutism was to restore the 
parliament in less than a year's time, the revolution had lost much of its fervour. Anti-
constitutional religious clamour was easily reacted to and condemned by the leading 
constitutionalists, but in the wider public, particularly among the merchants and artisans, 
some were left baffled. To this were added some unpopular economic and political 
developments. For example, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which divided Iran into a 
southern British sphere of influence and a northern Russian one, along with a neutral zone 
including Tehran, added to the anxiety over the integrity of the country, although parliament 
was not to blame for this. Besides, since the exorbitant court expenditures had always been a 
major concern for many of the constitutionalists, they sought ways to curtail it. To this end, in 
1907 a budget was drafted which not only targeted the extravagance of a few courtiers but 
also threatened the livelihood of thousands who made their living in the royal palace, in its 
various workshops.
75
          
With the termination of the first phase of the constitutional experiment, the political 
significance of Iranian guilds in the capital was also lost, and they were never to recover it. 
This shift was largely a result of a process during which a new political setting was emerging, 
which rested on new types of social groups using new discursive tools. Also, deprived of their 
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former economic strength, once they lost their political ground, trade guilds did not hold on 
very long to their social position. The ambiguous relations within guild organizations between 
the master, and the journeymen and apprentices, were in time replaced with a more rational 
and interest-based understanding. Many former craftsmen having gradually turned into wage 
labourers accelerated this process. Thus the gradual disintegration of the guild structure was a 




The Crisis of Parliamentary Politics: The Second Majles and the End of an Era 
The constitutionalists who were centred in Tabriz ultimately gained victory and succeeded in 
restoring the constitutional system by capturing Tehran and banishing Mohammad Ali Shah 
from the country. Iran now entered a new phase of parliamentary politics. A number of factors 
played a determining role in the shaping of this period which continued until mid-1920’s 
when the Qajar dynasty was replaced by the Pahlavi. First of all, the Electoral Law produced 
for the elections to the Second Majles brought about major changes. Secondly and in 
conjunction with the first, ideological differences which were already there from the turn of 
the century onwards became more pronounced, making it possible to talk about party politics 
during the Second Majles as indicated in many studies on the period. Thirdly tribal forces, 
particularly the Bakhtiyaris in the south, proved decisive in restoring the parliamentary 
system. Thus, from 1909 onwards they played major roles not only by occupying ministerial 
posts but more importantly, in regional politics. Fourthly, having already strengthened their 
position in Iran in 1907 Russia and Britain became more involved in the country’s politics 
both in the capital and in the provinces. These and other developments seriously influenced 
state-society relations in Iran during the period and formed the bases of later transformations. 
Now each of the above points will be discussed separately.  
The new Electoral Law drafted through the end of the Lesser Despotism abolished the 
tabaqeh-based electoral system and introduced a two-stage method throughout the country 
including Tehran.
77
 This meant that in the quarters of a city or in the towns of an Electoral 
Division the electorate would elect those persons, called the Elected, who would in turn go to 
the centre of the Electoral Division to elect the requisite number of deputies to the Majles. 
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The electorate were supposed to be Persian subjects and at least twenty years old, as opposed 
to twenty five years old in the former law. Also if they were not natives of their districts they 
should have settled there for at least six months prior to the election. Property qualifications 
were also modified. Accordingly, the electorate should fulfil one of the following three 
prerequisites: they were supposed to possess property amounting at least to 250 tumans (fifty 
pound sterling) or have a yearly income of fifty tumans (ten pound sterling); otherwise, they 
should annually pay at least ten tumans (two pound sterling) as tax. Those barred from right 
to vote were: foreign subjects, women, “persons whose apostasy from the orthodox religion of 
Islam has been established in the presence of a duly qualified representative of the Holy 
Law”, thieves, murderers and members of the naval and military forces actually in service.  
The following qualifications were looked for in the candidates: they were supposed to be 
Persian subjects aged between thirty and seventy with adequate reading and writing skills in 
the Persian language. In terms of faith they should be Muslim unless they represented 
Christians, Jews or Zoroastrians; and to be locally known and trustworthy. Those who failed 
to fulfil necessary qualifications for candidacy and those persons barred from the right to vote 
were barred from being elected along with the sons, brothers and paternal uncles of the Shah. 
Each of the Bakhtiyaris, Qashqais and Ilat-e Khamseh (Five Tribes) of Fars, Turkomans and 
Shahsevans of Azarbaijan would send one representative to the Majles. The number of the 
deputies was reduced from 160 to 120. According to the new law, Tehran which formerly sent 
sixty deputies would send fifteen while the provinces obtained more seats than before. Most 
notably Azerbaijan was given as many as 19 seats. It is argued that the law was not based on 
sound knowledge of the populations of the provinces and cities and the decision as to the 
numbers of deputies relied on estimation. Also, getting to the electoral divisions was another 
challenge due to the long distances. Such obstacles, and the ambiguities in the Electoral Law, 
caused several complaints.
78 
In the end the composition of the Second Majles came to be substantially different from the 
First. According to Dowlatabadi “the Second Majles had an air of wealth to it. It was filled 
with the members of the nobility and the wealthy. No attention was paid to the choice of the 
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masses of the nation. The seeds for this change were planted at the time when a two-stage 
election procedure was decided upon’.
79
 The Second Majjles commenced on 15 November 
1909 with the participation of only sixty one deputies out of 120. The structural changes laid 
the groundwork for ideological fragmentation too. Unlike the First Majles party politics was 
in play. The political atmosphere in the capital also played a role in this regard. First of all 
along with Mohammad Ali Shah prominent anti-constitutionalists were either exiled or 
executed, such as the high-ranking cleric Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri who was hanged following 
the Civil War in Tehran. This in turn resulted in the consolidation of the constitutional form 
of government despite the internal conflicts amongst constitutionalist forces which mostly 
originated in bids for greater power. Yet, the elimination of the common enemy in turn 
brought the already-existing but somehow postponed ideological differences to the fore. The 
main cliques were Democrats and Moderates while smaller groups such as Accord and 
Progress and The Progressives of the South were also formed.
80
 Here a brief analysis of the 
two main parties, the Democrat Party and the Moderate Party, will be provided.  
Socialist ideas had already gained ground in Iran from the early twentieth century onwards. 
Such figures as Haydar Khan Amu Oghli and Narim Narimanov had founded in 1905 the 
Social Democratic Committee of Iran whose members were known as Social Democrats 
(Ejtema‘iyun ‘Amiyun) in Baku where many Iranians lived and laboured. They consequently 
founded cells within Iran and the Iranian Social Democratic Party was founded in 1905. 
Social Democrats presented themselves as Democrats in the Second Majles for fear of 
negative reactions.
81
 Led by Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh the central committee of the party 
consisted of Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh, Solayman Mirza Eskandari, Mirza Baqer Agha 
Qafqazi, Mirza Abd al-Hosayn Khan Vahed al-Molk, Seyyed Mohammad Reza Mosavat, 
Mirza Ahmad Qazvini and Mirza Mahmud Khan.
82
 According to the Democrats, the twentieth 
century carried the same significance for the East as the seventeenth century carried for the 
West in the sense that the ‘outmoded feudal system’ was to be replaced by the overwhelming 
power of capitalism.
83
 Iran would also join this inexorable current of history. The party also 
expressed its determination to preserve the constitutional system and the rule of the 
parliament. Also according to the program of the party all of the members of the nation were 
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equal before the state irrespective of their ethnicity or religion. Freedom of the press, 
organization and movement were also stressed in the program.
84
 About economic issues the 
program was rather detailed. Apart from financial matters such as direct and indirect taxes, 
the program also touched upon the following labour issues: no child under the age of fourteen 
could be employed; the workday should not exceed ten hours; workers must have one day of 




Two points in the program deserve separate mention as far as labour and class issues are 
concerned. First, in the texts from early twentieth-century Iran the standard Persian equivalent 
of class was tabaqeh pl. tabaqat. The Democrats, however, stated that ‘the wellbeing of the 
country can only be obtained through a unity of the senf of the masses’.86 The term senf has 
historically been used to refer to a single trade guild such as senf-e dabbagh (tanners’ guild). 
Here however, it was used to mean class. Also, Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh, a prominent 
Democrat and the editor of Iran-e Now, the Democratic Party organ was ‘the only 
distinguished thinker in the party’s ranks’, used the same word in his Critique of the 
Moderates’ Party or Social Moderates which was one of the first detailed discussions on 
socialist ideas.87 In this work, he mentions senf-e karegaran (working class) and mobarezeh-e 
senfi (class struggle). On the other hand, although apparently Rasulzadeh makes no clear-cut 
distinction between tabaqeh and senf he repeatedly uses tabaqat-e momtazeh (privileged 
classes) and places senf-e aksariyat (the popular classes) against them.88  
According to Adamiyat the preamble of the Democratic Party’s program which contained the 
theoretical issues regarding socialism and class was also authored by Rasulzadeh.89 This 
makes the connection between the two texts clearer. Also as mentioned earlier unlike the First 
Majles trade guilds did not directly partake in the Second Majles and this made this shift of 
meaning possible. Secondly, the program was based on a clearly linear and progressive 
understanding of history and an objective perception of classes. Accordingly, as the world 
progressed, it was suggested, industrial tools and implements would also progress.90 Therefore 
unsurprisingly no mention was made of the non-factory labour which doubtlessly 
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encompassed the greater part of the labour force in Iran. Although most of the articles 
included in the Democratic Party’s program, particularly those related to labour issues, were 
largely to remain on paper, they were revolutionary in many respects. Iran-e Now started 
publications as an independent daily in August 1909 but was edited by several leading 
Democrats. Many of the social issues from the criticism of class society to the position of 
women and to ethnic and religious prejudices were discussed in this journal for the first 
time.91       
Revolutionary or not, the ideas expressed by Democrats infuriated more conservative circles 
both within and outside the Majles. Gradually the Moderate Party was formed. Led by 
Murteza Qoli Na’ini, Mohammad Sadeq Tabataba'i, son of the prominent mojtahed, a high 
ranking Shiate Islamic theologian, Tabataba'i, and Ali Mohammad Dowlatabadi, younger 
brother of the democrat Yahya Dawlatabadi, Moderates gained a wide support from various 
classes. Compared to that of the Democrats their program was far from coherent.
92
 It stressed 
the importance of Islam as a uniting bond amongst Iranians. It than summarized the Party`s 
main perspective under seven articles where emphasis was made on progress, centralization, 
obligatory education, improvement of the armed forces as well as of the foreign relations in 
order to develop trade. In the third and fourth articles, attending to the situation of those who 
toil (ranjbaran), and improving their living conditions are stressed. Moderates regarded 
Democrats’ ideas as a source of ‘devilry and corruption’ and a cause of disorder in state 
affairs.
93
 Behbehani, a leading Moderate, severely attacked Taqizadeh and even obtained a 
fatwa from the leading ulama in Najaf as to his apostasy from Islam.
94
 Islam was again at the 
core of the clash between the two parties and their supporters. Democrats` emphasis on the 
separation of religion and state apparently resented not only the ulama but also other 
conservative groups including a good part of the members of the trade guilds. Generally 
speaking, the lower classes were rather conservative and under the influence of the clergy. 
Thus any allegedly anti-Islamic move or idea provoked them. For example agitated by an 
article published in Habl al-Matin of Tehran trade guilds in the city pressed for and secured 
the banning of the newspaper as well as the imprisonment of its editor Mirza Hasan 
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 The assassination of the leading cleric Behbehani further escalated the tensions and 
resulted in the closing of Iran-e Now and the exile of Taqizadeh.   
Another significant development of this period was the ever-increasing influence of tribal 
elements in Iran. Their influence both on the capital and in the provinces was furthered 
through their participation in restoring the constitutional government in 1909 and continued 
roughly until mid-1920’s. The political instability in Tehran provided a suitable atmosphere 
for Turkomans in north Khorasan, Shahsevans in Azerbaijan, and Kurds in Lorestan to 
disregard the central authority and expand their own to neighbouring towns and villages. The 
position of the Bakhtiyari chiefs was particularly impressive in mid-1911. As Samsam al-
Saltaneh presided over the government in Tehran, the palace guard and the War Ministry were 
under different branches of this tribe while Sardar Asad, the former minister of war, continued 
to be a prominent figure in the capital. Also from 1909 on all of the governors of Fars were 
from the Bakhtiyari tribe. This escalated both inter- and intra-tribal conflicts. Furthermore, the 
six leading chiefs of the Ilkhani and the Hajj Ilkhan families of the Bakhtiyari tribe signed 
agreements with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the protection of the company`s 
installations in return for a 3 percent share of the profits.
96
  
This political instability and fragmentation stimulated further foreign intervention in the 
country. While the British were busy strengthening their position in the south, the Russians 
were alarmed by the policies of the Majles and regarded them as contrary to their interests. 
The appointment of the American, Morgan Shuster, as treasurer-general of Iran and his 
economic and political policies brought about the Russian ultimatum of 1911. Having already 
occupied Anzali and Rasht in the north, the Russians delivered an ultimatum to the Majles 
with the following conditions: Shuster would be dismissed; no foreign adviser would be hired 
without a mutual consent from the British and Russians; and an indemnity would be paid to 
cover the expenses of the expeditionary forces in Anzali and Rasht. The Majles at first 
rejected the ultimatum but the Russians marched to Qazvin, and open confrontations took 
place between the Russian troops and Iranians, who suffered many casualties. Widespread 
public demonstrations for the rejection of the ultimatum reached a peak with this move, and 
Russian goods were boycotted. The boycott was a part of a larger issue of excessive imports 
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and a result of the already existing opposition to Russian economic penetration. The following 
petition sent from in 1911 provides a good illustration of the anti-Russian feelings and the 
popular disillusionment from the Majles:  
How long should we, the oppressed and helpless people, bear the merciless transgressions and 
unlawful violence of the northern neighbour [Russia] which each and every day produces new and 
countless transgressions and removes our security by various tricks? Does international law not 
apply in Iran? […] Do you not pay attention to the future of this country? Will you not question 
the groundless existence of the troops of the northern neighbour? [… ] Do you not consider 
ourselves accountable in before God and people?
97
       
Yet the protests and boycott failed and ultimately the Majles accepted the ultimatum and 
submitted to the Russian demands. This brought the end of the Second Majles in 1911. After 
the first constitutional experiment between 1906 and 1908, parliamentary politics failed once 
again. This time the final blow came mainly from external factors. The new era was 
predominantly characterized by local politics, security crises and a quest for order.  
 
Constitutionalism without a Parliament: Local Politics and the Rise of Reza Shah 
In Iran there was much disparity between popular expectations from the constitutional system 
and what it actually brought about. For the masses, constitutionalism entailed dignity for 
themselves and the homeland, stability and political as well as economic growth. For many it 
was like a magic wand which could heal any of Iran’s problems. Yet the subsequent 
developments largely lagged behind these expectations. The Revolution was successful in 
creating a political community in Iran but its achievements were overshadowed by its failures. 
The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the Russian Ultimatum of 1911 disillusioned 
people, and the constant confrontations between royalist and constitutionalist forces seriously 
exhausted them, further deteriorated their living conditions and stripped them of security.
98
 
                                                          
97
 “From Isfahan to Tehran, March 1911”, in Yusofi Neya, Asnad-e Tejari, 206. Apparently, such feelings did 
not always materialize affective boycotts. Thus, the extent and the popularity of the boycotts were not the same 
in every corner of the country. Although in the north and in the capital the enthusiasm was rather high but in 
such cities as Isfahan the situation seems to be different. A report on the trade of the town in 1911 states that 
being under the pressure of the clergy the merchants boycotted Russian sugar and other goods but in march 1911 
this did not bring about any apparent effect on trade. FO 248/1029, 1911, “The Trade Report for the year 1910-
1911”.  
98
 There were several reports to in this regard. For example, in Mazandaran, northern Iran, Consul Rabino 
informed the Legation in 1911 that “the nationalists and ex-Shah`s supporters between them have robbed the 
unfortunate inhabitants of Mazandaran of all they had”. Quoted in Muhammad Ali Kazembeyki, Society, Politics 
and Economic in Mazandaran, Iran, 1848-1914 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 191. In the same year, G. 
Grahame, the British consul in Isfahan, made the following observation: “Now that clerical pressure has relaxed, 
74 
 
From 1911 onwards Iran entered the Naseri Period when Naser al-Molk, who had been acting 
as a regent to the under-aged young Ahmad Shah since the beginning of this year, ruled 
without a Majles. This period was marked by rising provincial powers rather than 
parliamentary politics. The First World War added to the disintegration of provinces from the 
centre. Although Iran remained neutral during the war, the country was partly invaded by the 
Ottomans and Russians in the north along with the continued presence of the British in the 
south.  
The political instability in the capital and the inability of governments to resist foreign 
penetration widened the gap between Tehran and the provinces. Britain and Russia had 
substantially consolidated their position in the country. While they played decisive roles in the 
capital they were also influential in the provinces. In March 1915 Britain and Russia signed 
the Constantinople Agreement. Accordingly, while the British extended their sphere of 
influence to the central neutral zone Russians obtained full freedom of action in the north. 
Besides, the Third Majles which met in 1914 was, in less than a year, dismissed by the 
Russians again. In the provinces they exercised their influence through their political 
missions. Apart from being a popular location for bast, the foreign legations were also 
involved in local matters. The following letter written by an ‘unknown party’ and entitled 
‘collective appeal to the ambassadors of all governments’ summarizes the general feeling 
against foreign powers. Allegedly intercepted at post office in Qazvin on its way from Tehran 
to Tabriz, the letter is worth quoting at length: 
Although we are certain that Their Exellencies [sic.], the ambassadors are well aware of all events 
that have occurred in this country, and possess full knowledge of the hardships and sacrifices 
sustained by the Persian nation, in her effort to attain liberty and establish a constitutional system 
of government, nevertheless perceiving in the actions of the present Cabinet, which pretends to 
have the support of the British Government – such acts, as closing our newspapers and meetings – 
a danger and menace to the constitutional system of our country. We hereby appeal to you, in the 
name of the defence of freedom and law, to come to our assistance. 
It is evident to all those who are informed of the history of our country during the last twelve years 
that, from the very beginning of the revolutionary movement in our country, the sympathies and 
the hopes of the nation were turned toward the English, whose previous representatives, in the face 
of the oppressive and aggressive measures of the tyrannical Russian government, had rendered 
considerable assistance, and displayed goodwill to those who were striving for the freedom of their 
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country. Since the treaty 1907, however, and the change of representative, namely from the time 
the British Government, in spite of all the awful blows dealt on Persia by the Tsar`s Government, 
assumed an attitude of silent watchfulness and withdrew all assistance from the struggling 
democracy of Persia, and gradually, as it appeared that the British Legation was showing moral 
assistance and encouragement to the oppressive steps of the Tsar`s Government, the same general 
dislike and hatred which were felt against the Russian Government now reverted to the British 
Government.  
At the outbreak of the European War and the appearance of a third diplomacy in Persia [i.e. 
Germany], the general feeling and sympathy of the liberty-loving were turned to Germany, with 
the hope that seeing this, the English would renew their previous views of and defend the national 
and legitimate rights of the Persians and their independence. Great efforts were made in this 
direction until finally the Government at London, perceiving the results of the ill-behaviour of 
their former representative, rekindled a great hope in the hearts of the Persians by recalling their 
Minister and replacing him by Sir Percy Cox. From the moment of the latter`s arrival all eyes were 
turned to him and great were the hopes lain on him. But regretfully in view of the conduct and 
course of the present Cabinet, which is definitely anti-constitutional, anti-democratic and which 
moreover pretends to be backed up by the British Legation, the hopes of Persians have turned into 
despair.  
We therefore consider it necessary to invite the attention of the diplomatic representatives to the 
following: 
If the pretentions of the present Cabinet are true, and H. E. the British Minister had, through such 
traitors and unprincipled men revived the operations of the despotic Russian Government, then he 
should answer the following questions in order that the Persians may know their position and duty 
prior to the assembly of the peace conference. 
Are the declarations of the British Government and the English Press concerning non-interference 
in Persian affairs sincere or not? 
Does the democratic Government of England permit of violation of liberty and lawless acts in 
Persia?       
Had England any aim other than commercial speculations in Persia? 
Does the independence and progress of Persia interfere with the commercial plans of England? 
Is it possible now to deceive and blind-fold the Persians as usual with absurd and tinted phrases? 
Is it supposed that the Persians will continue to be silent in the face of all illegal interference? 
Is not [sic.] the support and encouragement of tyrants and criminals in this era of socialistic ideas a 
shame and disgrace? 
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Are the losses and damages incurred by Persia and the Persians through various intrigues and 
devices sufficient?  
Is Persia guilty in happening to be a neighbour of England? 
Are the robberies and crimes perpetrated by the members of the present Cabinet and their 
treachery to Persia unknown to the diplomatic representatives and do they require confirmation? 
There are these and many other questions which cannot be inserted here.  
If in fact there is not mutual understanding between the British Legation and the Cabinet and they 
(the English) prefer general sympathy and good feelings then they should openly declare this and 
their non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia and thus lift off the minds of the people the 
general anxiety and distrust.
99
                    
The disillusionment with foreign powers elaborated in the above letter was a widespread 
phenomenon in Iran during the 1910’s. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 added to the 
sentiment. The agreement, which was never ratified by the Majles since there was none in 
place for the previous four years, “gave the British a free hand, to the virtual exclusion of 
others, in the affairs of Persia”.
100
 The British would lend required advisors to Persia and 
supply munitions and equipment for a national army which was to be trained by British 
officers. Also two million pounds sterling would be provided to Persia for necessary reforms, 
customs tariffs would be revised and assistance would be provided for railway 
construction.
101
 The British and the Premier Vosuq al-Dowleh came under fire both inside and 
outside the country. The political turmoil and unpopular decisions raised the provinces to 
prominence in national politics once again. Generally speaking, provinces had already 
become of great political importance during this period in two different ways. On the one 
hand tribal elements extended their influence and hence political power as indicated above.  
Also, there was dissatisfaction from governors in various parts of the country. On the other 
hand, nationalist uprisings took place, particularly in the north. In 1920 Sheikh Mohammad 
Khiyabani and his Democratic followers took control of Tabriz with a great part of Azerbaijan 
which they now named Azadestan (The Land of the Free). In Gilan Mirza Kuchak Khan had 
already triggered a rebellion which is known as the Jangali (Forester) Movement in Iranian 
history for the first group of Jangalis took to Gilan’s forests (jangal). Backed by the Red 
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Economically speaking, several important laws, with major economic and social 
consequences, were passed by the Majles between 1906 and 1911. In 1907 a committee was 
appointed in order to examine financial reform which was directly linked to the issue of land 
tenure. Subsequently four measures were adopted: pensions and grants paid to a large number 
of individuals were either greatly reduced or completely abolished; revisions were made in 
provincial revenue assessments; the toyul system was abolished; and the conversion rates, 
were abrogated.
103
 Also due to the disastrous effects of the First World War and its aftermath 
a number of measures were taken to support the poorer classes which will be discussed in the 
Third Chapter. Yet, lack of viable infrastructural facilities and political problems impeded any 
sustainable economic growth which would positively affect the lives of the larger population. 
Taken as a whole, Iran was wedged between the two superpowers of the period, Britain and 
Russia, and therefore its economic policies were made in a context of semi-colonization, with 
the full ramifications of this in both the political and economic realms. Although the 
constitution theoretically remained in effect after 1911, it only existed on paper. Following the 
bombardment of the First Majles it had taken 18 months until the second one was convened. 
Once the Second Majles was dissolved, Iran had to wait almost for three years for the Third 
Majles, which survived for only eleven months. It was only by the end of the First World War 
that the Fourth Majles commenced in 1919, to remain in force for two years, after which it 
took another eight months for the Fifth Majles which crowned Reza Khan as Reza Shah 
Pahlavi and ratified the change of dynasty in 1925. Overall, between 1906 and 1925 the 
Majles remained in force for only seven years in total.
104
  
The history of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution is, in a sense, a history of centralization 
on different levels. The fragmentation of the armed forces, mostly tribal, the lack of any 
viable national market and the chronic inability of an efficient tax-collection system had long 
stoked demand for the establishment of an effective central government. Constitutionalism at 
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first provided a necessary stimulus for the increasing integration of the provinces with the 
centre. Local power bases were more or less well-represented in the First Majles. Yet, from 
the Second Majles onwards, provinces, or at least the have-nots residing therein, were further 
pushed to the margins of the constitutional system. One paradoxical feature of centralization 
during this period was that the material means to bring it about were largely absent. 
Communication and transportation facilities were insufficient. The following illustrates the 
unfavourable situation of transportation in Iran:  
A British firm shipped a consignment of piecegoods from Manchester in October 1909. 
Reforwarded from Bushire for Tabriz on the 22dn December 1909, these goods were abandoned at 
Dashtarjin (about 40 miles south of Shiraz) in January 1910, the muleteer refusing to proceed 
further on account of the insecurity of the road. Eventually, i.e, in May 1910, the goods reached 
Shiraz and were reforwarded from there for Isfahan in July but got no further than the first stage, 
Zarghan, about 24 miles north of Shiraz, the road further north being blocked. Brought back to 
Shiraz on 6
th
 December 1910 they were reforwarded on 6
th
 January 1911 and arrived in Isfahan ın 
March 1911, having taken approximately 19 months from the date of their despatch from 
Manchester to that of arrival at their destination.
105 
The Constitutional Revolution brought diverse social groups into the political sphere in Iran 
and contributed to the making of a political community which was underway especially from 
late nineteenth century onwards. Nonetheless, it ultimately failed to rid Iran of its chronic 
problems of economic deterioration and political instability. In a sense, the Constitutional 
Revolution had “destroyed the traditional centre of despotic power without producing an 
adequate substitute.”
106
 As the well-to-do felt insecure about their property, the lower classes 
were disillusioned by instability and external oppression. A widespread belief emerged in the 
need for a strong government which, according to many, was important above all else. The 
military coup launched in 1921 took shape in such an atmosphere. Henceforth Reza Khan, 
later on Reza Shah, would ensure much of the desired leap-forward in terms of territorial 
integrity, political independence and economic growth at the expense of undoing much of the 
achievements of a genuine parliamentary experiment, albeit of a much precarious nature, of 
the preceding two decades.  
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From Freedom to Security: Reza Shah and the Period of Pragmatist Modernization  
The two decades of Iranian history between 1921 and 1941 have largely been dealt with in a 
manner heavily laden with the modernist paradigm.
107
 Industrialization, secularization and 
nationalism are often presented as the main triumvirate of Pahlavi modernization.
108
 What 
distinguished Pahlavi modernization from the “renovation” (tajaddod) of previous 
generations was its radical attitude both in its form and content. The Pahlavi modernization 
was selective in the sense of giving immediate priority to certain issues while postponing, and 
even dismissing altogether, certain other issues. Centralization, accompanied with a 
nationalist outfit, and industrialization, equated with large-scale industrial establishments 
were the two most immediate priorities of this modernization. Pahlavi modernization was not 
only selective but also had several contradictory features. The parliamentary guise of the 
system was preserved and the constitution remained intact throughout. Yet from the Fifth 
Majlis in 1925 onwards while the Majlis lost much of its real power, and the constitution was 
often ignored. Also while such grand military and economic projects as universal male 
conscription and the Trans-Iranian Railway Project were undertaken, they usually added to 
the burden of the poorer classes, rather than improving their living and working conditions. 
This feature struck contemporary observes such as Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British 
Minister in Tehran, who in 1935 criticized the Pahlavi modernization project for being 
“progress for progress’ sake”, because of the implementation of policies allegedly without too 
much consideration for whether they suited the conditions of the country.
109
 The following is 
a discussion of Pahlavi modernization in the context of centralization, which I present in order 
to provide a backdrop for the next two chapters. 
In February 1921 two men, Reza Khan who was a commander of the Cossack Brigade based 
in Qazvin and the Seyyed Zia Tabataba’i, a liberal journalist, launched a relatively uneventful 
military coup. Seyyed Zia was soon appointed as Prime Minister but shortly after had to leave 
the country and was replaced by Qavam al-Saltaneh. Acting after the coup first as the 
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Commander in Chief (Sardar-e Sepah) from 1921, then the Minister of War from 1922 and 
finally the Prime Minister from 1923, Reza Khan was by mid-1920’s the undisputed leader of 
Iran even before his coronation as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925. He owed his early prestige 
largely to a number of operations he launched against local power bases which had 
accumulated an immense material wealth that translated at the same time to political power. 
This in turn paved the way for greater foreign influence as foreign powers found it more 
reasonable to negotiate with actual local power holders than with the weak central authority. 
For Reza Khan and the ruling elites around him, centralization was of utmost importance, and 
this could only be achieved by dismantling local power bases. Furthermore foreign influence 
was an equally discernible hindrance to progress and modernization. Thus they saw in every 
move towards political or economic progress a blow to foreign domination. In a series of 
military operations between 1921 and 1925, he had suppressed, often in a bloody manner, his 
opponents and regional uprisings. By terminating the Jangali Movement in 1921 he at once 
eliminated a major internal threat and checked Russian influence in northern Iran. The same 
was true of the campaigns he launched against several tribal leaders, most significantly 
against Sheikh Khazal who was the Sheikh of Mohammereh and a British protégé.110  
The literati and the ruling classes celebrated this not merely as yet another step towards 
territorial integrity but more importantly as halting the overwhelming influence of the British. 
In the meantime a number other revolts such as the one against Mohammad Taqi Khan, a 
gendarme colonel in Khorasan and against Esma’il Agha Semko, a Kurdish tribal leader in 
northwest Iran, were also crushed and the state authority was restored in these regions too.
111
 
In the face of these significant achievements little room was left for his opponents to 
disfavour Reza Khan in the eyes of the public. The following remarks of Seyyed Hasan 
Modarres, a staunch opponent of the Minister of War and vice president of the Fourth Majles, 
aptly illustrate this ambivalent attitude: 
“We have no fear of Reza Khan. Why should we speak with reserve? We must speak frankly. We 
have the power to dismiss and to change the government, the Shah and everyone else. We can also 
dismiss Reza Khan if we so desire, and nothing is easier… This authority of the Majles is 
supreme… However, the good qualities of the Minister of War outweigh his bad ones… He is a 
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mere fly on the face of our nation. In my opinion the Minister of War had major merits and minor 
defects.”
112
      
Not only did the ‘supreme authority` of the Majles come to be more apparent than real, but it 
also appeared that Reza Khan was, for many Iranians, more than ‘a mere fly` on the face of 
the nation. He had already turned into a hero in the eyes of an increasing number of people 
owing to his promising moves towards the consolidation of security in the country and the 
relative flourishing of mercantile activities. This point was expressed by some two hundred 
merchants in 1922 in a letter where they displayed their gratitude to the Minister of War in the 
following manner: “before our beloved commander saved us, the Islamic Empire of Iran was 
disintegrating. The army had collapsed, the tribes were looting, the country was the laughing 
stock of the world. Thanks to the commander, we now travel without fear, admire our 
country, and enjoy the fruits of law and order.”
113
  
Yet, Reza Shah`s real show of strength came following his resignation as Minister of War in 
October 1922 shortly after Modarres’ above remarks. The first reaction came from his officers 
who went as far as parading through the streets of Tehran in support of their commander. 
More importantly, however, petitions poured into the Majles from the provinces for the 
rejection of his resignation. In some cases petitioners were rather aggressive and even 
threatening. Because of their significance in shedding light on popular perceptions of the 
political process, these petitions deserve to be analysed at some length. The following 
observations are based on thirty six petitions which were sent in support of Reza Khan upon 
his resignation.114 Although the crisis continued for about only ten days, the echo it created in 
the provinces was immense, as was the speed with which the news spread. Until the end of 
October 1922, apparently even after the crisis settled down and Reza Khan withdrew his 
resignation, the Majles kept receiving letters from all over the country, including Anzali, 
Isfahan. Astarabad, Khorasan, Golpayagan, Mashhad, Rasht, Yazd, Kermanshah, Malayer, 
Rafsanjan, Shiraz, Kerman and Borujerd. The petitioners ranged from guildmen to merchants 
and from the clergy to ordinary people, whose opinions have so far been underrepresented in 
the current literature. The letters started by expressing their respect for the Majles and praying 
for its perpetuation. Then the supplicants shared their dissatisfaction with resignation by 
adding in some cases that people took sanctuary in telegraph offices and even stopped work to 
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which they would only return once the crisis was solved. They then emphasized the services 
undertaken by Reza Khan, often called Vazir-e Mo‘azzam (the Glorious Minister) and Hazrat-
e Ashraf (the Honorable Presence) in the letters, in restoring peace to the country and paving 
the way for its progress. The telegraph sent from Golpayagan, a town close to Isfahan, in 17 
October 1922 openly targeted the opponents of the ‘beloved’ Minister of War who, the 
petitioners argued, was the First Man of the country (shakhs-e avval-e mamlakat). The letter 
criticized the opponents of Reza Khan for not having seen the plunder and looting committed 
by the Bakhtiyaris. An intense concern for security and peace dominated the discourse of the 
petitions. They made repeated references to the plight of the country which, they argued, the 
patriotic Reza Khan reversed. The letter sent from Rasht on 15 October 1922 adequately 
summarizes the prevalent popular feeling about the crisis: 
To the Sublime Majles, to the Prime Ministry, through Hojjat al-Islam Behbehani to all the ulama 
and through Hajj Amin al-Darb to all merchants and guilds member and to Iran Newspaper.  
If the Majles is to be influential in the country and if the nation is to possess laws and gain respect 
before other nations, this will only be attained through the Majles. The creation of disciplined 
troops and military divisions jealous for their country will provide the Parliament its first and 
foremost protector. […] The Minister of War is renowned for his effort to form a government in 
Iran, and to revive thousands of troops under the flag of Iran and he is well-known for his love for 
the independence and progress of his country. Through various struggles he restored security in 
Gilan, Azerbaijan and Khorasan. […] Because of his resignation people in our town stopped 
working and gathered at the telegraph office. Thus we request you to block the ways to seditious 
elements and to cut the hands of the devious people and work and fight for the protection of laws 
and order which are the first task of the Majles and the military forces. We ask the Minister of War 
to withdraw his resignation and inform us on the matter so that we go back to our jobs.
115 
Following this incident Reza Khan followed a steady rise to greater power and was finally 
crowned in 1925. In this he was celebrated by a significant part of the population and 
supported by modernist nationalists. In the Fourth and the Fifth Majles he was supported by 
certain groups. These groups were formed from four parties: the conservatives of Hezb-e 
Eslah-taleban (Reformers` Party); reformers of the Hezb-e Tajaddod (Revival Party); and the 
radicals of the Hezb-e Susyalist (Socialist Party).116 In the first group Modarres, Firuz 
Farmanfarmaian, Qaval al-Saltaneh, and Seyyed Ahmad Behbehani, son of the famous 
mojtaheds who had been assassinated in 1909, were among the leading figures. The Revival 
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Party was formed by young Western-educated individuals such as Abd al-Hossayn 
Teymurtash, a major Khorasanian landowner, Prince Firuz Mirza, a Qajar prince and a lawyer 
and Ali Akbar Davar. Such prominent constitutionalist figures from the previous generation 
as Taqizadeh, Bahar, Mustowfi al-Mamalek, Ali Zoka al-Molk (Forughi), and Shahrokh 
Arbab Kaykhosrow were also associated with the Revivalists. The Socialist Party was led by 
Mirza Sulayman Eskandari, Mosavat and Qasem Khan Sur, the editor of Sur-e Esrafil. They 
were also allied with the Communist Party. They have published: Paykar (Battle); Nasihat 
(Exhortation); Sada-ye Sharq (The Voice of the East); Faryad-e Kargaran-e Azerbaijan (Cry 
of the Azerbaijan Workers); and Banvor (Worker) in Armenian.  
The Revival Party was highly influential on Reza Shah and its ideas were largely in line with 
Pahlavi modernization. The following were among the principle publications of the 
Revivalists: Iranshahr (Country of Iran) published by Hosayn Kazemzadeh in Berlin between 
1922 and 1927; Farangestan (Europe) edited by Mostafeh Kazemi in Germany between 1924 
and 1926; and Ayandeh (The Future) edited by Mahmud Afshar in Tehran in 1925. The 
creation of a centralized state was among the main concerns of the Revivalists. They called 
for “separation of religion from politics, creation of a well-disciplined army and a well-
administered bureaucracy, an end to economic capitulations, industrialization, replacement of 
foreign capital by native capital, transformation of nomads into farmers, a progressive income 
tax, expansion of educational facilities for all, including women, careers being open to talent, 
and replacement of minority languages throughout Iran by Persian.” Through these measures 
the power of the tribal forces, the financial and judicial powers of the clergy, the autonomy of 
minorities, and foreign influence would be broken, which would in turn lay the ground for the 
establishment of a modern centralized state. Furthermore such moves would also remove 
‘disunity’ which, in Ahmad Kasravi’s words, was “the worst calamity that [could] befall a 
nation”. He formulated the bases of disunity as follows:    
Factionalism is one of the worst maladies afflicting Iran. Factionalism is caused by religious 
sectarianism: I can count fourteen separate sects, each with its own separate goals, interests, and 
leaders. Each in fact is a state within a state. Factionalism caused by tribal and linguistic 
differences: there are innumerable tribes and at least eight major linguistic groups. And 
factionalism caused by wide social differences – between the city and the country, the young and 
the old, the modern educated elite and the traditional-minded masses.
117
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A number of measures were adopted for the creation of a nationwide market and further 
territorial integrity. In 1927 the Trans-Iranian Railway project, which linked the Caspian Sea 
through Tehran to the Persian Gulf, was launched, to be completed more than a decade later. 
Overall the two thousand miles of roads which existed in Iran in 1925 had multiplied to 
14,000 by the end of the Reza Shah period.
118
 Infrastructural measures were accompanied by 
a number of economic legislations such as the following; the law exempting industrial and 
agricultural machines and instruments and their component parts from import duties for ten 
years (1925); a law for the establishment a state monopoly on sugar, sugared goods and tea 
(1925); the establishment of the National Bank; abolition of guild taxes on 216 guilds; and the 
abolition of capitulations in 1927. During this time Arthur Millspaugh, the American 
Administrator General of the Finances, was in control of finances until he was dismissed in 
1927 and in 1928 tariff autonomy was attained. The policies concerned macro projects and 
paid little, if any, attention to the subaltern classes. Thus the following remarks written in 
1929 by R. H. Clive, the British Minister in Tehran, hardly exaggerated the situation:   
Although there is perhaps a growing consciousness in responsible circles that the needs of the 
poorer classes of the population will have to be attended to sooner or later there is no doubt that 
window-dressing is still the order of the day. Apart from the questions of security and 
communications one looks in vain for any indication of real value in the so-called reforms of the 
Pahlavi regime. Even the ambitious railways project is the child of national sentiment rather than 
that of material necessity. Tehran must have more water, better lighting, wider street, because 
Tehran must be counted an up-to-date capital. But no thought is given to the unhappy poor whose 
houses are ruthlessly pulled down, the compensation voted by the Majlis accruing as everyone 
knows to the benefit of the municipal authorities whose destructive propensities consequently pass 
all rational bounds. Venereal disease is said to affect 80 percent of the urban population; the 
infantile mortality in Tehran is estimated at 60 percent; yet these vital problems claim far less 
attention than that of the dress, and monies which would be spent in attempts to solve them 
continue to be wasted on the external trappings of civilization.
119
 
The 1930’s were the golden age of grand projects. The economic depression during these 
years called for more bureaucratic control over the national economy. Especially during the 
Eighth Majles which commenced in 1930 further economic measures were adopted resulting 
in the consolidation of the state’s control over economic development. Reza Shah had 
declared that “we wish this Majles to be known in the history of the country as the ‘Economic 
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 In 1931 a law was passed which established state 
monopoly over foreign trade Taken as a whole the state had filled in the vacuum left by the 
gradual removal of local power bases and it did so to an unprecedented extent through the 
newly established ten ministries. These ministries were the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Roads and Industry and they employed 90,000 civil servants 
living on government salaries.
121
 In 1937 the previous division of a few large provinces 
(iyalat) and a large number of small districts (velayat) was replaced by a more elaborate 
arrangement which established: eleven provinces (ostan) governed by governor-generals; 
forty-nine countries (shahrestan) governed by governors; numerous municipalities (bakhsh) 
governor by manors; and large districts (dehestan) governed by officials appointed by the 
Ministry of the Interior.
122
 Increasing centralization also attracted opposition since the 
traditional means of production, transportation or arbitration provided a source of livelihood 
for large numbers of people. Industrialization policies or the modernization of transport and 
communication facilities or the centralization of judicial affairs inevitably evoked resentment 
from these groups as in the case of the carriage drivers of Rasht. Reza Shah and his entourage 
paid particular attention to the northern provinces of Iran which received the lion’s share of 
attention from modernization policies. In January 1931 the drivers sent a petition, with twenty 
two stamps on it, to the Majles in which they complained about the deterioration in their 
business due to the increasing numbers of motorcars. Their reaction to the decision illustrates 
a typical response to the centralization policies of the state. They wrote:  
In the past when there were no cars the business of this weak people was good and we used to pay 
12 qrans as a monthly tax. When the tolls were cancelled we had to give 17 qrans and two shahis. 
[…] Later we were ordered to give three tumans although because of the increasing number of 
automobiles we work from the morning until four at night to only earn our bread. What we earn is 
not enough for our horses, the stablemen and our families since each have us have ten or twelve 
persons in our family to provide for. Despite all difficulties we have so far complied with the order 
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and paid three tumans. But we humbly request the sacred Majles to take pity on us and reduce the 
taxes so that we increase our prayers for you.
123
   
In March a new petition arrived to the same effect containing more details about the bitterness 
of their living conditions. Apparently achieving no tangible results, the drivers sent a third 
petition in November 1931 which added new dimensions to the issue. After repeating their 
complaint about the spread of motorcars in Iran, particularly in Gilan which, argued the 
petitioners, seriously hurt their business, the decision of the Municipality to strictly forbid the 
passage of carriages from the bazaars dealt yet another blow to their business. People were no 
longer able to reach the drivers easily when they needed. The drivers asked in the end the 
removal of the ban on the carriages and the restoration of “order”. Following internal 
correspondence between the Majles and the Ministry of the Interior the latter informed the 
former in December 1931 that the ban in the bazaars was for the safety of pedestrians and at 
the large streets and districts the carriages could move freely. The same kind of complaints 
arose about the trade monopoly law and similar new legislations.124  
The ever increasing penetration of the state power and the growing bureaucratization 
constituted a major turning point in state-society interactions in Iran. Besides, apart from these 
‘material’ aspects the Pahlavi modernization included a wide range of cultural dimensions 
such as the dissemination of education, imposing certain dress codes and ‘language 
engineering’.125 The main aspiration behind such policies was to further the centralization of 
authority and constructing and penetrating the ideological pillars of it to the wider population. 
With regard to the language issue there have already been several attempts in the late Ottoman 
Empire and Iran to simplify the language and the alphabet. Yet, the radical attitudes taken 
towards language by the early Republican elites in Turkey or by the ruling elites during the 
Reza Shah period in Iran were substantially different. Now, the unification of linguistic 
groups under one exclusive language constituted the core of the linguistic policies rather than 
the simplification of the alphabet. Put differently, language was instrumentalized in order to 
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achieve a higher degree of centralization. The following case vividly illustrates how such 
policies influenced state-society relations in Iran during the period in question. The Deputy of 
Armenians in Tabriz sent a petition in 1931 in which he complained about the linguistic 
policies and the attitude of the Head of the Directory of Education in the city. He complained 
about “the unprecedented negative attitude towards the Armenian language, singing in 
Armenian and the Armenian schools”.126 According to the petition, the American school in 
Tabriz invited the Deputy to deliver a speech in its fiftieth anniversary celebrations since two 
hundred Armenian boys and girls studied there. But he was prevented from speaking in 
Armenian and was told to speak either in Persian or in English. Also Mademoiselle Shahgelan 
[?] was invited to give a concert but she also was told by the Directory that she could sing in 
Persian, Italian, Russian and French but not in Armenian. Armenian schools were banned 
from organizing events and so were the Armenian artists from using the Armenian language. 
To this effect announcements were written in Armenian and posted on the street. Finally the 
Deputy stressed the adverse consequences of this kind of measures which would “separate the 
Armenian nation (mellat-e Arameneh) and Iranian people (ahali-ye Iran)”. The main and the 
larger agenda behind such policies was the submission of all social groups to state authority. 
Ethnic groups, linguistic groups, tribal elements and finally social classes, primarily workers, 
should be seen as parts of this policy.  
Once more or less confident as the absolute ruler of the country, Reza Shah took steps to 
concentrate power in his own hands by eliminating the powerful men around him. Yet the 
parliamentary guise of the system was preserved and the constitution remained intact. His 
modernizing policies fundamentally transformed Iran. By the end of Reza Shah’s reign 
thousands of miles of roads and railways had been constructed, hundreds of schools, 
including the highly influential Tehran University, had been established, an immense 
bureaucracy had been created. In addition, tens of large-scale industrial establishments 
employing hundreds of thousands of workers had been erected. Forced by the occupying 
British and Russian forces when Reza Shah abdicated the throne in favour of his son, 
Mohammad Reza Shah, judged by the outer standards of modernization, left behind a modern 
country, but with all the inherent complications of top-down modernization. It was within this 
political context that the Iranian working class was made and negotiated its interests. 
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The proclamation of the constitution by the ailing Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1906 contributed 
to the making of a political community in Iran. Diverse social groups participated in the 
making of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909. Initially the most popular demand 
voiced by the masses and the elites alike was the formation of a House of Justice which would 
ensure a jut order and remove arbitrary rule. Although the low level of large-scale 
industrialization determined the course of urban-based collective labour activism, labour 
became in this period an issue of unprecedented importance. For this development, not 
industrial workers, but those who were employed in craft industries were responsible. Also, 
the development of a distinctive worker identity also took place in this period. This 
development was a result of a complex process where the majority of workers found their 
livelihood threatened first due to the European economic domination and then because of the 
factory-based industrialization which paid little, if any, attention to anything other than the 
materialization of macroeconomic development and grand industrial projects. As will be 
discussed in the following chapters, confrontational labour activism carried little chance of 
success due to the weakness of state control over economy or the tightened state grip over 
economic development—which constituted two directly contradictory processes. The majority 
of workers, however, chose non-confrontational means of labour activism and developed 
sophisticated and sustainable discursive means to work the system ‘to their minimum 
disadvantage’, to use Eric Hobsbawm’s phraseology.
127
 This and other labour issues will be 
discussed at greater length in Chapter-5. However, first the development of industrialization 
in Iran will be investigated in the next chapter which lays the groundwork for a discussion on 
labour issues. 
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Economic development and industrialization have always been among the primary concerns 
of Iranian reformers and of the larger population, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards. As Chapter-2 illustrated, several steps had been taken during the 19
th
 century in 
order to obtain factory-based industrialization and to promote craft industries. Nonetheless, 
the treaties signed with foreign governments, especially Russia and Britain, in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries determined the basic framework of Iran’s foreign trade. 
Although in the beginning the aim of Russia and Britain was to provide cheap raw materials 
from Iran they gradually came to treat it as an open market for their ready-made products. 
Especially from the late nineteenth century onwards, foreign imports began to dominate the 
Iranian markets to the detriment of domestic production. This subsequently prompted a 
popular protest against foreign goods and the resulting trade deficit. The subsequent 
protectionist and developmentalist tendencies which emerged during the 19
th
 century 
proposed various solutions to the economic escalation which persisted well into the 20
th
 
century. It is safe to suggest that the increasing penetration of European commercial and 
political power into Iran substantially added to the complexity of economic development. On 
the one hand, crafts industries dominated the manufacturing scene of Iran and they were in 
need of protection and promotion to curtail the increasing imports of European commodities. 
On the other, the existing production capacity was, according to some, unable to 
counterbalance the ready-made imports which made factory-based industrialization a central 
economic policy. Nevertheless, in either case, European economic domination was the main 
question. While the government tried to secure as much cash as possible from customs duties 
and foreign investment, and a number of big merchants made huge fortunes from foreign 
trade, the popular classes, especially native manufacturers, had thoroughly negative 
perceptions regarding the foreign economic presence in Iran. Although these perceptions and 
the resulting debates on economic development played major and varying roles in the 
economic policies of several governments in Iran during the period under study, they have 
largely been insufficiently addressed in the existing literature.  
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Therefore, in the following section I will examine popular perceptions of economic 
development in Iran by referring such issues as trade balance, trade deficit and large-scale 
industrialization vs. crafts industries. This will demonstrate the complexity of the economic 
realm in Iran as a major field of state-society interaction. Following this, industrialization 
from the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of Reza Shah’s reign will be 
discussed as two distinct periods. The first period which extends from the early twentieth 
century to the late 1920’s was characterized by minimum tariff autonomy, lack of an 
industrial working class, and the coexistence of crafts industries with large scale industrial 
establishments. During the second period, late 1920’s and 1930’s, Iran largely reclaimed its 
tariff autonomy and experienced an industrial leap forward. Industrialization policy during 
this second period was almost invariably based on factory-based industrialization. Although 
other industries will be addressed throughout the chapter, the emphasis is on the textile 
industry.              
 
Foreign Goods and Native Consumption: Popular Reactions to Foreign 
Economic Domination 
To the Honourable Ministers of the Majles may their Fortune Endure. Since we Iranians must do 
everything forcibly I present the following petition. As a humble servant [bandeh] I am not a 
shroud-seller or a karbas
1
-seller and I am presenting this only to help the unemployed and the 
poor. How long shall we continue to shroud our corpses in foreign fabrics? Besides, when mister 
draper recognizes that the fabric will be used for shrouding he gives one of a lower quality. Instead 
of a prayer there are Jewish or foreign words on the shroud: no. 17 from Manchester. 
I request my proposal to be implemented if approved by you. When we are alive we do not use 
home-made clothes (lebas-e vatan) and we go around on foreign shoes. At least let our corpses be 
buried in Iranian fabrics (lebas-e Iran). Each year one million (do karvar) Iranians pass away and 
one shroud costs fifteen tumans (approx. £3). This way we can annually save one and a half 
million tumans. We do not need the foreign fabrics, Iranian karbas is enough. All we need is a law 
similar to the Registration Law.
2
 If such a law is put into effect neither the gravedigger can bury 
the body nor can the gentlemen [the clerics] perform the prayer [if the law is violated]. I hope if 
Allah wills the use of karbas as shroud will soon be implemented.  Mohammad Shafi‘ Nili.
3
  
By the turn of the twentieth century the greater part of the foreign imports into Iran consisted 
of consumption items, of which textiles, tea, and sugar were the leading articles and only one 
percent could be classified as capital goods, which were mostly of minor significance.
4
 The 
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challenges posed by the inhospitable landscape were doubled by the low customs duties, lack 
of a nation-wide market, as well as unpopular economic policies. In the early 19
th
 century the 
Treaties of Golestan (1813), and Torkomanchai (1828) signed with Russia after the two bitter 
defeats had set up a standard amount of 5% ad valorem duty for imports and exports between 
Russia and Iran. Britain soon obtained the same privileges in 1841 and in this it was followed 
by other countries during the next few years.
5
 Against this 5% customs duty for foreigners, an 
Iranian was supposed to pay 7,7% on textiles and 14% on sugar while he was also subject to a 
road tax (rahdari) every time his goods passed through an Iranian town.
6
 By the mid-19
th
 
century Iranian craft industries recovered from the shock created by the growth of imports and 
managed to find alternative ways to compete with ready-made European products by 
employing an inexpensive female and child workforce and using aniline dyes and yarns. 
Nonetheless, Iranian producers were still in acute need of effective protective measures.    
Although foreigners enjoyed the lion`s share in Iran`s foreign trade through their offices and 
agents in the country, Iranians especially, but not exclusively, non-Muslims partook in foreign 
trade too. The British were active in the south while the northern regions were largely 
dominated by Russian firms. On British commercial influence Lord Curzon reports, for 
example, that in the late nineteenth century in southern Iran six large British firms were 
actively involved in mercantile activities.
7
 He reports that “a good deal of trade is done by 
native merchants; but the bulk of mercantile transactions passed through the hands of what 
may indisputably be described as English firms, whose activity here is in pleasing contrast 
with the apathy that has been displayed in other parts of Central Asia”.
8
 The foreign 
domination over Iran’s foreign trade in time reached such an extent that “many prosperous 
Persian traders were converted into the agents of Russian and British commercial firms, and 
lost their independence”.
9
 Regarding the Russian commercial presence in Iran E. Grant Duff, 
the Secretary of the British Legation in Tehran, anxiously commented in 1906 that “the end of 
Persia as an independent state is not far of”.
10
 He argued that such northern regions as 
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Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Khorasan lied “within the shadow of Russia, and 
commercially are practically part of that Empire.”
11
 
Along with foreigners non-Muslim Iranians greatly benefited from their contacts with Europe 
and were involved in foreign trade at high volumes. For example, in the early 20
th
 century, 
Iranian Jews were prominent in the import of cotton textiles from Manchester though 
Baghdad and it is reported that at least eighty percent of the trade in Kermanshah and 
Hamadan was in the hands of Jewish traders.
12
 In a few trades, however, Muslim Iranians 
dominated. For example the tea trade was almost entirely controlled by Muslim merchants.
13
 
This was largely true for the export of carpets and opium, too. In particular, the carpet trade, 
Iran’s main export item during late nineteenth century, was almost completely controlled by 
Tabrizi merchants.
14
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century Iranian merchants started 
purchasing directly from Europe instead of buying from foreign firms established in Iran.
15
 
Some Muslim merchants, such as Hajj Hasan Amin al-Zarb, the famous 19th century Iranian 
merchant, made huge fortunes from foreign trade.  
Importers, whether foreign or native, were the immediate targets of those who opposed 
foreign goods. The foreign and non-Muslim shops which sold foreign products were regarded 
as the agents of European economic hegemony.
16
 In various occasions, such as the Russian 
ultimatum of 1911 against the Iranian Majles, foreign goods were boycotted but not always 
successfully. The curtailment of imports and the development of native industries preoccupied 
diverse classes of Iranian society. From the beginning there has always been a popular 
attention to and demands about curtailing imports in order to counteract the dismembering of 
crafts industries. As the Chapter 2 illustrated several attempts had been made during the 
nineteenth century to promote craft industries and to introduce factories in Iran. Yet, 
notwithstanding the extensive human and material capital mobilized for these nineteenth-
century projects, they had fallen behind expectations. Many of the state-owned or private 
factories had to shut down not long after their erection. Thus when Curzon wrote in 1890 that 
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“factories as the term is understood and used in Europe do not exist in Persia and the 
multiplication and economy of labour-force by the employment of steam power or even 
water-power is hardly known” he was hardly exaggerating.
17
 Similar remarks were made by 
Iranians too. For instance, at a meeting between the Shah and a group of merchants in 1893 
Amin al-Zarb pointed out the lack of industries in Iran and the country's dependence on 
Western imports in the following words: “what do we have for manufactories and industries 
that we can say: we don't want European commodities?”
18
 Apparently, crafts industries were 
simply incapable of meeting domestic demand. Besides, new consumption habits had 
developed in Iran, and people preferred more colourful and relatively cheaper foreign goods, 
particularly textiles, over native manufacturers. This, according to some contemporaries, was 
the main reason for the decline of the craft industries. For example Mirza Hosayn Tahvildar, a 
contemporary observer and the author of The Geography of Isfahan, makes the following 
observation about the weavers’ guild in Isfahan in the 1870s:  
For the past few years the cheap red and yellow European fabrics have been popular. Whenever 
their textile fabrics have had a new design, and have appeared different to the eyes, the people of 
Iran have given up their body and soul and have pursued the colour and scent of others. In doing 
this they have incurred losses which they do not realize. Especially now they are crazy about 
inexpensive clothes which, looked at wisely, are not at all economical or lasting. On the other hand 
when the merchandise of the weavers’ guild lost the market, it began imitating European wares. 
Weavers paid more attention to appearance than to Quality. It was for the sake of elegant 
appearance and easy handling that they employed European yarn in weaving qadaks.
19
 Their work 
became ugly and, as a result of mixing European and Iranian materials, it became progressively 
defective and tore and went to piece while worn: it also lost its stiffness, fluff, and durability. 
Spinners lost their jobs and gradually perished.
20
      
For the bazaars ‘the foreigner’ had become a mutual enemy.
21
 To this the ‘traitorous’ native 
merchants who, in the words of a petitioner from Azerbaijan in early 1920’s, “import into our 
glorious country the kinds of articles which are domestically produced on a scale great 
enough to meet people`s demands and by whose production craftsmen are saved from misery” 
were added.
22
 Foreign imports persisted but industrialization attempts remained largely 
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unsuccessful. By the turn of the 20
th
 century Iran had only a negligible number of large-scale 
factories with ten or more workers. Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, an employee of ILO, gives a 
list of 29 factories which were established in Iran but he believes that these factories whether 
owned by foreigners or Iranians have not provided the expected outcome “out of 
inexperience, lack of persistence and especially due to the competition of the two evil 
neighbours”, to wit, Russia and Britain.
23
 Out of these factories nine were occupied with 
textiles and related industries such as silk reeling, and cotton ginning.  According to Floor, on 
the other hand, between 1900 and 1914 about 30 modern large-scale factories were 
established.
24
 Many of these enterprises were either gradually abandoned as failed projects or 
went into bankruptcy for a variety of reasons. Despite the failed attempts at factorization, 
however, many small-scale manufactures found a place in the market. By 1928 thousands of 
workshops were established in Tehran alone.
25
  
Table 4.1: Large Scale Factories in Iran and Their Labour Force 1890-1914 
Type of factory Number of 
workers 
1890-1900 
Silk reeling factory/Amin al-Zarb 
150   
Silk reeling factory/Birikadeh 20   
Match factory/Tehran 50   
Paper mill/Tehran 60   
Sugar mill/Kahrizak 300   
Glass and porcelain/Tehran    20   
Brick-making/Tehran 20   
Oil-refineries/Gilan (5 plants with 272 men) 54   
1900-1914    
Yarn factory/Tabriz 100   
Brick factory/Orumiyeh 30   
Olive-oil mill/Rudbar 20   
Cotton ginning (26 factories with 416 workers) 16 (average)   
Timber mill/Rasht 15   
Timber mill/Talesh 15   
Tobacco factory/Mashhad 20   
Brick factory/Tehran 20   
Soap factory/Nezafat 20   
Brewery/Orumiyeh 15   
Brewery/Tehran 10   
Arsenal/Isfahan 15   
Source: Floor, Labour and Industry, 119-120.  
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Against the inflow of imports the production of such export-oriented items as carpets, shawls, 
woollen and cotton fabric, silk-stuff and leather recorded a major increase in the same period 
and accounted for nearly one quarter of the value of Iran’s total visible exports.
26
 Yet Iran 
continued to suffer a chronic trade deficit. The promotion and development of native 
industries and the curtailment of imports were emphasized in literary works, religious 
writings and petitions sent from the public to the Majles. Ahmad's Book or the Talibian Vessel 
which was written in 1900 by ‘Abd al-Rahim Talebov, an Iranian intellectual and social 
reformer, is an example of such literary texts.
27
  In the fictional conversations between the 
author and his fictional son, Ahmad, Talebov draws attention to the significance of promoting 
home industries in the following words: 
“If we do not open schools our children will remain illiterate. If we do not establish companies, 
develop and promote our industries and wear home-made clothes we will need foreigners for 
everything from match to paper. We will then send orders to their factories every day and we will 




Also, during the late 19
th
 century and the early years of the twentieth, several companies were 
established with the explicit objective of stimulating native industry. Lebas al-Taqwa (Cloth 
of Abstinence) was written in 1900 by Seyed Jamal al-Din Va‘ez Esfahani, a popular pro-
constitutional preacher and writer, in support of such enterprises. Esfahani starts by urging 
Iranian not to use foreign textiles and to prefer home-made manufactures instead.
29
 He argues 
that to support such enterprises is identical with helping Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. 
The following two verses from the Quran play particularly important roles in Esfahani’s 
argumentation: 
O ye who believe! shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous 
Penalty? That ye believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that ye strive (your 
utmost) in the Cause of Allah with your property and your persons: that will be 
best for you, if ye but knew! (61/10-11).
30
 
By using the metaphor of trade he suggests that two distinct capitals should be mobilized for 
this purpose. The first one, which is also the basis of all merits according to Esfahani, is faith 
                                                          
26
 Bharier, Economic Development, 170. 
27
 Abd al-Rahim Talibov, Ketab-e Ahmad ya Safineh-e Talebi (Tehran: Sazman-e Ketabha-ye Jibi, 1967), 98.   
28
 Ibid., 98.   
29
 Seyyed Jamal al-Din Vaez Isfahani, Libas al-taqwa, ed. Homa Rezwani (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 
1985), 10-11. 
30
 A.Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary (Brentwood: Amana, 1983), 1541-1542. 
96 
 
in God and the Prophet. According to him the second capital, jihad, entails fighting against 
the enemies of Islam. Nevertheless, he warns his audience that jihad should not be taken in 
the narrow sense of the word as to mean armed struggle and literal fight. Quite to the contrary 
according to him the real jihad is to work for uplifting the message of Islam and increasing its 
authority and to remove dependence on the enemy.
31
 On this common objective Esfahani 
bases a de-stratifying argument which suggests that all Muslims are servants of Islam and 
there are no such classifications as poor vs. rich or master vs. servant.  Overall, Esfahani’s 
work presents an impressive argumentation where religious, nationalist and patriotic 
discourses are effectively blended together in order to reach as many audiences as possible.   
 
To the Sublime Majles: State-Society Relations and the Economy in Iran 
The ineffective economic policies of the first two decades of the twentieth century, and World 
War I resulted in the further escalation of the Iranian economy for which imports were again 
held responsible. Although Iran remained neutral in WWI it suffered extensively from its 
consequences both as a battlefield of the Great Powers as well as due to the political 
instability created by the war. The increased unemployment in wartime conditions had a 
deteriorating effect on the lives of the lower classes as well as the businesses of the well-to-
do. Thus the prohibitive and developmental approaches to economic development were 
voiced once again. Protectionists took a firm stand against the majority of imports, 
particularly consumption items, and argued that the economic collapse and the perennial trade 
deficit could only be reversed by an effective ban on imports. Developmentalists, on the other 
hand, argued that such a ban was not only against the basic principles of free market economy 
but also practically unworkable since home manufactures did not have enough productive 
capacity to substitute imports. Hence they urged for comprehensive economic planning and 
development. In the following paragraphs petitions which were sent in the early 1920’s by 
diverse groups of the Iranian society to the Majles will be investigated in order to illustrate the 
grassroots dimensions of the debates regarding the trade deficit in Iran. 
In October 1921 the Merchants Union of Tehran sent a petition to the Majles in which they 
attracted the attention of the deputies to the distressing economic conditions in the country 
where they cautioned about the inescapability of an irreversible devastation in case the 
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economic situation continued as it was.
32
 Based on an analysis of the customs statistics, it was 
recognized, argued the petition, that the reason for the widespread poverty and economic 
disaster was the excessive imports compared to the scarcity or even the absence of exports. As 
a remedy they proposed a list which contained luxuries and decorative items to be banned 
from importation (Appendix 2). It consisted of eighty one articles which included, but was not 
restricted to, candles, cacao, sugar, tea, carpets, felt, eggs, biscuits, cheese, salt, fish, meat, 
vegetables, wax, oil, and gramophone and glass and crystal products. As for the textile articles 
the list was rather detailed and included all sorts of fabrics made of any material such as 
woollens, cotton products, silk-stuff, and linens. Indeed there was a chronic trade deficit in 
Iran’s visible trade throughout the 1920’s, as before, which by the end of the decade added up 
to at least $30 million which was mainly financed by the outflow of precious metals i.e. gold 
and silver.
33
 Upon not receiving any reaction to the first petition, the Union sent a second one 
in November 1921 to the same effect.
34
 Two days after the second petition the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Welfare (MACPW) informed the President of the 
Majles that during the government of Moshir al-Dowleh between July 1920 and October 1920 
the matter was investigated and a commission was set up at this ministry in order to consider 
the prohibition of the importation of luxuries and a report along with a list of such items had 
been sent to the Prime Minister.
35
 It appears from the letter of MACPW that no effective 
measure was taken on the issue. This was apparently chiefly due to the treaties signed with 
Britain and Russia as the two major sources of imports.  
After the Tehran merchants others too followed suit. The Merchants Union of Hamadan sent a 
petition in late November 1921 in which they argued that notwithstanding the good intention 
of the state the law regarding the prohibition of the outflow of gold and silver from the 
country did not produce the expected outcome due to the smuggling activities of those people 
who “[did] not care about the interests of the country”.
36
 By the law they were referring to the 
law passed by the Majles on 8 May 1915 concerning the prohibition of the outflow of gold 
and silver from the country. According to the merchants, a ban on the importation of 
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luxurious and ‘unnecessary’ items would be the most effective measure to obtain the balance 
of trade. The debate was further continued by Tehran merchants in a third petition which they 
sent in mid-December 1921 where they openly criticized the inattentiveness of the deputies to 
the issue.
37
 They argued that, from a purely economic point of view, the proposal for a ban on 
imports was in fact against the interests of merchants. They further argued that only out of a 
feeling of patriotism (vatandusti), and a sense of altruism they gave priority to the common 
good. Therefore, the deputies were also called to pay due attention to the matter. In the rest of 
the petition the merchants drew attention to the possible risks of widespread poverty and 
deprivation by warning the deputies that the persistence of the trade deficit carried the 
terrifying risk of producing a widespread poverty. Moreover they added that no powerful 
force could stand against the devastating consequences of widespread poverty and depravity. 
In an atmosphere of grave political instability and regional insurgencies this was an 
intimidating warning.   
A series of correspondences between the Majles and various state departments followed this 
last petition. In February 1922 the Ministry of Finance sent a report to the Majles which was 
prepared by the commission which was set up at the Administration-General of Customs 
(AGC).
38
 The report started by referring to the above-mentioned law concerning the banning 
of the export of silver and gold as well as of coins made from these metals. According to the 
report although the law aimed at protecting Iranian currency against unfavourable wartime 
conditions, any country which was incapable of reciprocating in kind to imports was obliged 
to pay in cash. It then stated that, as Josephn Naus, the former administrator of customs, had 
forecasted, as long as Iran`s imports remained more than its exports and it failed to develop its 
industries and proliferate its exports according to the principles of economics it was inevitable 
that it would spend its gold and silver stocks, which would result in poverty and bankruptcy. 
In another report AGC summarized its views on a proposed ban on imports under three 
articles.
39
 Firstly, it was proposed that the government should examine the nation’s 
commercial treaties in order to ensure whether a ban on imports is legally feasible. Secondly, 
the Iranian government had a right to adopt countervailing measures in order to decrease 
imports and to obtain a positive trade balance, through which it would protect and promote its 
national industries. According to the report, in recent years many European states put 
extraordinary taxes on imports for various reasons, but primarily to protect the value of their 
                                                          
37
 LMDCIP. d4/k25/j12/p14, “Merchants Union of Tehran the Majles”, 1 December 1921. 
38
 LMDCIP. d4/k25/j12/p14, “From the Ministry of Finance to the Majles”, 14 February 1922. 
39
 LMDCIP. d4-k25-j12-p14, “From the Administration-General of Customs to the Ministry of Finance”, n.d.  
99 
 
money. In this way they aimed at increasing their customs revenues as well as promoting their 
industries. Thirdly, as the Administrator General has suggested in earlier years, the 
government could put extortionate taxes on some luxuries, and apply prohibition to others.     
From early 1922 onwards, merchants, guildsmen and workers in the provinces were more 
actively involved in the debates. In January 1922 Hajj Taqi Vakil al-Ro‘aya of Hamadan, one 
of the prominent constitutionalist merchants and the sponsor of the sanctuary at Abd al-‘Azim 
in 1906, sent a private petition to the Majles where he brought a new dimension to the issue.
40
 
After highlighting the importance of maintaining the balance between imports and exports he 
called the attention of the deputies to the significance of free trade and the possible risks of 
violating it. Based on this, he proposed that a law should be passed according to which those 
who wanted to import foreign manufactures into Iran should first export Iranian goods of the 
same value as their imports. Vakil al-Ro‘aya was also the head of the Merchants’ Union of 
Hamadan and his arguments should have influenced other merchants too. In the second 
petition sent to the Majles on 7 February 1922 the Union argued that prohibiting the import of 
luxuries would not save more than four million tomans.
41
 Furthermore due to the principle of 
free trade as an important principle of international trade, such a measure would not produce 
the expected outcome. The Union then argued that balancing the trade through encouraging 
and increasing exports was the only viable solution. However, the merchants were aware of 
the fact that achieving such an economic leap forward in the near future was nearly 
impossible, since it would require the development and dissemination of trade, agriculture and 
industry, building streets and roads, exploitation of mines such as those in Kerman province, 
building dams, opening an agricultural bank and companies, establishing and supporting 
factories and materializing several other infrastructural projects. In order to achieve these 
developments, added the merchants, Iran would need much time which made this option 
impractical for the day. As an interim solution the one put forward by Vakil al-Ro‘aya was 
repeated.  
Nonetheless it appears that both Vakil al-Ro‘aya and the Union abandoned this rather 
complicated solution and turned back to the simple one proposed by the merchants of Tehran. 
This shift becomes clear in a petition sent on to the Parliament on 12 January 1923.42 After 
reproducing their account as to the economically harmful impacts of the trade deficit and the 
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significance of the positive trade balance the merchants described the socially devastating 
consequences of the excessive imports which, they argued, hurt every sensible person. 
According to them the inflow of foreign goods into the country had gradually destroyed 
thousands of Iranian families who lived on handicrafts. These people who relentlessly worked 
for long years to meet the domestic demands resisted these unfavourable conditions to the 
greatest extent. However because of a lack of protective measures in support of their trades, 
they disappeared. The marks of this decadence and misfortune, they argued, could be seen in 
such craft centres as Kerman, Esfahan, Kashan, and Yazd, as well others. The merchants then 
warned the Majles that should they keep on tolerating this situation, the country would, due to 
the predominance of imports over exports, turn into a great beggar house and an irreversible 
decline would set in. Based on this, they reaffirmed their proposal for the prohibition of the 
importing of decorative, luxury, and unnecessary items into Iran. According to them, after 
inspecting national manufactures and textiles, which could become productive with little 
support, a law prohibiting the importing of goods equivalent to goods produced in the country 
should be passed.  
As the Majles did not take any concrete measures, petitions were sent from the provinces, 
such as the one sent from the Merchants Union of Malayer in November 1922.43 After 
criticizing the deputies for not paying attention to their previous petitions and for not 
discussing them openly in the Majles, they stated that the trade balance was a matter of life 
and death. Thus, they argued, instead of discussing issues of minor significance, the deputies 
were supposed to consider the trade of the country and the ways to obtain a positive balance 
of trade. Further, in December 1922 a certain Mahmud M. Ramez, a textile entrepreneur from 
Tehran, sent a petition in which he argued that the only way out of the widespread poverty 
and depravity was to use national textiles and manufactures. To this end, he added, a law for 
the encouragement of industrialists should be passed by the Majles.44 According to Ramez 
this law would consist of three articles. According to the first article, the state would, through 
MACPW, allocate ten thousand tumans in order to develop the textile industry. The second 
article would state that the ministry would make sure that no penny was wasted. According to 
the last article, fifteen months after a factory started its operations completely, the 
entrepreneurs would annually pay back five hundred tumans to the ministry with a certain 
percentage of interest that the government would determine. 
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A close analysis of these protectionist and developmentalist opinions reveals that there was an 
observable accord of views as to the vitality of curtailing imports. Yet opinions do not appear 
to be clear enough about how domestic demand could be met once imports were effectively 
curtailed. On the one hand, one has the impression from the protectionist approach that the 
capacity of the then-existing home manufactures was self-evidently sufficient. Put differently, 
it was suggested that foreign manufactures did not fill in any gap in the market but only 
blocked the way of home-made goods. Therefore the sole prohibition of the importation of 
such articles was sufficient. Yet, the developmentalists approach acknowledged the 
insufficiency of domestic manufactures, but they disagreed on how to overcome it. According 
to some, the solution lay in the encouragement of crafts industries while others urged for 
large-scale industrialization accompanied with infrastructural projects. Generally speaking, 
however, the issue of a ban on imports and the promotion of home-made production was as 
much an emotionally charged discursive debate as it was an informed negotiation on the 
productive capacity of the country. As different classes other than the merchants became 
involved in the discussions, this dimension became more visible.  
In December 1922 the Guilds’ Union of Tehran sent a petition to the Majles in which they 
reproduced the account of the negative consequences of the disastrous economic situation and 
argued that guild members were the most immediate victims.
45
 Then, they expressed their 
support for the then-discussed bill which would make it obligatory for those who lived on the 
treasury of Muslims, to wit state employees, to wear domestically-produced clothes. This law, 
which will be discussed below, was passed on 19 February 1923. According to the Union, an 
article introducing a penalty for violators should also be added to the law. Finally, they stated 
that through this law some needs of the country would be met and new employment 
opportunities would be created for the jobless. In the meantime, religious groups brought a 
new dimension to the issue. On 6 December 1922 the Society of Religion (jame‘eh-e 
diyanat), and the Society of Free Muslims (jam‘iyat-e ahrar-e eslami) petitioned the Majles. 
On the top of the petition sent by the former a Prophetic saying was quoted which goes as 
“Islam is always higher and nothing goes above it” (al-eslamo ya‘lo vala yo‘la aleyh). By 
ascribing the deteriorating economic situation of the country to the excessive imports and the 
scarcity of exports the petition affirmed its support for the above-mentioned bill which would 
save the people and the helpless workers from misery. It was also stressed that use of national 
textiles and other goods was an effective means to combat imports. The Society of Free 
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Muslims also supported the proposal of the merchants regarding the prohibition of the 
importation of luxuries.  
In the meantime, the Merchants’ Union of Tehran continued to pressure the Majles for the 
adoption of their proposal. They argued in a petition sent in January 1923 that although their 
proposal as to the prohibition of the importation of unnecessary articles was met positively by 
the deputies, no measures had been taken in last the two years to reverse the economic 
problems.
46
 Therefore they asked their proposal to be loudly read in the Majles and to be put 
into practice if considered useful. In case the deputies did not find it useful, added the 
merchants, they should come up with a better solution about which they should inform the 
merchants. The responsibility of the Majles to improve the country`s economy and to develop 
native industries was further highlighted by the petitions sent from the merchants’ unions of 
Golpayegan (6 February 1923),
47
 Kermanshah (11 February 1923),
48
 Ardabil (22 February 
1923),
49
 Astara (27 February 1923)
50
 and Khorasan (5 March 1923).
51
 All of them shared the 
same determination as to the significance of the protectionist trade measures. According to the 
Kermanshah merchants, the textiles produced in Isfahan and Khorasan, as two of the leading 
craft centres, could save the country from foreign products if effectively encouraged by state 
policies. The petitions sent from Astara and Ardabil, two of Iran’s northern cities close to the 
Russian border, blamed Russian merchants for the grave economic situation. Speaking on 
behalf of “the people and the merchants of the town”, the petition of the Merchants Union of 
Ardabil drew attention to the assaults on and the monopolization of Iran’s economy by 
Russian merchants. The merchants of Astara took a rather aggressive stand against foreign 
merchants. After referring to the widespread poverty in Iran the petitioners stated that Iran`s 
unjust and inhumane civilized neighbours were “by various tricks and unbearable devices 
from every corner busy destroying Iran’s future and fortune, monopolizing its trade, and 
turning Iranians into servants and captives”. Thus, the supplicants expressed their support for 
a ban on imports. In this way, Iran should immediately make it clear to foreigners that 
Iranians were no longer willing to submit to their pressure and monopolization of their trade 
and would no longer be subject to their unjust and greedy ends. In any case, added the 
petition, the merchants, the notables as well as the toilers and the farmers of Astara would 
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practically put the proposal into effect and refrain from using foreign goods as much as 
possible. 
`The law for the use of national clothes` (qanun-e este‘mal-e albaseh-e vatani) passed in 
February 1923 should be considered against this backdrop. The law made it compulsory for 
all state employees, including the military, to wear clothes produced of native fabrics and of 
Iranian make. In a collective petition dated December 1922 the supplicants expressed their 
gratitude to the parliamentarians for their sensitivity to native textiles and discussing the bill 
at the parliament.
52
 According to them this law was the only guarantee of the honour and the 
future of religion and the country (din va dowlat). Another petition dated 4 January 1923 
argued that the encouragement of national textiles, which would result in the balance of trade, 
would also save the Muslim nation from being in need to foreigners.
53
 On the other hand, 
however, as far as those people who lived on other sectors were concerned the law caused 
frustration and resentment. For instance, on 4 March 1923 shoemakers expressed their 
reservations about the law in a petition which they asked to be read at the parliament as a sign 
of the deputies` attention to the situation of a handful of toilers. The petition reads as follows:  
Before we begin our petition we entreat the retainers of the President of the Majles, may God 
make his power endure, and the honourable deputies to read this petition loudly in the Majles and 
to pay due attention to the situation of these craftsmen. Admittedly the purpose for the 
establishment of this national regime and the basis of the constitutional system is to attain the 
means of security and welfare for all as well as to obtain advantages and dispose of disadvantages 
to Iranians. This can only be obtained by making laws for the good of the country and for 
providing peace and revenues to people from which the general populace will benefit without 
discriminating between various crafts therein. You should not forget the principle of egalitarianism 
(mesdaq-e vaqe‘-e mosavat).  As shoe makers we have always made sacrifices and become 
forerunners for the establishment of the sacred constitution while at the same time we have, in the 
last years, significantly developed our craft and made our handiwork far more beautiful and 
attractive. However, in return for our efforts, some of the deputies totally disregarded this craft in 
their debates concerning the use of native fabrics and home manufactures and they were oblivious 
to our craft and showed a humiliating attitude towards us. Their pretext was that home-made shoes 
hurt and injured their feet and produced [?]. Of course our words are about a number of deputies 
who wear foreign shoes and not those who from the beginning of their lives wore home-made 
shoes. In the meantime we urge those deputies who did not help us to study history in order to see 
what the Japanese Emperor did and said. You should have already heard that the Emperor, 
Mikado, declared that until shoes were produced in his country he would go around barefooted 
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which he really did for a while until shoes were produced in his country. This is what great men 
and persons who are interested in promoting and developing a nation do. We would like to gain 
the attention of you gentlemen and request that you pay attention to native shoes like you did to 
native textiles. This way we request that you add an article about native shoes to the supplement of 
the law, and promote this craft too.
54
 
The petition is an interesting example of how workers engaged with the ruling establishment. 
On the one hand the workers used every discursive tool at their disposal to criticize the 
deputies, but on the other hand were careful not display a negative attitude towards all of the 
deputies, and they distinguished the deputies who wore foreign shoes and those who used 
domestic ones.  However, there were also those who were critical of the actual value of the 
law which allegedly aimed at appeasing popular excitement due to the insufficient production 
capacity of the industry. 
In a petition dated 4 March 1923 Taqi Daneshvar stressed the unintended consequences of 
this law.
55
 He argued that although there was much excitement among the population as to 
promoting handicrafts in general and handmade textiles in particular, it was not possible to 
meet the demand of the market with handmade textiles, and by manually washing cotton and 
wool. Moreover, he argued, the native wool fabrics communicated anthrax to hundreds of 
people. 
Furthermore, if handmade textiles become widely used, the industry would not be able to 
meet the demand and prices would rise considerably. This in turn would promote the cheap 
foreign clothes. Following these considerations Daneshvar emphasized that mechanization of 
the textile industry was the only feasible solution. Taking into account the devaluation of the 
German mark he proposed the purchase of factories from Germany at low prices, to be 
installed in Iran. The issues raised by Daneshvar were not the only problems that the law 
exposed. Although the law was a notable means to promote the weaving industry, it also 
betrayed the state’s inability to introduce any effective prohibition on imports. Lack of a 
nationwide market and the virtual absence of transportation facilities were compounded by 
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Figure 3: Shoemakers’ Petition Dated 1923 
 
Iran had to wait until the late 1920’s to attain full tariff autonomy. New factories were 
established while at the same time crafts industries continued to dominate the manufacturing 
sector. From the late 1920’s onwards, industrialization policies largely aimed at import-
substitution grew at an unprecedented pace. This new policy aimed at large-scale 
industrialization. Before moving to what is often called the industrial leap forward in Iran in 
the late 1920’s and during the 1930’s, an analysis of textile craft industries will be provided. It 
will be demonstrated that following a set-back from the mid-19
th
 century, crafts industries 
recovered from the shock and competed for the domestic market. It will also show how 





Iranian Industries before Large-Scale Industrialization: The Textile Industry in Iran  
The history of Iranian industry has often been studied within an urban context by emphasizing 
a transition, or lack thereof, from traditional crafts which were practiced mainly within guild 
structures, to large-scale industrial establishments. Although mention was made of other 
forms of production, such as village production or cottage industries, they were usually 
referred to in passing. What Donald Quataert calls “the factory orthodoxy” has for a long time 
haunted Iranian history writing, too.
56
 Factories were regarded as the most tangible 
manifestations of modernity in countries as Iran as, for example, in the Ottoman Empire or 
Egypt. Thus, greater attention has been paid in Iran to large-scale industrialization attempts in 
a country where small-scale production was the dominant type of manufacturing. Further, 
industrialization was judged, in Rudolf Braun`s words, “from the point of view of uprooting, 
disruption and stereotyping”.
57
 The negative impacts of industrialization on craft industries 
were overemphasized. In the rest of the chapter, I will first discuss the textile industry until 
the late 1920’s after which will be followed by an examination of large-scale industrialization 
in Iran.  
Encompassing all spinning and weaving activities with their ancillary crafts, such as cotton 
carding, combing, dyeing and so on, the textile industry was the largest industry in Iran in 
terms of value production and size of workforce prior to the discovery of oil in the country in 
1908, and was still ranked second afterwards. Small-scale manufacturing or cottage-industry, 
which typically but not necessarily employed less than ten workers and with rather light 
machinery, was the principal textile production type in Iran. This could either be practiced 
along guild-lines in urban settings or by part-time cultivator-workers in rural areas. Generally 
speaking, textile manufacture required little expertise and very light machinery which 
facilitated its widespread practice, especially for own use. Although urban based 
manufacturing is relatively well-documented, it is hard to find data that illuminates rural 
production.  
Early-twentieth century Iran could be described as one “big weaving mill supported by many 
ancillary crafts”.
58
 Tabriz, Isfahan, Yazd, Kashan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Kerman and Rasht were 
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the major centres of the many textile-producing centres.
59
 Although a variety of raw materials 
were spun and woven in Iran cotton and wool were the most favourite and widespread among 
them.
60
 Silk was particularly processed in Yazd, Gilan, Mazandaran. Khorasan, and 
Azerbaijan.
61
 A simple hand loom was required in weaving and it was quite common to have 
at least one loom in the house. Testimonies of travellers attest to the widespread practice of 
weaving in Iran. Although Iranian textile production was hard-hit by ready-made imports, 
producers soon partly recovered from the shock by mobilizing cheaper labour, and reducing 
the quality of products through the use of imported yarns and dyestuffs. Consequently despite 
the initial setback a significant part of the textile industry remained intact. In many parts of 
Iran weaving continued to be the most important manufacturing activity. Available data can 
provide an overview of this point.
62
 By the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries there were 1,000 shawl looms in Kerman with an annual export of 
300,000 tomans. There were 200 woollen looms in Na‘in and 300 in Kerman. The number of 
silk looms in Kashan was 200 producing a monthly output of 400 pieces while Yazd had 400 
workshops with 2,000 looms and Mashhad 100 shops with 200 looms, and Nishapur 16 shops 
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with 3 to 4 looms. As for cotton weaving, in Yazd there were 800 workshops with 2,000 
looms. In these looms, imported British and Indian yarns were used.
63
 Also, cotton pileless 
carpets, locally known as “zalu,” which were made of native yarn, were woven in Maibud 
around Yazd. In the town a small quantity of thinner, generally in red and blue stripes, was 
woven using artificial dyes. Also canvas of coarser or finer texture was woven by villagers of 
Yazd using local cotton and old-fashioned spinning wheels.
64
 Kashan had 100 workshops 
which wove cotton. At Isfahan there were some 2,000 cotton looms and about 500-600 
manufactories in all.
65
 Thus it is “seen that although the crafts had been hurt by foreign 
competition, their output was still considerable”.
66
 Shawls are a good example of this. 
Originally made of Persian goat wool and extensively woven in Kerman, shawls were a 
favourite dress material in Iran and not used only for decorative purposes.
67
 Shawls were also 
woven from other materials such as camel wool, sheep wool, cotton, and silk. Although 
Kerman was the main production centre, in Mashhad, Tabriz, Yazd, and Isfahan too, shawls 
were woven.
68
 By the early twentieth century, shawl production declined considerably. It was 
carpet-making which employed increasing numbers of weavers, and which became the most 
important export-oriented craft in the country. Interest in Persian carpets had increased in 
Europe after the World Trade Fair in 1851 and the demand was furthered by the World Trade 
Fair in Vienna in 1873.
69
 It attracted a substantial amount of domestic and foreign capital and 
by 1914 was exporting goods worth £1,000,000.
70
 In order to assure high quality production 
and more profits, foreign companies, such as the British-Swiss Ziegler&Co., the German 
Persische Teppiche AG, and the Dutch Hotz&Zoon directly invested in carpet weaving. 
Soltanabad, southwest Tehran and northwest of Isfahan and about 180 miles from both, was 
one of the main centres of such investment. There were approximately 2,000 looms in 
Soltanabad while in the villages in its vicinity 6,000 looms were functioning with an annual 
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production of 15 million qrans (£ 274,527) worth of carpet in 1913.
71
 In carpet production, the 
putting-out system and village production played an important role. H. W. Maclean`s 
observation sheds important lights on this point. Sponsored by the Commercial Intelligence 
Committee of the Board of Trade in London Maclean made an extensive tour in Iran in order 
to investigate the conditions and prospects of trade in Iran and produced a report in 1904.
72
 
The information he provides sheds light on the working of the putting-out system in the carpet 
weaving industry. In his Report on the Conditions and Prospect of British Trade in Persia, he 
makes the following observations: 
The bulk of the carpet industry is carried on in the weavers’ homes, the women and children doing 
the weaving. The so-called manufacturer supplies to the weaver the design and the quantities of 
wool in different colours required for one carpet. He also advances sums to account of the price 
arranged, the balance being paid on delivery of the finished article. The practice has the usual 
disadvantages of home employment, slovenly and dilatory work, with little progress towards skill 
and finish, as the looms, scattered over a wide area, cannot be constantly inspected. The vast 
majority of weavers, however, living in small isolated villages, and having also household duties, 
can work only in this way
.73
        
As late as 1924 carpet was mostly manufactured at home around Tabriz as elsewhere.
74
 
Carpet weaving was also practiced by Armenians of the Julfa quarter of Isfahan at schools.
75
 
It was a source of income for many people. According to the British political resident in the 
Gulf, five or six carpet-weaving establishments were set up in 1914 and they employed 
considerable numbers of children and women which, he added, diminished the number of 
beggars in the town.
76
 Overall, the number of people employed in the carpet industry rose 
drastically from 1,000 in 1860 to 65,000 by 1910.
77
 In terms of foreign trade too the 
importance of carpets was on the rise from the late 19
th
 century onwards as can be seen in 
Table-4.2. From almost zero in the mid-nineteenth century, the share of carpet weaving in 
Iran`s export revenues rose to about 12 percent in the 1911-13  period and grew to constitute 
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Iran`s second largest export item, after oil, by late 1920’s.
78
 A number of points determined 
the general course of the Iranian textile industry during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. First of all notwithstanding the survival of a considerable textile industry producing 
a variety of textures there has been a noticeable shift to cotton at the expense of other 
materials.
79
 As stated above, a variety of raw materials such as silk, wool, and cotton have 
been historically used in the Iranian textile industry. Of these cotton was easiest to process: it 
was available in large quantity, for it was grown practically all over Iran. In addition, the silk 
disease of 1860 had seriously hurt silk production.
80 
Table 4.2: Main Exports of Iran
81
 (Percentage of Total) 
Product 1850s 1880 1911-13 
Silk and products 38 18 5 
Cotton and woollen cloth 23 1 1 
Cereals 10 16* 12* 
Fruit 4 6 13 
Tobacco 4 5 1 
Raw cotton      1       7    19 
Opium  26 7 
Carpets … 4 12 
 
Cotton cultivation showed a remarkable rise, and on the eve of World War I cotton cultivation 
expanded to over 100,000 hectares of land, amounting to 33,000 tons.
82
 Yet much of the crop, 
25,000 tons, worth about £1,500,000, was exported to Russia.
83
 Against the export of raw 
cotton, cotton yarns were increasingly imported in order to further reduce production costs. 
Secondly, imported yarns and dyestuffs were increasingly used by Iranian weavers.
84
 The 
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import of yarn and thread showed almost a steady increase as can be seen in Table-4.3. Apart 
from cotton yarns dyestuffs were also imported in large quantities. The use of aniline dyes has 
been an issue in Iran for it harmed the quality of Iranian textiles, particularly carpets. This 
cost Iranian textile products their lasting colour, for which they were famous. The increasing 
use of aniline dyes diminished the demand for and the growth of home-grown colouring 
plants such as indigo, madder-roots, and saffron.
85
 In 1892 the import of aniline dyes and the 
thread dyed with them were prohibited, but due to smuggling activities the proscription 
remained largely on paper.
86
 For some time, the export of carpets coloured with aniline dyes 
was prohibited, but in the early 1910’s it was permitted and taxed at 12% ad valorem.
87
 
Thirdly, although domestic production gradually managed to regain, partly if not fully, its 
prominence in the domestic market, Iranian textiles, with the exception of labour intensive 
carpet industry, had already lost its international significance. 
Table 4.3: Comparative Table Showing the Value and the Source of Cotton Yarns and 
Thread Imported into Iran During the years 1906-07 to 1913-14 (In pound sterling)  
Country 1906-07 1907-08 1908-09 1911-12 1912-13 1913-14 
British Empire  
(excl. India) 
56,890 83,343 70,394 54,640 21,612 21,833 
British India 86,039 90,904 49,104 88,038 129,476 132,244 
Russia 4,760 8,131 8,099 30,231 72,134 85,677 
Turkey 37 589 3,279 1,999 2,580 1,226 
Belgium  - - 1,314 715 1,593 1,428 
Austral-Hungary 1,092 723 939 363 520 840 
Italy  3,814 4,665 454 805 350 2,531 
Germany 48 891 380 1,215 4,266 2,580 
Switzerland 446 338 56 764 1,683 883 
France 11 298 42 - - - 
Oman - 275 - - - - 
Other countries 43 117 24 200 381 243 
Total 153,091 190,368 134,086 179,020 234,595 249,485 
Total imports 8,620,795 8,168,685 7,449,681 - 10,319,557 11,766,663 
Source: DCR 4487, Report on the Trade of Persia (London: HMSO, 1910), Annex F, p. 9 [rate exchange was 
£1=53.82 qrans]; DCR 5515, Report for the Year 1913-14 on the Trade of Persia (London: HMSO, 1915), 
Annex F, p. 13.  
 
Compiled and quoted in Willem Floor, Textile Imports into Qajar Iran, Russia versus Great Britain: the Battle 
for Market Domination, California, Mazda Publishers, 2009, 72. 
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There is no satisfactory statistical information on the workforce which was engaged in craft 
industries throughout the period under study. But the first complete census which was 
undertaken in 1956 attests to their persistence.
88
 Even by then in many of the craft centres, 
craft industries were only the second greatest economic activity after agriculture. At any rate, 
it is obvious that crafts continued to be a major economic activity even when factory-based 
industrialization was well underway. Apparently, weaving was undertaken as a part-time job 
as it also was a major source of income. Yet, even in urban settings, guilds apparently lost 
their hold on textile production and the business became a free-for-all. Despite the political 
role they played in the Constitutional Revolution, the importance of guilds as economic units 
was rapidly declining. Production was either spreading to rural settings through the putting-
out system, or it was gradually being concentrated in large-scale industrial establishments. 
The coming of a bureaucracy and the increasing authority of the central government, 
particularly from the early 1920’s onwards, deprived guilds of many of their former 
administrative powers. However, when in the mid-1920’s the Majles abolished guild taxes, 
the main source of power for guild elders, in the annex of the law 239 organizations were 
listed as currently paying the guild tax.
89
  
With further centralization and with improved transportation and communication facilities, 
Iran was becoming an integrated market with relatively free movements of goods. As will be 
discussed shortly, the ineffective state involvement in economic affairs rapidly changed from 
the 1920’s onward but often to the disadvantage of small-scale industries. Tax exemptions 
were introduced, protective economic measures were adopted, and monopolies were 
established in order to secure neat operation and a viable market for state-sponsored or 
privately-owned large-scale industrial establishments. Although crafts, and cottage-industries 
did not disappear overnight, their economic significance continued to vanish. The population 
of villagers and craftsmen provided the newly established factories, as well as the developing 
oil industry in the south, with the necessary workforce. The following section deals with 
factory-based industrialization of the textile industry in Iran which, though it started much 
earlier, accelerated and became the standard economic policy during the Pahlavi era, 
particularly during the 1930’s. Not only the development of industrialization shall be 
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discussed but also mention will be made of how small-scale producers engaged with and tried 
to influence the newly emerging conditions.       
  
Fabricating Iranian Modernization: Large-Scale Industrialization in Iran, 1925-1941 
The economic and industrial policies of Reza Shah’s reign have been both criticized and 
praised extensively. Involving a wide range of areas, from railway construction to mining, and 
from introducing new tariff policies to launching a state-sponsored or subsidized 
factorization, his reign witnessed a genuinely state-controlled economic development. For 
these policies, he was praised a saviour, and as ‘the father of the nascent Iranian nation’. Or 
alternatively, he was criticized for his allegedly ‘ill-planned’ economic projects which, in the 
words of a contemporary observer, aimed at “progress for progress’ sake”.
90
 To find a 
definitive answer to this debate is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, the stress on the 
achievements and the failures of the Pahlavi elites in the economic sphere, as in others, is 
another way of giving primacy to the actions of the state in shaping economic development, 
and it distracts our attention from the more complex decision-making processes. In these 
processes not only high politics was involved but also the demands of merchants, craftsmen, 
and workers played an active role.   
Thus, the agency and the perceptions of the wider population regarding the economic policies 
which have been adopted from the mid-1920’s onwards, particularly during the 1930’s, 
warrant investigation. The reactions of those people who lived on crafts industries or small-
scale manufactures should also be emphasized. As far as the textile industry is concerned, 
well into the twentieth century the output of the newly emerging factories continued to be 
largely insignificant in quantitative terms when compared with craft and cottage industries. 
For generations of reformists, saving the country from foreign dependence had been an 
elusive dream, which was greatly desired but not attained.
91
 They suggested that if factory-
based industrialization was a major component of European modernization, Iran should 
follow the same trajectory. The flourishing oil industry in the south also set an example of 
European technology and industry. Unlike the Qajars, however, economic development was 
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to be achieved not through concessions but through the mobilization of indigenous resources. 
Import-substitution was the underlying objective of the industrialization program during the 
1930’s. To this end tens of factories which produced a variety of articles such as sugar, 
matches, soap, oil, and leather were erected. However, textiles received the lion’s share of the 
massive industrialization projects for four main reasons. First of all textile products 
constituted the greater part of the imports which could be counterbalanced by an effective 
investment in this industry. Secondly, the raw materials required for textile production such as 
cotton, wool, and silk, were extensively produced in Iran. Thirdly, textile production required 
little expertise which facilitated the supply of the necessary workforce. Fourthly, the wartime 
crisis and its ramifications in the interwar period provided ample opportunities to renegotiate 
the existing tariff system and to purchase and install machinery from Europe.
 
  
During roughly the first two decades of the twentieth century, apart from the Majles and the 
cabinet, the Ministry of Commerce and Public Utilities was mainly responsible for industrial 
planning and monitoring. Also it appears that municipalities were also involved in industrial 
policies. For instance, in 1918 a wool spinning factory was erected by the Charities 
Directorate of Tehran municipality which provided employment to female workers, 
particularly widows.
92
 Following the coup d’état in 1921 new branches were established to 
implement and monitor industrial policies and relevant infrastructural projects. Ministry of 
Public Utilities 1922-9; Ministry of Economy 1929-31; Directorate General of Commerce, 
Agriculture and Industry 1931-7; Ministry of Industry and Mines 1937-9; and Ministry of 
Arts and Crafts 1939-41 have been established at various periods for this purpose.
93
 
Industrialization required legislative effort as well. Between 1925 and 1941 as many as 1,145 
laws and decrees were passed or issued on industrial and related matters.
94
 As can be seen in 
Table-4.4 most of these laws and decrees dated between 1933 and 1938. In 1927 the 
ambitious Trans-Iranian Railway project, which linked the Caspian Sea through Tehran to the 
Persian Gulf, was launched. In 1925 a law was passed which exempted industrial and 
agricultural machines and instruments and their component parts from import duties for ten 
years.
95
 Until 1930 several monopolies were formed starting with sugar and tea, and extended 
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to other goods until foreign trade was fully monopolized in 1931. Also in 1925 the National 
Bank was established and soon took over from the British-owned Imperial Bank the 
monopoly right to issue banknotes. In the meantime, Arthur Millspaugh, the American 
Administrator General of Finances since 1923, was dismissed in 1927. Equally importantly in 
1928 full tariff autonomy was attained. Thus, unlike the British-led oil industry in the south of 
Iran, the flourishing nationwide industrialization was financed and controlled by Iranians.  
Table 4.4: The Distribution of Laws and Decrees on Industrial Issues According to 
Years, 1925-1941. 
 
Year Number Percentage  
1925 8 0.69 
1926 10 0.88 
1927 33 2.88 
1928 22 1.93 
1929 25 2.18 
1930    35     3.05 
1931 54 4.72 
1932 158 13.80 
1933 108 9.43 
1934 123 10.75 
1935 42 3.67 
1936 148 12.93 
1937 91 7.95 
1938 41 3.58 
1939 130 11.35 
1940 75 6.55 
1941 42 3.66 
Total 1145 100 
 
Source: Sadeghi, Siyasatha, 61. 
The renewed efforts at large-scale industrialization had been underway since the end of the 
First World War. The Vatan Wool Spinning and Weaving Factory at Isfahan, which was 
established in 1923 by the prominent merchant and industrialist Hajj Mohammad Hosayn 
Kazeruni, was a notable example of early factories (Figure 3). The machinery was imported 
from Germany and the factory was supported by the state. For instance orders were given for 
the military by the then the Commander in Chief Reza Khan.
96
 Also Akhgar newspaper 
reports in June 1929 that one of the deputies, Seyyed Yaqub, proposed for the promotion of 
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native manufactures especially for the textiles produced at Vatan Factory.
97
 Industrialization 
was also among the concerns of political parties. For example, the Revival Party which was 
formed in the early 1920’s by Abd al-Hosayn Teymurtash, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayon, and 
Ali Akbar Davar called, inter alia, for an end to economic capitulations, industrialization and 
replacement of foreign capital by native capital.
98
 In 1924 Taqizadeh, for example, was asked 
about the path the government should follow in order to restore the greatness of Iran and 
proposed the following remedies: construction of suitable motor-roads and importation of 
motor-cars; construction of railways through concessions; establishment of small factories for 
supplying the different districts of Iran; abolition of import duties on machinery; the granting 
of concessions to foreigners to secure investment in Iran for its development; introduction of 
waterway systems, telephones; encouragement of immigration from Europe to attract experts 
in agriculture and other fields.
99
  
Figure 4: Interior of the Vatan Factory, Late 1920’s. 
 
Source: Parisa Damandan, Portrait Photographsfrom Isfahan: Faces in Transition, 1920-1950 (London: Saqi 
Books, 2004), 219. 
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The Age of Iron: Factorization of Iranian Textile Industry, 1931-1941 
Between 1925 and 1931 the foundation was laid for the nascent industries. Not only were 
important economic steps taken during this period, but also, major achievements, from the 
eyes of the central establishment, were registered in a variety of fields from the 
sedentarization of tribes, the creation of a strong army and security forces, and the 
consolidation of a strong government. The last two especially contributed to the elimination 
of the chronic countrywide insecurity in roads which very much hindered the safe movement 
of goods. The Great Depression in the early 1930’s, and the implementation of the first five-
year plan in the USSR, which prevented the access of Iranian merchants to Russian markets, 
further pushed Iran towards self-sufficient economic development in many of its 
manufacturing industries. From the early 1930’s onwards the state took a rather direct roles in 
industrial development. The textile industry, especially cotton processing, flourished. 
Germany and Britain were the favoured suppliers of the necessary machinery for the new 
factories. Extensive investment was made in spinning in order to curtail the importation of 
foreign yarns since many of the existing factories and workshops used imported yarns. This 
point was also a major concern especially in the early 1920’s. For example, in April 1923 a 
petition was sent from the Merchants Union of Tehran with twelve signatures, including that 
of the famous merchant and the head of the union Amin al-Darb.
100
 By highlighting the 
significance of supplying thread to the cloth making, and carpet weaving industries they asked 
for a concession to establish spinning mills around Qazvin, Qom and Isfahan. However, 
despite their call as to the urgency of the issue, no tangible steps seem to have been taken. For 
example Hajj Mirza Ali Kaisariyeh, one of the petitioners, had to wait until 1938 to open a 
spinning mill at Qom in partnership with Hajj Mohammad Hosayn Yazdi.
101
 In 1932 the 
cotton spinning mill in ‘Aliabad which was established in 1931 was extended.
102
 The 
following year orders were given again to British firms for necessary machinery for spinning 
mills at Shiraz with 5,200 spindles; Isfahan and Yazd, 4,200, spindles each; while the Shahi 
Mill in Mazandaran was expanded with 11,000 spindles.
103
 Investment in spinning 
increasingly continued and in 1935 orders were made to British firms for textile mills at 
Kashan with a total of 6,400 spindles; Ahvaz, 8,800 spindles; Isfahan 6,688 spindles and 
2,400 spindles (cotton thread); Mashhad 10.120 spindles; while the Shahi Mill was extended 
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again with 9,856 spindles.
104
 Germans also received their share from rapid industrialization. 
In 1935 orders were made to German firms for 6,000 spindles at Shiraz and 5,000 at Qom.
105
 
In the meantime, several other spinning and weaving mills, both private and state-owned, 
were erected in various parts of the country, particularly in the central and Northern 
provinces, while some of the existing ones substantially increased their products as well as 
their workforce. In the four years between 1934 and 1938 manufacturing industry experienced 
a major expansion, as can be seen in Table-4.5.
106
 To provide raw material to these factories 
and to utilize the domestically produced cotton, there were 100 cotton ginning plants in 1936 




Table 4.5: Statistics of Large Manufacturing Industry, 1926-41 (Establishments with ten 


















         
1926 2 2 462 1 1,005 1 0 
1927 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1928 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1929 5 5 463 3 2,105 3 8 
1930 1 1 2,397 1 3,500 1 187 
1931 2 2 859 2 1,666 2 60 
1932 8 6 2,182 6 1,599 5 67 
1933 6 4 586 5 871 5 60 
1934 13 13 5,675 10 4,824 11 182 
1935 12 11 3,092 9 8,838 11 223 
1936 14 11 5,142 13 8,654 11 443 
1937 9 9 6,418 7 7,493 9 625 
1938 10 9 7,417 8 9,127 8 373 
1939 4 3 1,184 4 2,202 3 60 
1940 3 3 67 3 550 3 11 
1941 3 2 149 3 178 2 23 
1942 1 1 146 1 3,300 1 14 
1943 1 1 12 1 233 1 0 
1944 4 4 1,949 0 0 3 6 
1945 1 1 17 0 0 1 0 
1946 9 7 1,409 4 223 5 15 
1947 2 2 795 1 13 0 - 
Date not 68 39 3,143 20 5,986 28 361 
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Total 178 136 40,421 102 62,367 114 2,718 
 
Reliability: Fair for number of factories and employment; poor for H.P and paid-up capital. Source: Ministry of 
Labour, Statistical Survey of Major Industrial Plants of Iran, 1947, Tehran, undated (1948?).  
Source: Compiled and quoted in Bharier, Economic Development, 173.  
In industrialization, the state not only acted as an investor, but also as a protector of the 
private factories. This was done either through tax exemptions or by making orders, when 
there was no business, to sustain the operations of the existing factories. For example, in 1936 
the Khosravi Tannery in Tabriz was saved from its financial problems by orders for the 
army.
108
 Further, the modernization policies that were pursued supported the nascent factories 
as well. For instance, due to the Uniform Dress Law passed by the Majles in 1928, a need 
emerged for the provision of the necessary clothes to be worn by state employees. Thus when 
in 1935 a special uniform was made obligatory for the employees and the students attached to 
the Ministry of Education, orders were given to Vatan Factory for the clothes.
109
  
By the end of the 1930’s the state was allocating 20 percent of its budget to industry.
110
 
Compared with the turn-of-the-twentieth-century situation when the industry received almost 
nothing from the budget, this was a major improvement. Yet already from 1938 onwards the 
pace of industrialization started slowing down due either to the fear of overproduction or 
governmental attempts to limit profits.
111
 Bharier aptly summarizes the general outline of 
industrialization policy during this period as follows:  
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On the industrial scene, government policy in the 1930’s combined the establishment of state 
factories with various protective devices for privately owned plants. Insofar as there was a strategy 
for industrialization, it was based on the view that more factories are better than less factories, that 
state factories are better than private factories, that big plants are better than small plants, and that 
capital-intensive production is preferable to labour-intensive production. Choice of manufacturing 
industries was generally well-conceived on the grounds of raw material supplies and existing 
domestic markets, yet administrative and accounting inefficiencies in state plants meant that 




But not all factories were state-owned. By the end of the 1930’s there were, in Iran, at least 
265 plants with not less than 63,000 horsepower providing employment to 48,000 workers as 
can be seen in Table-4.6.
113
 Table-4.6 also demonstrates a sectoral distribution of factories 
established between 1930 and 1940. Of these 70 or 72 were spinning and weaving mills. 
Appendix 4 contains a detailed list of the textile factories. It shows that the factories centred 
in a number of locations. Along with Tehran, Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Fars, and 
Isfahan were the main centres of large-scale textile factories establishments. This was due to 
the availability of raw materials and the necessary workforce in these locations. Owing to this 
extensive industrialization, and the state’s control over foreign trade, by the late 1930’s not 
only did textile imports drop considerably, but also the value and the percentage of imported 
yarn experienced a major decline. The industrialization projects were financed by domestic 
sources, and only technical assistance came from outside. More than 40 percent of 
government expenditure was invested mainly in transportation and industry during this 
period.
114
 Mass consumption goods were heavily taxed at the cost of deteriorating living 
conditions for the lower classes, who suffered all the disadvantages of rapid industrialization. 
Compared with the early twentieth century, Iran of the late 1930’s had experienced a major 
leap-forward towards industrialization. However, small-scale production was still the 
dominant mode of production and it employed the greater part of the labour force. This 
especially held for the carpet industry. The modernizing policies such as the introduction of 
certain dress codes, and the Pahlavi hat, outmoded many of the existing craft industries. In 
order do away with traditional dress large quantities of European clothes, hats and shoes were 
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imported and sold at cheap prices which were impossible for local producers to compete 
with.
115
 In May 1929 the weavers of Mashhad sent the following petition to the Majles: 
To the sacred Majles, may God empower its pillars, 
Every helpless and unfortunate soul who suffers hardship and poverty seeks refuge in the high 
offices. Because these days people shun national clothes as the weavers’ guild of Mashhad some 
eight to nine thousand miserable people who live and provide for their families on this craft are on 
the edge of destruction. Therefore, we found it necessary to present our situation to the sacred 
Majles may God empower its pillars. We ask the deputies to save us from our hardships hoping 
that they have not forsaken us and will give an answer to these weavers of Mashhad.
116
  
       
Table 4.6: The Manufacturing Plants Established Between 1930&1940* 








Textiles 72 1168 43026 29601 
Sugar 8 582 9909 4501 
Drinks 40 75 1360 565 
Chemicals 11 637 2901 4458 
Soap 16 15 85 231 
Glass 6 22 574 1043 
Leather 11 65 635 608 
Matches 26 50 354 4033 
Flour & rice milling 37 89 3072 1376 
Cotton ginning 29 53 1382 590 
Tea 9 42 348 399 
Total 𝟐𝟔𝟓 𝟐𝟕𝟗𝟖 63646 𝟒𝟕𝟒𝟎𝟓 
 
Source: Extracted from Ministry of Labour, Statistical Survey of Iranian Industries 1947 (in Persian). Quoted in 
Massoud Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 77.  
 
* Excludes government cement factories. 
** Historical cost at current prices[1990] in millions of rials.  
Guilds were among the first groups to suffer from extensive political and economic 
centralization. Traditionally, alongside their economic functions guilds enjoyed important 
social and political powers in cities. The economic challenges coming from European 
economic penetration notwithstanding, they largely maintained their economic role, but 
during the Constitutional Revolution their influence was mostly political. In the first year of 
Pahlavi modernization severe blows were dealt to the guilds. Apart from the abolition of guild 
taxes, as the severest blow to their basic structure and raison d’être, guilds’ activities, even 
their meetings, were put under strict police control.
117
 Radical secularization policies, on the 
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other hand, significantly weakened the position of the clergy and this in turn deprived guilds 
of a major supporter. Still yet, it is much of a state-centred approach to suggest that guilds 
“were deprived of all power”.
118
 As will be discussed in Chapter 4 the ineffective political 
system of the late Qajars against the European penetration had brought guilds closer to the 
mercantile groups which, with the exception of a few, had enormously suffered from foreign 
imports. During the late 1920’s and throughout 1930’s, on the other hand, guild members 
came to be more closely allied with the nascent working class due to the negative effects that 
industrial policies had on them. The two formed joint unions to protest against their 
deteriorating living and working conditions. 
 
Concluding Remarks: 
The Constitutional Revolution brought major changes in Iran’s political outlook. Not only the 
opening of the Majles, but also the provincial contribution to the political processes through 
societies (anjoman) formed in almost every town brought a new political culture to the 
country. Yet, for both internal and external reasons political stability could not be attained. 
Consequently the revolution fell short of realizing economic expectations. The geographical 
challenges to forming a nationwide market were compounded by political instability and the 
hostile attitude of Russia, as well as Britain’s self-interested policies which gave priority to its 
commercial ends above anything else. Still yet between 1906 and 1921 several attempts, 
successful or abortive, were made to achieve economic development and industrialization. 
During this period, the guilds as the main structure of urban-based manufacturing became 
politically significant while their economic role was decreasing. This was not only because of 
external factors, but also because manufacturers preferred more unmonitored methods of 
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century onwards, if not before, blurred the distinction between the two out of which emerged the foundations, if 




production and the putting-out system in order to lower costs. Available data suggest that 
from the early 1920’s onwards these initiatives gained unprecedented momentum. The 
increasing realization of political stability, often at the expense of political and cultural 
pluralism, and nationwide security, paved the way for the major economic leap forward of the 
1930’s. Attaining a large web of factory-based production was the main goal of the Pahlavi 
modernization policies. This would not only give Iran a modern outlook like its neighbour, 
Turkey, but would also stop the loss of the country’s wealth to foreign nations for imported 
goods. The Pahlavi economic policies were almost exclusively aimed at the domestic market, 
and apart from the oil industry, Iran’s role in the international economy hardly changed. Also, 
Iran’s currency, qran until March 1930 and rial henceforth, almost steadily lost value in the 
face of the pound sterling. By the turn of the 20
th
 century the rate of pound sterling in qran 
was around 51.1 in Tehran while by the start of the WWI it was about 55.5.
119
 Until the early 
1920’s it remained more or less the same and in 1923 it slightly rose to 56.56 but in 1929 it 
dropped to 54.76.
120
 By the late 1930’s the rate of pound sterling in qran rose to as high as 
80.
121
 At any rate, when the Allied forces occupied Iran, and Reza Shah was forced to 
abdicate from the throne in favour of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, in 1941, Iran had made 
significant progress towards industrialization. As the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
increasingly expanded its operations in the south, a nationwide industrialization had 
substantially transformed country’s manufacturing scene. More than two hundred factories 
were erected by the late 1930’s, producing a variety of goods from soup to matches, and from 
military boots to bricks, chemicals etc. Although art schools were established to promote craft 
industries, the main policies targeted factories. Carpet weaving remained largely under the 
control of small-scale establishments. In this industrial fervor, labour issues were given only a 
peripheral role. with the exception of a few specific legislative attempts at improving labour 
conditions, such as the one concerning carpet weavers in the mid-1920’s, labour did not 
attract much official attention. Whether factory-based or otherwise, Iranian workers have 
reacted to, and accommodated the developments which took place from the early twentieth 
century onwards. Their living and working conditions as well as their engagement with higher 
authorities constitute the main concerns of the next chapter. 
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Whether in craft industries or large-scale industrial establishments, workers’ worksite 
experiences, perceptions and actions are crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the 
period under study. Twentieth century was a century of revolution which brought about far-
reaching consequences in many aspects of life in diverse parts of the world. At the turn of the 
century a various constitutional revolutions took place in many countries. For instance, in Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire the constitutional revolutions which occurred in 1906 and 1908 
respectively provided, if temporarily, a suitable environment for labour activism and for a 
freer expression of the labour-related demands and grievances. Both in the Ottoman and Iran 
workers seized the relatively free political atmosphere of the post-revolutionary period as an 
opportunity and launched various strikes.
1
 Later on, the First World War which posed 
unprecedented military challenges to the belligerent countries and brought about major 
problems for non-belligerent countries played an important role in terms of labour relations. 
None of the states could predict that the war would last so long with so much heavy burdens 
and catastrophic consequences. To maximize the war effort governments had to mobilize not 
only troops to fight the war but also workers to work at factories. In many cases, in order to 
replace the male workforce growing numbers of women and children worked at factories 
usually under utterly difficult conditions. That “the demands made by the Government on the 
British people over the course of the First World War were on a scale hitherto unknown” can 
be said to hold true for any country which was influenced by the War in way or the other.
2
 
The wartime problems were aggravated by high inflation. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 
in Russia added to the already existing labour activism in many countries including Iran. The 
war was followed by waves of strikes and demonstrations in various parts of the world 
especially in Europe and the United States. Demands were put forward for union recognition, 
shorter working hours, and wage raises exceeding the inflation rate. Consequently, the 
wartime hardships and the post-war challenges called for an effective state intervention to 
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restore order and improve working and living conditions. The Great Depression which broke 
out in 1929 and continued throughout 1930s further escalated the economy and workers’ 
conditions. Iran was not an exception to these worldwide developments.  
In early twentieth century, foreign economic and political domination and internal despotism 
have created class-crossing alliances in Iran which at times obscured, if only temporarily, 
class boundaries. Nonetheless, the subsequent developments and the dissemination of 
communist ideas contributed to radicalization among the working people especially in urban 
settings. Formal labour organizations and the Communist Party of Iran radicalized workers 
and organized several labour actions throughout the period under investigation. Yet in a 
country where craft industries and small manufactures were the principle types of production, 
the impact of the leftist agitation was, for the most part, confined to urban centres and to 
factories which employed only a small part of the workforce throughout the period under 
investigation, as well as for a long time afterwards. Although much emphasis has been put, in 
the existing literature, on formal labour organizations and the collective labour activities 
which have been organized by them, a number of significant issues remain unclear. For 
instance, it would be interesting to learn more about informal labour organizations and non-
organized labour which comprised the majority of the Iranian workers. Also, generally 
speaking “working class” is erroneously and unclearly taken as a distinct category and 
insufficient attention is paid to the discursive formation of the Iranian working class.
3
 
This chapter examines labour issues in Iran form the inception of the First Majles in 1906 to 
the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. It first discusses the discursive process of working-class 
formation in Iran in order to show how workers gradually developed a peculiar linguistic 
category for themselves as distinct from the language used by subaltern groups at large. 
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Secondly, it then provides an overview of the workforce in Iran. Thirdly, the chapter 
investigates legislative attempts at regulating labour. Although no distinct labour law existed 
in Iran throughout this period there have been several, often sector-based attempts to improve 
working conditions. Fourthly, such major labour issues as working hours, wages and sanitary 
conditions are addressed. Fifthly, collective labour activism and formal labour organization 
will be discussed. The sixth and last section will investigate petitioning as a form of labour 
activism. Although this chapter predominantly analyses the textile workers, other industries 
and sectors will also be referred to throughout.   
   
Being of the Working-Class: From Kolah-namadi (Felt-capped) to Kargar (Worker)
 4
 
Many studies on Iranian labour history seem to take for granted the existence of the working-
class as a category, or else they seek its formation exclusively in certain material practices. 
Indeed the role of these material practices or structures has been great in Iran particularly 
from the mid-19
th
 century onwards. Foreign economic domination, domestic political and 
economic developments, and the subsequent dislocations of villagers and townspeople, 
significantly contributed to the formation of the Iranian working class. However, beyond 
these structural developments the formation of the Iranian class should first be sought at its 
discursive formation. Through this discursive formation one not only can see how Iranian 
workers came to see themselves as such, but also follow how their relationships with the 
political establishment and other classes were shaped and shifted depending on their self-
perceptions. There is no evidence to suggest that at the turn of the 20
th
 century the Iranian 
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working-class existed, at the discursive level, as a distinct and exclusive social entity, for 
being a worker did not constitute a distinct identity even for those who by every criterion 
could be considered workers. Workers` discursive formation, therefore, gradually emerged 
from a general subaltern discourse and in time gained a language of its own.  
In addressing higher authorities, Iranian subalterns described themselves—apart from such 
words as ahali and mardom (both meaning people) which separated only the ruled from the 
rulers—in various ways: kaminegan (inferior subjects)
5
; bicharegan (the helpless) and 
badbakht (the wretched)
6
; and bandegan (servants)
7
. Or else they combined a few of them 
such as bichareh, ‘avamm, and kolah-namadi (helpless, common folk and ‘amaleh—literally, 
“felt-capped”) There is thus a move from ahali (the people) to kolah-namadi (‘amaleh).
8
 This 
latter term was particularly used to refer to a class of unskilled labourers who migrated to 
larger towns and cities, as a result of the increasing rural-urban migration which took place 




 A set of petitions sent by the tanners of Kashan in the 
early 1920’s sheds light on how they perceived themselves against the ruling classes. In 
February 1922 the tanners wrote a petition to the Iranian Majles in which they complained of 
the excessive taxes and the subsequent deterioration of their trade:  
To the deputies of the sacred Majles, may God empower its pillars. Our opinion as the helpless 
members of the guild of tanners and of the ‘amaleh and the common folk of Iran who are involved 
in trade and agriculture is that the honourable deputies and the ministers should not only deal with 
foreign affairs but they should also pay attention to domestic issues. The initiatives at the political 
level make sense to the clergy and the wise men who they enjoy dealing with such matters but as 
the common folk we lack that capacity.
10
 
In their subsequent petitions they called themselves ranjbar (toiler), and fa‘aleh (labourer). 
The term kargar, the equivalent of ‘worker’, came into common usage towards the end of the 
Qajar period in the 1890s when the first wave of modern manufacturing began in Iran.
11
 
Urban wage-earners – the casual, seasonal and unskilled construction labourers – were at that 
time commonly referred to as ‘amalajat (labourers) not kargar (worker). Following the 
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Constitutional Revolution in 1906, in the parliamentary proceedings kargar was used. For 
instance, according to the list which enumerated the responsibilities of the Majles, the twenty 
sixth article suggested that it was supposed to “make sure that workers (kargar) and labourers 
(fa‘aleh-ye ‘amaleh) receive their wages in time and in full”.
12
 However kargar did not 
emerge for some time as the standard and a distinct category from fa‘aleh or ‘amaleh.
13
 
Apparently, as Atabaki argues, prior to the First World War there is no evidence that the 
working people in Iran called themselves kargar.
14
 From the early 1920’s onwards kargar 
increasingly came to be used to refer to the working people.  
However one should be careful not to make far-reaching conclusions from this slow 
development in Iranian workers’ self-identification. ‘Workerness’ and some sort of 
‘classness’ existed among Iranian workers even when kargar was not yet established as the 
standard term.
15
 The dislocations resulted from foreign economic domination, unpopular 
economic policies inside and the mass migration to Russia in search of jobs created some sort 
of a collective identity among Iranian workers. The transformation of this collective identity 
into a distinct working class identity gradually started from the early 20
th
 century onwards. 
The relatively freer political atmosphere created by the Constitutional Revolution and wide 
politicization accelerated this transformation. To this the industrialization attempts in the post-
WWI Iran, particularly during the 1930’s, were added. From the early 1920’s onwards kargar 
came to denote any wage-earners whether employed at large-scale establishments, at small-
scale workshops or at public baths and at bakeries. From the early 1920’s onwards not only 
did the number of industrial workers steadily increase, but also the diversified nature of the 
Iranian working class became more pronounced. In addition to men, woman and children 
gained an increasingly visible place in working life.  
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The Workforce in Iran 
Between 1900 and 1940 the population of Iran increased from 9.29 to 14.55.
16
 There is no 
conclusive evidence as to the size of the workforce in Iran for the period under study. 
According to Abdullayev between the late 19
th
 century and the First World War there were 
126,000 workers in Iran of whom 17,000 were employed in modern industrial establishments 
while the rest worked at craft industries and traditional economic activities.
17
 Abdullayev’s 
figures were based on a narrow definition of worker. Table-5.1 shows the economically active 
male population and its proportion to the total population for three years at twenty-year 
intervals. According to the figures provided by Bharier in Table-5.2, however, in 1906 the 
estimated total number of economically active men over ten years of age was 3.812 million of 
which 3.431 million were engaged in agriculture. This means that the number of the industrial 
workers was at that time 381,000. In either case the real numbers should have been higher 
than this. As Floor argues underage children and quite a significant number of women who 
were engaged in all kinds of economic activities especially in carpet weaving should also be 
counted as part of the workforce.
18
 Moreover, peasants too usually spun or wove for 
additional income and they gradually incorporated into the urban workforce.  
Table 5.1: The Percentage and the Number of the Economically Active Male Population 




Potentially active males Estimated active 
men  
 
1906  39.0 10.29m. 4.013m. 3.812m. 
1926 39.0 11.86m. 4.625m. 4.394m. 
1946 35.6 15.93m. 5.671m. 5.104m. 
Source: Bharier, Economic Development, 34. 
As shown in Table-5.2 according to Bharier between 1906 and 1946 the proportion of the 
agricultural workers to the total labour force declined about 15 percent despite the rise in the 
actual number of agricultural workers caused by the increased population.
19
 This should have 
resulted from increasing rural-urban migration as well as growing employment opportunities 
in cities and towns.   
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Table 5.2: The Proportion of the Agricultural Workforce to the Total Population. 
Year  Proportion (%)  Agricultural Workers  
1906  90 3.431m. 
1926 85 3.735m. 
1946 75 3.828m. 
Source: Bharier, Economic Development, 34. 
Yet, as Table-5.3 shows the proportion of the workers at large industrial establishments in the 
total population was insignificant, although it experienced a steady rise from the mid-1920’s 
onwards. If we consider the three tables together we have to conclude that there were 
1,276,000 industrial workers in Iran in 1946 of whom 94,000 were employed in large-scale 
industrial establishments with ten or more workers. The rest were then employed by smaller 
manufacturers. If we add to this the child and female workers and those who were employed 
in the service sector, the figures should be higher.   
Table 5.3: The Proportion of the Industrial Workers to the Total Population 
Year  Proportion (%)  Industrial workers Employed at large Industrial 
Establishments Including the Oil Industry 
1906  - - 
1926 1 0.030m. 
1946 2 0.094m.. 
Source: Bharier, Economic Development, 35. 
Abdullayev suggests that the industrial workforce was derived mainly from three sources. The 
first source was the peasantry.
20
 From the late 19
th
 century the Iranian peasantry, especially 
those who lived in the northern regions sought employment in the expanding industries in 
Tsarist Russia. For example, of a total 192,767 workers who crossed the Russian border 
legally in 1911 as many as 160,211 were Iranians.
21
 Many of these migrant workers came 
from rural backgrounds. Following the October Revolution of 1917, thousands of these 
Iranian migrant workers in the Caucasus returned to their homeland to join the mounting army 
of unemployed labourers.
22
 Also, following the establishment of the oil industry in the south 
from 1908 onwards peasants were employed in this growing industry as in the other industries 
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elsewhere in the country. Particularly by the end of the First World War the deteriorating 
living conditions forced many Iranians, especially the peasantry, to abandon their homes in 
search of a living. The second source of the nascent Iranian proletariat, according to 
Abdullayev, was the artisans.
23
 Reports abound as to the decline in craft industries as a result 
of which many craftsmen sought employment in the growing industries. This was particularly 
true for the textile industry. It is impossible to draw a definitive picture of the workforce 
employed in craft industries in Iran. However craft industries continued to employ the greater 
part of the workforce. The first census undertaken in 1956 sheds important light on this point. 
It appears that as late as the mid-20
th
 century in many parts of the country craft industries 
ranked as the second most important economic activity after agriculture. As far as people ten 
years of age and over and involved in gainful economic activity are concerned, the 
percentages for some of the major craft centres were as follows: in Tabriz district out of the 
181 thousand thirty-eight percent of the men were farmers whereas 33 percent were 
craftsmen. Of the women sixty-one percent were engaged in crafts while 25 percent were in 
service sector
24
; in Isfahan and its environs, of the 195 thousand persons 47 percent of the 
men were farmers and 26 percent were craftsmen whereas sixty percent of the women were 
engaged in crafts while 23 percent were employed in services
25
; of the 165 thousand persons 
in Mashhad district 48 percent of men were farmers whereas 23 percent worked in craft and 
related industries. The percentage for the women was forty-five percent for crafts and 36 
percent for the service sector
26
; in Tehran of the 581 thousand persons those who were 
engaged in crafts amounted to thirty-four percent among men and 12 percent among women. 
For the men, sales and related occupations ranked second with 15 percent while as much as 
sixty-two percent of the women were engaged in the service sector.
27
  
Kashan was no different. Out of 73 thousand, 57 percent of the men were farmers and 27 
percent were craftsmen while of the women, ninety-six percent were engaged in crafts while a 
mere 2 percent were employed in services
28
; in Yazd, of the 106 thousand persons sixty-one 
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percent of the men were farmers and 23 percent were craftsmen. Of the women, as much as 
eighty percent were engaged in crafts while farming came second with 12 percent
29
; in Shiraz 
census district among 110 thousand persons those employed in crafts amounted to 21 percent 
for men and as much as seventy-five percent for women. Also while farming was the largest 
economic sphere for men with forty-six per 28 percent of the women were reported to be 
employed in service occupations.
30
 It was also reported on various occasions that those 
engaged in craft industries tended to be younger than those in other occupations.
31
 When we 
also consider the fact that boys and girls under 10 years of age were also employed in craft 
industries, it appears that the actual figures should be even higher. At any rate, although a 
substantial number of former craftsmen sought employment at the growing large-scale 
industrial establishments, craft industries continued to be the most important manufacturing 
activity throughout the period under investigation. The mass of urban poor constituted, 
according to Abdullayev, the third source of the Iranian working class.
32
 Recurring famines, 
droughts, and arbitrary rule in the provinces had pushed many peasants throughout the 19
th
 
century to larger towns and cities.  
  
The Nature of Textile Labour 
Although craft industries remained the principal type of textile manufacturing in towns and 
cities, peasants also spun and wove for own-use or for additional income. Although guilds 
have historically functioned as the principle centres of craft-based production in urban 
settings for the period under study they have steadily lost much of their controlling capacity. 
However as far as the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries are concerned, apart from references to 
the negative impact of ready-made imports on them, little is known even about the Iranian 
guilds and their workings, let alone about their workforce. Floor rightly argues that compared 
to Egyptian and Ottoman guilds, Iranian guilds remain largely understudied.
33
 Guild 
membership was a male privilege and female membership was possible only in exceptional 
cases. In rural places, on the other hand, it was common to have a spindle or a loom, or 
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alternatively both, at which women along with men worked as a part-time activity. For 
instance, a German traveller makes the following remarks in early twentieth century:  
However little the Persian, in general, likes to work, insofar as the common people are concerned 
it is rare to see the women just gossiping without their working at the same time on the spindle or 
the loom – not unlike our own womenfolk with their knitting. But even the men if they do not 
sleep during the day or sit in a tea-house, also start their spinning-wheel during the idle moments, 
but often to be occupied rather than of an urge to be productive.
34
 
Problematic though they are in their essentialist judgemental remarks about Iranian people, 
which abound in the travelogues of Westerners visiting Iran or other Middle Eastern 
countries, such observations are still useful for seeing how widespread weaving activities 
were. The rapid commodification of agriculture during the nineteenth century furthered the 
integration of the part-time weavers into the growing textile industry, particularly carpet 
making, through the putting-out system. With the disintegration of the guild system due to 
several factors, such as the ready-made imports, centralization policies and the establishment 
of a nation-wide market which rendered the closed-up guild structure dysfunctional, the 
labour force involved in urban-based manufacturing changed too. In small manufactures 
where sometimes tens of workers worked under overly unfavourable working conditions, 
women and children were employed extensively. Guilds seem to have substantially lost their 
regulating capacity, especially over the workforce, from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
which paved the way in urban centres for the dissemination of extra-guild manufacturing. 
Typical guild-based manufactures and the newly emerging workshops from late nineteenth 
century onwards are often indiscriminately referred to as ‘traditional industrial 
establishments’.
35
 However, these workshops apparently displayed the guilds’ weakened 
control capacity at the production and workforce levels.  
In the post-World War I period the number of female industrial workers steadily rose, 
especially but not exclusively in the textile industry. For example, due to the atrocities of the 
First World War, the Charities Directorate of Tehran Municipality established the Dar al-
Sanaye‘ or the House of Industries with the aim of providing such jobs as weaving and 
spinning to needy women. At the Wool Spinning Factory in Mazandaran which was erected 
in 1918 at least as many as three hundred women were employed.
36
 On the other hand, in the 
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expanding textile industries during the 1930’s, child labour was increasingly employed too. A 
survey of twelve cotton spinning and weaving plants in 1936 showed that although the 
number of male workers in the industry was declining as in other countries, instead of being 
replaced by female workers, their places were being taken by child-labour as seen in Table-
5.4.
37
 A list of the workers of the E‘temadiyeh Weaving and Spinning Factory in Bushehr in 
1937 shows that the average age of the workers was 21.6 and fifty-five workers were under 
fourteen (Appendix 5).
38
 Also from among 707 workers at Vatan Factory in Isfahan in 1934, 
184 were reported to be women.
39
 As is also shown in Table-5.4 from the mid-1930’s 
onwards there was a substantial increase in the number of the female and child workers.  
Table 5.4: Workers in the Cotton Industry, by Gender and Age 
Mills March 1935 March 1936 March 1937 
 male female child male female child male female child 
1 - - - - - - 443 58   212 
2 - - - - - - 127 -     79 
3 270 60 120 350 150 180 355 142   190 
4 200 50 150 500 100 200 600 200   300 
5 - - - - - - 695 342   262 
6 70 - 50 120 - 80 280 20   150 
7 - - - - - - 378 42   140 
8 - - - - - - 300 -   500 
9 - - - 160 - 180 170 15   315 
10 - - - 70 - 50 130 -   120 
11 440 52 - 544 15 - 625 122     - 
12 180 20 100 180 20 100 210 20   110 
Total 1160 182 400 1924 285 790 4313 961 2378 
          
Source: Touraj Atabaki, Willem Floor and Nazanin Sadeghi, “Change and Development in Labour Relations In 
Iran 1650-2000”. Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500-2000, 
https://collab.iisg.nl/group/labourrelations/documents?p_p_id=20&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=maximized&p_
p_mode=view&tabs1=recent-documents (last access. 27.11.2014). 
Forced labour was another type of recruitment at the newly established factories. Forced 
labour was especially employed from the late 1920’s onwards to supply the necessary 
workforce for the growing textile industry in northern Iran, where several large-scale 
industrial establishments were established during the 1930’s. For example, in 10 April 1939 a 
“confidential and urgent” letter was sent from the Isfahan Municipality to the Governorship of 
Isfahan in which the need was expressed for workers to be employed at the newly established 
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factories in Behshahr in the Mazandaran province in northern Iran.
40
 It was also added that 
workers would be sent with their families, to prevent any attempt to escape in order to return 
to their families. Apparently the order was sent to various towns and in 12 April 1939 a 
similar one was sent to Shehreza in the province of Isfahan.
41
 In response, it was stated in 22 
April 1939 that there was only one male worker suitable for the job and that many peasant 
women were engaged in such activities.
42
 We do not know how many workers were sent from 
Isfahan or elsewhere to Mazandaran. There are other reports regarding the employment of 
forced labour. For instance only two weeks before Allied forces entered Iran in 1941 a 
lengthy commentary on a report by Albert C. C. Embrechts, a Belgian employee of the 
American International Telephone and Telegraph Company in Tehran, was prepared by 
Harold G. Minor, the secretary of the American legation. Among other things he pointed out, 
in the following words, the plight of forced labourers in Reza Shah’s reign: “forced labour, 
amounting almost to slavery, exists on some of the Shah’s properties with wages as low as 
three and a half rials a day, from which the local police take a cut. Exploitation of the people, 
truly, has become scandalous and malodorous”.
43
     
 
Regulating Labour: Attempts at Labour Legislation 
It is not always easy to determine what is meant by labour legislation. The problem for the 
Iranian case stems from two main causes. On the one hand, during the period under study no 
distinct labour law existed in Iran. Instead, sector-based regulations were introduced often on 
a local scale. On the other hand, one’s definition of labour very much delineates the scope of 
labour regulation. In the early twentieth century, “worker” was almost invariably taken to 
mean those who worked at factories, which Iran did not yet have many at that time. In what 
follows labour regulation is used to refer to every regulation which was introduced at the 
central and local levels and which targeted workers involved in every kind of trade and 
industrial activity. From the early 20
th
 century onwards several political parties such as the 
Democrats and later Socialists and Communists addressed some preliminary labour issues 
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such as working hours and child labour. For instance the Democrat Party’s program declared 
that children under the age of fourteen must not be employed; the workday must not exceed 
ten hours; workers must get a weekly rest day; the factories must have necessary facilities for 
work and should provide the required sanitary conditions.
44
  In 1919 The Socialist Party also 
included an eight-hour workday and the prohibition of the employment of children before 
they completed mandatory education among the party’s objectives.
45
 Notwithstanding their 
progressiveness such regulations took a long time to materialize.   
In the beginning, provincial administrations played a prominent role in monitoring labour-
related issues. Provincial administration was consolidated by the Constitutional Revolution. 
Anjomans, societies which were established in various cities in order to monitor elections to 
the First Majles in 1906, but continued to exist afterwards, were the main bodies which 
enjoyed much local influence. According to “the Law for the Provincial and District Council” 
which was passed by the Majles in 1906, the twenty-sixth article of the responsibilities of the 
Districts Council was to ensure the payment of workers’ wages.
46
 Other than this nothing 
specifically related to labour was mentioned. Apparently until the coup d’état in 1921 labour 
regulation consisted of local attempts such as the one in Kerman in 1913. The Deputy 
Governor of Kerman introduced a set of regulations to be maintained at carpet factories which 
incited carpet weavers to take sanctuary at the British consulate.
47
 These disagreements 
brought carpet weaving to a standstill. Since much of the carpet weaving was done for 
European firms, they were also involved in the negotiations.
48
 The regulations, according to 
the British Consul: 
For the most part were in themselves desirable, an opinion in which the agents of the European 
carpet firms concurred. Some of them were however scarcely practicable, and to a large extent 
they could only be made effective after the lapse of a reasonable period of time, while in fact they 
were declared operative at once. On the other hand the conditions of the trade are notoriously 
scandalous and highly injurious to the health and wellbeing of the workers who are largely small 
children.
49
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Subsequently the regulations were suspended but the question of the working conditions at 
the carpet industry would soon resurface. The most powerful pressure for labour regulation 
regarding this industry came from abroad when the newly founded the ILO (ILO), to which 
Iran was an early member, sent a memorandum to the Iranian authorities in 1921 in which it 
drew attention to the unfavourable working conditions in the carpet industry. The issue was 
discussed in the Fifth Session of the Governing Body of the ILO in October 1920 and 
consequently the case was presented to the Persian Government.
50
 To this effect, on 31 
October 1921 Albert Thomas, a former French politician and Minister and the first Director of 
the ILO, sent a letter to Prince Arfa‘ al-Dowleh, Iran’s delegate to the Second Assembly of 
the League of Nations, in which he underlined the plight of the child and female workers in 
the carpet industry in Kerman.
51
 He first referred in the letter to the deliberations of the 
international conference held in Washington between 29 October and 29 November 1919 
according to which the employment of children of under the age of 14 was forbidden. 
Following this he stated that children, some of whom were only five years old, had to work in 
the carpet industry in Kerman under unfavourable working conditions from sunrise to sunset 
with only a very short rest at midday. This, argued Thomas, hurt their physical and mental 
well-being. He then reminded the Iranian representative that since Iran was a party to the 
League of Nations and the ILO, their decisions were binding for it. Therefore he requested the 
Iranian authorities to take the necessary actions in this matter.  
The same issue was reemphasized in another letter which was sent to the Iranian 
representative at the League of Nations.
52
 After reproducing the same account regarding the 
unfavourable working conditions of child and female labour in the carpet industry, it was 
stated the recent reports showed that the working conditions not only in Kerman but also in 
such cities as Kashan and Isfahan, were even more appalling than they previously been aware 
of.
53
 It was discovered, continued the letter, that women had been paralyzed due to difficult 
working conditions and long working hours which amounted to about fourteen hours a day. In 
the subsequent negotiations and by the initiative of the British Consul in Kerman the owners 
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of carpet factories which mostly belonged to Americans and Europeans agreed on a number 
of regulations regarding working conditions. Accordingly boys under 8 years of age and girls 
under ten must not be employed; carpet looms must be eleven inches from the ground to 
enable workers to comfortably lay down their legs; the workday must not exceed eight hours 
with a short rest at midday during which workers must go out of the workshops; a 
commission, whose members were not to consist of factory owners, must be formed to 
monitor compliance with the regulations.
54
         
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mo‘azzaz al-Dowleh, also informed the British Legation, which 
backed ILO in this matter and whose several companies were involved in carpet industry in 
Kerman, that necessary instructions were sent to the local authorities in Kerman regarding the 
improvement of the working conditions.
55
 Subsequently, the Governor of Kerman, Ja‘far Qoli 
Bakhtiyari, informed the Prime Minister, Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i, that a meeting was held with 
employers of the carpet industry on 11 December 1921 during which they agreed to the 
following: employment of journeymen should be strictly free and the contract should be based 
on mutual agreement; once approved by a religious judge (hakem-e shar‘i) the contract should 
be presented by the master to the Kargozari and the Directorate of Public Utilities for 
registration; the previous contracts should also be rearranged in accordance with the first two 
terms and should likewise be presented to these two authorities; the workday for journeymen 
as well as other employees should be eight hours in all seasons, and overtime shall depend on 
their consent for additional pay; boys under eight years of age and girls under ten should not 
be employed; masters should arrange the workshops with proper sanitary conditions; wages of 
journeymen should be increased five percent; on Fridays and public holidays should be free 
days; and men and women should work in separate workshops.
56
 Shortly after the arrival of 
this report from Kerman the Majles sent a letter to the Prime Minister in which attention was 
drawn to the absence in the agreement reached by factory owners of a commission, as 
proposed by the British legation, which would monitor compliance.
57
 Ultimately, on 17 
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1- The working day for all workers in carpet factories shall be 8 hours. The 
manufacturers (employers) shall not be entitled to require their workers to work longer 
than the specified hours. 
2- On Fridays and on public holidays work shall be suspended in all carpet factories, and 
the workers shall be entitled to receive their wages for these days as working days. 
3- Boys under 8 years of age and girls under ten years of age shall not be employed in 
these factories. 
4- The boys’ workshop shall be separate from the girls’ workshop. Mixed workshops 
shall be absolutely prohibited. 
5- Foremen (persons who dictate the patterns to the workers) shall not be admitted into 
the girls’ workshop. Forewomen shall be employed to dictate the girls’ patterns. 
6- A manufacturer shall not in any case engage or retain a worker suffering from an 
infectious disease.  
7- Carpet weaving workshops shall not be situated underground or in dump rooms. 
Workshops shall have windows towards the south, so that the sun can enter them. 
8- The carpet weaving loom shall be one meter above the floor of the workshop and the 
seat shall be high enough for children to be able to perform their work as comfortably 
as possible. 
In addition to these, several articles were also added regarding the enforcement and inspection 
for the implementation of these measures, and fines were proposed for non-compliance. The 
result was satisfactory for both ILO and the British Government. The British Minister in 
charge of the ILO affairs admitted his satisfaction in the House of Lords.
59
 The Kerman 
negotiations were even regarded as “a very interesting example of the influence that may be 
exercised by international inquiry and persuasion”.
60
 Yet, a few years later an article titled 
“the Kerman carpets, or the cutting off of the offspring of Kerman” appeared in Shafaq-e 
Sorkh (The Red Dawn) in 1928 which was quoted at length in the ILO’s official publication.
61
 
After emphasizing the importance of the carpet industry for Kerman, the unfavourable 
working and living conditions of the workers were once again underlined. It was stated that 
“it is not possible to meet in the city of Kerman itself one carpet weaver, boy or girl, woman 
or man, who has the appearance of a human being, the majority of the men and youth are 
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sallow, abject, hunchbacked with deformed legs and arms, unfit for work”.
62
 Apparently the 
regulations of 1923 had not been properly implemented. As stated in the article, during the 
governorship of Abd al-Hosain Teymurtash, the former Governor of Kerman and the Minister 
of Court in 1928, a commission was appointed which consisted of chiefs of the District and 
City Police, the Director of Education and certain of the master carpet weavers. Subsequently 
a Government decree was issued which contained a set of sanitary and physical instructions 
for carpet workshops in line with the 1923 decree but in a more detailed fashion.
63
 Apparently 
these instructions also remained limited in scope and effect, and the unfavourable conditions 
in the Kerman carpet industry made it one of the centres of labour activity.  
Lack of a proper labour law was a matter of concern for workers too, as in the example of 
public bath attendants who, in the petition they sent to the Majles in August 1926 complained 
about the absence of a labour law:   
To the Honourable Deputies of the Sacred Majles May God Empower its Pillars. With utmost 
respect,  
In this period of Constitutional rule everyone, and every guild and trade is provided with laws and 
regulations with the exception of the public bath attendants. For bakers it was decided that they 
should work eight hours a day in two shifts. Yet, public bath attendants start work one hour and a 
half before the sunrise and work until three hours after the sunset and we work in immense heat. 
When we want to have some rest the master of the bath assigns us with drudgeries so that in an 
eighteen or nineteen-hour workday we have no time for rest but they do not pay us accordingly. 
We request that the municipal directorate in charge of these matters should inspect public bath 
workers and pay them in accordance with their work. Also […] they give us two free days without 
pay although others have one day off with or without pay. What if we humble workers remain sick 
for four days? What should we eat then and how should we provide for our families? In addition to 
these, we suffer hardships during the summertime, and in wintertime a Mazandarani comes and 
presents a gift to the master and takes over our jobs.
64
 
In the rest of the petition bath attendants requested the adoption of measures to regulate their 
working conditions and safeguard their rights. Nonetheless, despite these calls, labour 
regulation remained a peripheral issue throughout the period under study. Most of the 
legislation attempts during the 1920’s and 1930’s concerned state employees. Due to the fever 
for industrialization during this period, labour issues remained of secondary importance. Iran 
had to be modernized, and workers’ concerns were not on the list of immediate priorities. This 
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point is made overtly in correspondence between Mirza Seyed Baqer Khan Kazemi, the 
Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, an employee of the 
ILO.
65
 In a letter dated October 1933 and sent to Kazemi, Jamalzadeh raised a number of 
labour-related issues.
66
 He mainly urged the establishment of a state department which would 
deal exclusively with agricultural and industrial affairs by focusing on labour issues. 
Furthermore, he stressed that since industrialization was increasingly underway in Iran at the 
time the creation of a labour office to ensure the neat working of this process was a necessity 
and that many Eastern countries have adopted essential measures on this issue. For instance, 
added Jamalzadeh, such countries as Egypt and Turkey have either established a labour office 
or a similar body to deal with industrial and agricultural affairs and to take part in the 
preparation of the necessary laws and regulations. He then proposed the establishment of an 
office with the following tasks: the inspection of working conditions and the situations of 
workers who were employed in the agricultural sector, craft industries or large-scale industrial 
establishments; the preparation of bills for laws and regulations about such labour issues as 
wages, working hours, sanitary conditions, worker-manager relations, setting the minimum 
limit age for workers, and the treatment of pregnant workers and the training of workers.
67
 In 
May 1934 Baqer Khan Kazemi replied by stating that the introduction of laws and regulations 
about labour was not an urgency in Iran since the erection of factories was a new and an 
ongoing phenomenon in the country.
68
 Once again, labour was equated with factory labour.  
 
The Factory Act: 
In the mid-1930’s unfavourable working conditions, mainly in small-scale textile factories in 
Isfahan, came to the fore. In the ensuing investigations it was discovered that the conditions in 
textile factories were extremely unfavourable, they were full of garbage, and workers had to 
work under dust and in putrid air. The worksites were constructed in such a way that they had 
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neither air nor light.
69
 The Factory Act which was adopted by the Majles in 1936 and 
introduced a number of essential sanitary measures for working conditions.
70
 These 
regulations were in themselves revolutionary but not only did the Act remain largely on paper 
as far as workers’ rights were concerned but also, it only concerned factories with ten or more 
workers. Besides, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) as the biggest employer in the 
country, after the Iranian state, did not implement the Act. The company found impossible the 
implementation of the Act and the modification of their existing practices accordingly. 
Ultimately, “the Act no doubt became a dead letter in many parts of the country – but 
nowhere more than in the oil districts of Khuzestan”.
71
 It can even be argued that in some 
respects the Act made things worse for workers.
72
 The following measures, to name a few, 
were introduced that were to the disadvantage of workers: any misconduct from the part of 
employees on “sanitary, technical and disciplinary instructions of the competent authorities” 
was subject to imprisonment or fines; neglect of duty was to be compensated by the employee 
by a deduction from his/her wages and the sum was to be decided by the factory owner as the 
employee could also be prosecuted if negligence was held to be an offence. In case of non-
compliance the employee was not only to make good the damage caused to the factory but 




These points can best be illustrated by a comparison of this Act with the Labour Law in 
Turkey which was passed by the Turkish Parliament in 1936 and put into force in 1937.
74
 To 
start with, both the Iranian Factory Act and the Turkish Labour Law concerned establishments 
with ten or more workers. This point was criticized by some leftist publications in Turkey. 
For instance, according to the newspaper İşçi Dünyası (Worker’s World) the definition of 
‘worker’ in the Law was quite narrow and should be expanded since, argued the newspaper, 
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“all of us, except the children and the elderly are workers”.
75
 Although industrial development 
had recorded comparatively more impressive success in Turkey in mid-1930’s both countries 
were dominated by small-scale manufactures but in practice the laws concerned only large-
scale industrial establishments. However, both of the laws contained details regulations 
regarding work contracts, working hours, female and child labour as well as sanitary 
conditions of the worksites. The underlying aim of these two laws was to discourage 
collective labour activities as well as to thwart communist and socialist agitation. The states 
acted in both of the laws as the sole an only legitimate intermediary between the employers 
and the employee. Karpat argues that “since the Labour Law numbered 3008 was prepared in 
line with the pre-WWII Italian law it regulated workers’ issues in a totalitarian manner.”
76
 
Makal describes this feature of the Turkish Labour Law by stating that the law was 
“protective” in individual labour issues and authoritarian in “collective” labour issues.
77
 This 
latter feature was clearly reflected in the Iranian Factory Act which forbade the employees “to 
form or take part in any union or association prejudicial to the interests of the factory.”
78
 Both 
in Turkey and Iran workers’ right to form organizations or to become members of the existing 
organizations came later on. For instance the Iranian Labour Law of 1946 recognized 
workers’ right to form a union.
79
        
In short, the liabilities of the employer, according to the Act, were less than those of the 
employee. These points were made strikingly by the workers of the Pashmbaf Factory in 
Isfahan.
80
 After complaining about the arbitrary practices of the factory management in the 
past years “workers’ representatives”, more than a hundred individuals, as far as the 
signatures show, express their pleasure with the Factory Act which arguably was a result of 
their insistent efforts. Yet, they criticize the authority granted to the employer, or the factory 
manager, for the implementation of the adopted measures by arguing that workers were 
dismissed on unsound pretexts. Therefore the petitioning workers requested rehiring of the 
fired workers as well as the mediation of the judicial authorities in case of conflict between 
the workers and the factory. 
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Working Hours and Wages 
For a long time no fixed rules seemed to exist in Iran about working hours. Usually Iranian 
workers had to work long hours, and a workday between ten and twelve hours was apparently 
normal.
81
 It could sometimes be as long as sixteen hours.
82
 Occasionally working hours were 
defined by sunrise and sunset as in the example of the aforementioned public bath attendants 
who complained in their petition that they had to start work “one hour and a half before the 
sunrise and work in the heat until three hours after the sunset.”
83
 In some cases working hours 
were explicitly arranged at least on paper. For example it was decided in 1921 that the carpet 
weavers in Kerman would work eight hours in all seasons and Fridays and public holidays 
would be free days.
84
 The long working day was one of the main concerns of early labour 
activism in Iran. For example in 1918 the printers in Tehran struck and obtained an eight-hour 
workday.
85
 Also in 1919 the Socialist Party included an eight-hour workday among its 
objectives.
86
 Through the 1930’s several measures were taken to restrict working hours 
especially at the newly founded factories. Nonetheless arbitrary decisions continued to exist. 
For example the workers of the Pashmbaf Factory in Isfahan complained in May 1943 that the 
factory management extended their work hours from 8 to 10 hours.
87
  
Our information about the wages for the entire period under study is rather inconclusive. 
Wages varied considerably from one sector to the next while regional differences were also 
significant.  At any rate as a rule wages were below the poverty line especially for unskilled 
workers. According to Abdullayev before the First World War in a silk reeling factory in 
Rasht male workers’ wages for a day varied between 1,5  and 3 qrans while female workers 
earned between 0,5 to 0,75 qrans.
88
 Child workers could earn 7 shahis a day.
89
 Among 
weavers wages were more egalitarian but still quite low. An adult male weaver could earn 1,5 
qrans a day while women and children received for a day’s labour about 1 qran and 0,5 qran 
respectively.
90
 In the early 1920’s a weaver in Tehran could ear at most 3-4 karans a day.
91
 In 
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the mid-1930’s at large mills average wages were about sixpence (two rials) for a ten hour 
day compared to 63 pence in Britain, 23 pence in India and 14 pence in Japan.
92
 In 1928 a 
British commercial attaché remarked that a labourer’s wage amounted to three to four qrans 
per day. For these wages he could only buy “bread and cheese and an occasional piece of 




Sanitary Conditions  
In a radio broadcast dated 19 October 1942 A. K. S. Lambton, the press attaché of the British 
legation at the time of the broadcast and a famous British historian of Iran, emphasized the 
appalling working conditions of workers, including children, which she personally 
observed.
94
 Generally speaking epidemic diseases have constituted a major problem in Iran.
95
 
There were not enough medical staff or infrastructure to fight the diseases. Reportedly in 1924 
there were only 905 physicians in the country.
96
 For example, in February 1933, petitioners 
from Zarand, in the province of Kerman, complained about the inattentiveness of the deputies 
to their repeated requests for a doctor to take care of sixty thousand people.
97
 Although the 
ratio of doctors to the population almost tripled from the mid-1920’s to the mid-1930’s it still 
was a mere 1:4.000 in 1935 compared with more distressing 1:11.000 in 1924.
98
 Apparently, 
the sanitary conditions at industrial establishments became a matter of concern in the mid-
1930’s. Workers often had to work in dark and poorly ventilated and insufficiently lighted 
rooms which exposed them to dust, steam and dirt. This was especially true for smaller 
workshops. For example it was discovered in the ensuing investigations at small workshops in 
Isfahan that workers had to operate in extremely dirty and dark environments where there was 
no proper ventilation.
99
 The Bazaar of Hajj Mohammad Hosayn which was managed by a 
German national named Jackman and produced blankets for Vatan Factory was the centre of 
                                                          
92
 Bharier, Economic Development, 178. 
93
 F. R. Lingeman, “Report on the Finance and Commerce of Persia 1925-1927”. London: HMSO, 1928. 30. 
Quoted in Floor, Industry and Labour, 100. 
94
 ILO. CL-49.01.48. 11. 1942.  “Conditions of Labour, Hours of Work-Iran- Industrial Conditions in Iran”. 
95
 About public health in Iran in general see Willem Floor, Public Health in Qajar Iran (Washington DC: Mage, 
2006); A. R. Neligan, “Public Health in Persia: 1914-1924”, The Lancet, Volume 207, Issue 5352, Pages 690 - 
694, 27 March 1926. 
96
 Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, Standford: Standford University Press, 1961, 73. Quoted in Rager 
M. Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era”, in Iran under the Pahlavis, George Lenczowski 
ed., California: Hoover Institution, 1978, 92. 
97
 LMDCIP. d8/k4/j19/p188-kerman, “Request for Remaining in the Office of Dr. Navabi”, 4 February 1933. 
98
 Savory, “Social Development in Iran”, 93. 
99





 Consequently a proposal was put forward by the Isfahan Municipality to 
design special places where such workshops would operate under sanitary conditions.
101
  
Investigations were soon extended to large-scale establishments such as Rahimzadeh and 
Vatan factories in Isfahan. It was reported that Vatan Factory had only one drinking vessel for 
four hundred workers and that workers used a water melon for this purpose during the 
summer.
102
 Appendix-6 contains the detailed results of the medical inspections undertaken in 
1934 and 1936 by Dr. Mahdi Filsuf, a prominent doctor in Isfahan, on workers employed at 
Vatan Factory as well as on their families. Out of 557 workers of Vatan Factory, only 17 were 
found to be in bad health.
103
 Yet, an array of medical problems from malaria (41 workers), to 
syphilis (75 workers), rheumatism (42 workers), various injuries (72 workers), etc. were 
discovered.
104
 Since the inspections included workers’ families it is not easy to make far 
reaching conclusions from them about conditions of sanitation. Taken as a whole, this list 
does not provide much information about the respiratory manifestations of worker-related 
illnesses in Iranian textile mills. Yet lung diseases such as asthma, influenza, lung congestion 
and tuberculosis were observed. Also it was discovered in 1936 that sanitary conditions at 
Rahimzadeh factory which employed 340 workers in 1940 were far from satisfactory.
105
 
There is no mention in the inspections about the working conditions in small-scale 
manufactures.  
The degree of the reliability of the inspections is not clear. Yet apparently it exercised an 
impact on the introduction of the above mentioned Factory Act which introduced a number of 
regulations on hygiene and sanitation, ventilation, lighting, heating and cooling of the work 
site, etc. Detailed rules were determined about the warmth of the work site, prevention of 
mosquitos and dust from entering the factory, provision of special clothes to workers as far as 
was possible, and the establishment of dispensaries in the factories. The following were 
among the issues regulated in the Act: buildings should be at least three meters high, unless 
required otherwise for technical reasons; the doors and the windows were to be adequate for 
ventilation and arranged so as to make workers comfortable during work; the work premises 
were to be cleaned while workers were not in; artificial light, if needed, was to be arranged in 
accordance with the work done and should not disturb workers’ eyes; the worksites were to be 
                                                          
100
 NLAI. 191/3284, “To the Governorship of Isfahan”, 16 Tir 1315 (7 July 1936). 
101
 NLAI. 191/3284, “From Isfahan Municipality to the Governorship of Isfahan”, 20 Tir 1315 (11 July 1936). 
102
 Floor, Labour and Industry, 98. 
103
 NLAI. 291/3284, “Report of the Medical Inspection on Workers”, May 1936. See Appendix 6. 
104
 NLAI. 291/3284, 29 Tir 1315 (20 July 1936). 
105
 NLAI. 291/3284, “To the Governorship of Isfahan”, 11 Tir 1316 (2 July 1937). 
147 
 
heated in winter time in to specified temperatures; fresh and cool water was to be provided 
with workers with an exclusive cup for each worker; measures were to be taken to prevent 
excessive noise; pregnant women were to be released on full pay during confinement; 
workmen were to be provided with special clothes for work; adequate medical facilities were 
to be provided inside factories.
106
 
The more distressing fact was that factories employed only an insignificant portion of the 
Iranian workforce, the majority of which worked in cottage and craft industries. Immediately 
after the Factory Act inspections were made again in Isfahan of the sanitary conditions of 
workers. As shown in Appendix 6 several reports were prepared again for the Vatan 
Factory.
107
 The subsequent reports speak of the appalling working conditions at such factories 
as Barq and Rahimzadeh in Isfahan, as they also clearly show the difficulty of controlling the 




Socialism and Labour Activism in Iran 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 took place as the result of a complex and class-
crossing alliance of various groups which regarded the absolute monarchy as the main 
hindrance to economic, as well as political and social, progress. However, lower classes and 
radicalized groups soon discovered that such privileged classes as the tribal chiefs, the large 
landowners and the senior religious leaders came to be the real beneficiaries of the 
revolution.
109
 The immediate aftermath of the Revolution witnessed the shattering of this 
alliance. The class-based nature of the First Majles from 1906 to 1908 furthered this process. 
With the gradual disintegration of the absolute monarchy, a new and more heterogeneous type 
of political community emerged in Iran, into which workers slowly integrated. Due to the 
dismay created by the post-Revolutionary developments, many Iranian migrants in Russia, 
who had been indoctrinated by the Russian Social Democrats, believed that a Communist 
revolution was the means to solve Iran’s problems.
110
 Nonetheless, many Iranians inside Iran 
regarded the establishment of a powerful government as the only viable solution. Such a 
government would eliminate foreign hegemony in the country and unfold development 
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projects especially in the economic realm. To them the ideal government would ensure 
economic development, security and order in every corner of the country without using any 
coercive power to penetrate into people’s everyday lives especially when penetration was not 
to their advantage. The process was more complex for workers. Until the development of 
large-scale industrial establishments many workers were employed in craft industries. For the 
period from the failure of the constitutional experiment in 1911 to the establishment of the 
authoritarian Pahlavi regime in the mid-1920’s, workers often complained of the absence of 
state authority to safeguard their interests. However from about 1925 until 1941 they 
increasingly conceived of and perceived state power as hostile to their interests. Thus from a 
labour perspective the period between 1906 and 1941 was characterized by workers’ drifting 
perceptions about and attitudes towards the state authority.  
 
The dichotomy of organized and non-organized labour has for a long time haunted the 
scholarship on Middle Eastern labour. So has the distinction between the workers employed 
in craft industries and those who worked in factories. A putative clear-cut distinction was 
implied between these two allegedly discrete categories. While those workers who worked at 
factories were depicted as having class-consciousness and acting accordingly, the rest of the 
workers, if they were even regarded as such, were characterized as bereft of class-
consciousness. If we consider the fact that until the end of the 1930’s, and for some time 
afterwards, the textile industry, like many other industries in Iran, was largely dominated by 
craft or cottage types of production, the workforce involved in them deserves closer scrutiny. 
It is true that their actions are less adequately documented than those of the factory workers. 
Besides, unlike the factory setting, in the relationship between the journeymen or the 
apprentices and their master exploitation was less visible and the acquisition of an 
independent shop for a journeyman depended on the goodwill and the support of his master, 
who typically worked side by side with him. These conditions, however, should not prevent 
us from scrutinizing their experiences nor should they be misleadingly assumed to be passive. 
What is equally wrong, however, is to suggest tacitly if not explicitly, that those who were 
engaged in craft industries mattered only when involved in “recognizably modern forms of 
labour struggle”.
111
 For the period under study, at least until the early 1930’s, several 
confrontational labour actions took place throughout Iran, but apparently, the majority of 
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workers often opted for more non-confrontational means to obtain better working and living 
conditions. At the same time, however, a non-obvious working class discourse and ideology 
was simultaneously growing in Iran especially from the mid-1910’s onwards. For this 
development, structural changes and workers’ reactions to these changes were as much 
responsible as the increasing radicalization among the Iranian working class through the 
formation of leftist organizations and publications.    
From the early twentieth century onwards, Iran had come under the influence of socialist 
ideas. The immigrant Iranian workers in the Tsarist Russia played a crucial role in this 
process. Mass migration to the Caucasus to for jobs was commonplace among Iranians, 
particularly among those who lived in the northern regions near Russia.
112
 Starting in the 
early 19
th
 century, this trend increased later in the century due to the famines and economic 
instability in Iran, which contrasted with the flourishing economy in Russia, especially in the 
oilfields in and around Baku.
113
 Within ten years between 1897 and 1907 the number of 
Iranians living in Central Asia rose from 23,191 to 55,000.
114
 Moreover, between 1876 and 
1890 an average of 13,000 Iranians acquired work permits and visas each year from Russian 
consulates in such northern cities as Tabriz, Mashhad, Rasht and Astarabad, to enter Russia 
legally. In Tabriz alone, the figure increased 110 percent from15,615 in1891 to 32,866 in 
1900.
115
 In Khorasan the number of those seeking “work in the Transcaspian region in 1909 
increased so fast that the number of villages with offices granting external passports rose from 
ten to twenty”.
116
 Overall, in 1911 Iranians constituted as many as 160,211 of a total of 
192,767 workers entering Russia legally.
117
 These figures should be considered together with 
those who crossed the borders by illegal means. Many of the migrant workers came back to 
Iran, and they did so often with some political experience. They were influenced by Marxist 
ideas and started to develop a socialist political language.  
 
In the midst of the constitutional discussions in 1905, the Tabriz Social-Democratic Group 
was formed by Armeno-Iranians in Tabriz.
118
 The main question preoccupying the Group 
concerned collaboration with non-socialist groups, primarily for the Constitutional 
                                                          
112
 For an analysis of this migration trend see in Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests: Iranian Subalterns on the 
Margins of the Tsarist Empire”, in The State and the subaltern: Society and Politics in Turkey and Iran, ed. 
Touraj Atabaki (London: Tauris, 2007), 31-52. 
113
 Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests”, 37-38. 
114
 Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests”, 38. 
115
 Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests”, 40. 
116
 Issawi, The Economic History of Iran 1800–1914, p 52.qouted in Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests”, 40. 
117
 Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests”, 40. 
118





 According to Tchilinkirian, a member of the Group, two tendencies prevailed. 
The first tendency, the ‘Democratic’, favoured such collaboration and disfavoured a purely 
Social-Democratic education at that time.
120
 However, although the second tendency agreed 
on the necessity of participation in the revolutionary movement it opted for an active 
educational program along socialist lines, among workers and other possible recruits.
121
 In the 
meantime a number of political organizations were formed among the Iranians in the 
Transcaspian regions. The Iranians living in the Caucasus had, in 1905, one year prior to the 
Russian Revolution, formed the Hemmat organization which in turned established the 
Ferqah-e Ejtema‘iyun-e ‘Ammiyun (The Social Democratic Party) known as mojaheds for 
which Nariman Narimanov was responsible.
122




1- Limiting the power of the monarch. 
2- Granting workers the right to vote, irrespective of their income or wealth. 
3- Holding parliamentary elections based on universal suffrage. 
4- Redistributing the large landed estates among peasants and introducing legal 
protections for peasant ownership of land. 
5- Granting democratic rights for workers, such as freedom of association, speech and 
assembly, and the right to strike.     
Social Democrats participated in the Second Majles between 1909 and 1911 as a separate 
group. Led by Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh the central committee of the party consisted of 
Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh, Solayman Mirza Eskandari, Mirza Baqer Agha Qafqazi, 
Mirza Abd al-Hosayn Khan Vahid al-Molk, Seyyed Mohammad Reza Mosavat, Mirza 
Ahmad Qazvini and Mirza Mahmud Khan.
124
 According to the Democrats, the twentieth 
century had the same significance for the East as the seventeenth century had for the West in 
the sense that the “outmoded feudal system” was to be replaced by the overwhelming power 
of capitalism.
125
 Iran would also join this inevitable course of history. The party also 
expressed its determination to preserve the constitutional system and the rule of the 
parliament. Also, according to the program every national was equal before the state 
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irrespective of their ethnicity or religion. Freedom of the press, organization and movement 
were also stressed in the program.
126
 About economic issues the program was rather detailed. 
Besides a number of economic and political issues, the program also touched upon the 
following labour issues: no child under the age of fourteen could be employed; the working 
day should not exceed ten hours; workers should have a weekly day off; factories should have 
the necessary facilities for work as well as to fulfil the sanitary conditions.
127
  
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 directly influenced the communist movement in 
Iran. Soon after the Revolution the Communist Party of Iran was founded in 1920 as an 
offshoot of the Justice Party. In the first congress of the Adalat Party on Iranian soil, in 
Anzali, in June 1920 the Communist Party was founded. Through the effort of the Socialist 
Party and the Communist Party of Iran, the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions 
(CCFTU) was established in 1921 and in the following three years reached a large size. Trade 
unions were active in the oil industry, as well as amongst carpet weavers in Kerman and 
textile workers of Isfahan, along with other industries. Communist and socialist publications 
remained a common feature of Iran’s intellectual scene during the 1920’s and several labour 
actions of varying extent took place in this period. With the Fifth Congress of the Comintern 
in 1924 and Moscow’s decision to ‘Bolshevize’ the international communist movement, 
which was re-affirmed at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, communist groups 
received orders for more radical actions in their respective countries.
128
 The strikes at the 
Abadan oil refinery in 1929, and the Vatan Factory Strike in Isfahan in 1931, were among the 
notable labour actions of the period.
129
 As a result of these and similar developments, the 
state’s attitude towards communist and socialist activities stiffened. First of all, a series of 
articles, which were quite possibly probably based on the revelations of Grigory Sergeyevich 
Arutyunov, also known as Georges Agabekov, were published in the Parisian periodical Le 
Matin between 26 and 30 October 1930, causing much speculation about the communist 
activities in Iran as in other Near Eastern countries.
130
 Agabekov had for a long time 
functioned as a spy for the OGPU (predecessor of the KGB) in Central Asia, the Caucasus, 
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and the Middle East.
131
 The information he disclosed regarding the communists in Iran 
resulted in the persecution and execution of many Iranian communists. Also, earlier in 1931 
the Iranian communists started to organize in Europe and a conference of Persian Communist 
Students was held in Cologne in February 1931.
132
  The delegates resolved “to uphold the 
standard of liberty and revolution  [and] … to do everything in our power to overthrow the 
regime of robbers … [as] Persia must belong to the labouring masses”.
133
 Ultimately in June 
1931 the Majles adopted the anti-communist bill which, inter alia, banned the formation of 
trade unions.
134
   
 
However, until 1931 several strikes took place in various parts of Iran. In the Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws of 1907, freedom of expression (article 20), and freedom of association 
(article 21) were established.
135
 The printers of the Kuchaki printing shop in Tehran became 
the pioneers of trade unionism in Iran when they formed a trade union in 1907.
136
 Likewise 
the first strike took place in November 1906 when the fishermen of Anzali protested against 
Liazonov, the Russian fisheries concessionaire.
137
 The strike took place in a form of 
sanctuary, at the telegraph office of Anzali, from where they complained to the Majles of the 
low price paid by Liazonov for each fish. It was largely due to the relatively free atmosphere 
ensured by the Constitutional Revolution that workers could strike. In 1907 telegraph 
operators of Tabriz went on a strike for the payment of their arrears.
138
 In the same year the 
printers of Tehran went on a strike out of solidarity with their colleague who had been beaten 
up by the chief of the government printing office, E‘temad al-Saltaneh.
139
 The strike ended 
upon the dismissal of the chief. Also the telegraph operators of Tehran went on strike for 
higher wages and better treatment. Likewise the workers of the power plant of Amin al-Zarb 
in Tehran organized a strike in 1907.
140
 The strike lasted for three days during which no 
electricity was supplied to the city. The striking workers demanded paid free days, clothes 
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paid by the employer (since because of their work, their clothes would become torn), as well 
as the establishment of a health and safety fund.
141
 The strikes continued to take place in Iran 
throughout the 1910’s and 1920’s. Many of the early labour actions which took place from the 
inception of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 to the dawn of Pahlavi modernization in 
the early 1920’s did not occur in the manufacturing sector. Instead, telegraphers, tramway 
workers and print shop employees were among the protagonists of labour activism.
142
 The 
First World War brought about a general destitution in Iran and the measures adopted by the 
government proved to be insufficient.   
Considering the total workforce engaged in the textile industry, the number of workers 
involved in trade unions and strikes was quantitatively insignificant. Textile manufacturing 
continued for a long time to be guild-based in urban settings, while in rural areas, households 
were the sites of textile production. The textile industry largely remained, throughout the 
period under study, in the hands of smallholders. This especially held true until the 1930’s 
when governmental support of and participation in industrial planning saw a remarkable rise. 
Nevertheless, even then the share of the privately-owned enterprises, mainly on a small scale, 
for the textile industry, was incomparably higher. This, more than anything else, contributed 
to the relatively smaller number of labour activities which took place among the workers 
employed in such enterprises—not simply because they were bereft of class-consciousness. It 
is true that formal labour organizations were, in early twentieth-century Iran, a latter-day 
phenomena, and that the development of organized labour went hand-in-hand with working 
class radicalization. Yet, we need to be cautious about what conclusions to draw from this. 
For instance, safeguarding the interests of the employees was apparently not the predefined 
raison d’être of guilds; it is controversial, particularly for the period under investigation, to 
argue that “guilds are and were organizations of masters which protected the interests of the 
employers, not of the employees” or to claim that the family-business nature of craft 
industries “precluded the possibility of labour disputes”.
143
 Certainly, one of the functions of 
the guilds was to ensure the smooth functioning of the manufacturing process and to prevent 
or resolve disputes between the master and the employee. Therefore, we can expect that such 
a dispute would be settled within guild ranks before it turned into an open confrontation. 
Also, a journeyman, for instance, had a good reason to remain on good terms with his master 
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not least because he need his master’s support for acquiring an independent shop and 
becoming a master himself. In addition, the struggle against foreign imports or later on 
against increasing factorization seems to have brought the master and his employees closer as 
real or perceived victims of these processes. Besides, guilds increasingly became debilitated 
and lost much of their controlling and enforcing capacity which promised low, if any, 
possibility of obtaining compromises through an open protest.     
During the 1910’s and 1920’s the voice of the textile workers is occasionally heard in the 
debates regarding the prohibition of the importation of foreign commodities and the 
promotion of domestic industries. Shokrollah Mani provides valuable information about the 
establishment of the Textile Workers’ Union in Tehran. After describing the unfavourable 
working and living conditions of the workers in the textile industry, as in others, in Tehran he 
describes how Ahmed Lame‘ from the Printers’ Union, encouraged him to establish a union 
for the protection of textile workers’ rights.
144
 Seeing Mani’s enthusiasm, Lame‘ arranged a 
meeting with Seyyed Mohammad Dehgan, a communist who in his previous career as a 
journalist translated The Manifesto of the Communist Party into Persian.
145
 Dehgan helped 
Mani form a trade union for textile workers which was represented in CCFTU. Mani states 
that because of the low wages the Weavers’ Union was more active in organizing strikes 
compared to other trade unions.
146
 For example upon the intention of textile factory owners to 




The rapid industrialization of the late 1920’s and 1930’s paid little attention to the plight of 
workers whose working conditions were usually heart-breaking. Wages, mostly on a 
piecework basis, were low, and job security was absent whereas vilification, and bastinado 
and similar punishments were commonplace. Apart from the oil industry, which was the most 
developed and mechanized industry in the country, the textile industry employed the greater 
part of the nascent proletariat. Villagers who migrated to larger towns and cities, former 
craftsmen who had lost their jobs for various reasons but mainly due to cheap imports, and 
destitute city-dwellers constituted the main source of labour in the nascent industries. 
Although both female and child labour were employed in factories, it was in the small-scale 
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establishments, particularly in carpet weaving, where they were extensively employed often in 
bad working conditions and for rather low wages.
148
 A survey undertaken of twelve cotton 
spinning and weaving plants in 1936 revealed that the number of male workers in the textile 
industry was declining, as in other countries. Yet unlike in other countries, male labour in Iran 
was being replaced by child labour instead of female workers.
149
 A list which was prepared 
for the E‘temadiyeh Weaving and Spinning Factory in Bushehr contains information about 
the workers and provides some ideas on the composition of the industrial workforce 
(Appendix 5).
150
 Of the 193 workers listed in the roster, 188 were women while the men 
numbered only five. The number of children under 14 years was 57 with an average of 9.8 
years. From the information provided in the roster, it appears that employing more than one 
worker from the same family was commonplace. But the list is not conclusive since, 
according to a list of factories prepared by the Ministry of Arts and Crafts, the factory had at 
least around five hundred workers with 3,500 spindles and 120 looms.
151
 Piecework was a 
widespread practice in the textile industry. In 1900, the basic daily wage for unskilled labour 
was 1 qran [about 4.5 pence] and a skilled worker received 1.5 qrans daily.
152
 In the mid-
1930’s, an average wage in the cotton textile-industry was about six pence for a ten-hour 
day.
153
 Wages usually fell far behind the costs of living. Thus throughout the 1920’s major 
labour actions took place in various sectors including the textile industry. Yet, the most 
notable strike of the textile workers took place in Isfahan in 1931 among the workers of Vatan 
Factory. 
The working and living conditions of the workers who worked at factories were in most cases 
unfavourable. For some time, a secret committee affiliated with the CPI had been preparing 
for a strike at Vatan Factory.
154
 The decision to strike on the coming May Day in 1931 
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coincided with an imprudent move on the part of factory management. A contract was drafted 
by the director Mirza Ja‘far Kazeruni, son of Mohammad Hosayn  Kazeruni, the famous 
merchant and owner of Vatan Factory, which according to the petitioning workers “was 
entirely in their own interests and against those of the workers”.
155
 On May Day, some 60-70 
workers arrived in a garden near the city. On the wall a red banner was fixed on which was 
written “Proletarians of the World Unite”.
156
 However, the actual strike took place on May 7 
with wide participation from the workers. A few workers who wanted to continue work were 
attacked by striking workers and were induced to strike. The striking workers came with a list 
of 13 demands including but not limited to: freedom to organize a union; changing from 
piece-work to a monthly salary; an 8-hour workday, instead of 12 hours, for not less than 5 
qrans; abolition of vilifications, punishment with the stick, etc.
157
 Some of the strike leaders 
were arrested and one, a CPI member, was taken to Tehran but succeeded in escaping.
158
  
Upon negotiation, not only was the contract withdrawn but workers also obtained the 
following concessions: the workday was reduced from twelve to nine hours; the examination 
system at the factory gate was abolished and vilification and money fines were reduced; a tea 
drinking facility was established and vessels with ice water were put in all departments; lunch 
time was extended from half an hour to one hour.
159
 Communist newspapers celebrated these 
achievements and opined that the strike set an instructive example for the future activities of 
CPI.
160
 The strike has usually been mentioned in the literature as an exceptional and 
exemplary action. Nonetheless, an analysis of the discursive tools which the striking Vatan 
Factory workers used attest to a more common and established form of labour activism 
through which workers engaged and negotiated with the central as well as local authorities in 
order to gain their support. This was much criticized by the communist publications of the 
time who blamed workers for having insufficient consciousness of the political context.  
The workers wrote a petition on 11 June 1931 which addressed Reza Shah and complained 
that the imprisoned workers were not released although the strike was over:
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To the sacred threshold of the protector of Islam His Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi may our souls be 
sacrificed for his sake, 
We are the praying servants of His Majesty and the workers of the Haft Dast [Vatan] Factory. The 
director has drafted a contract which was entirely in the interests of the employer and against those 
of the workers. Some of the workers who were forced to sign it, but refrained from doing so, were 
dismissed from their jobs and then other workers also stopped working. As a result, by the order of 
the director (Mirza Ja‘far Kazeruni, son of Hajj Mohammad Hosayn Kazeruni), the chief of police 
arrested and jailed six of them and denied access to them as if they were bloodthirsty criminals. 
For one and a half months they are now in prison. We made complaints to the high authorities and 
to the state attorney, but no one paid attention to our grievances. Since Mirza Ja‘far is the richest 
person in Isfahan he bribes whoever necessary (tarashsuhat-e servat-e u beh kasani keh bayad 
serayat bekonad mikonad). For his own benefit and for not paying wages to workers, he deprived 
fifty workers of their jobs and livelihood. A group of painstaking labourers who try to live on a 
few pennies with their families are tortured and jailed and all this can happen under the eternal rule 
of His Majesty the Shah, may our souls be sacrificed for His sake. What should we do? O, just 
King and the protector of Islam, O, protector of his subjects, O defender of the helpless and the 
weak! For the sake of Your Highness, for the Sake of the Leader of the Age [the twelfth imam of 
the Shiites] pay attention to the cry of these humble and helpless workers. We do not know why 
the chief of police always obeys Hajj Mohammad Hosayn Kazeruni’s son and does whatever he 
says. We are left helpless, please help us! We are expecting His Majesty’s answer and mercy.
161
  
The Ministry of the Interior informed the Government on 5 September 1931 about the release 
of the imprisoned workers following the necessary investigation.
162
 The deferential attitude of 
Iranian workers towards the Shah, as visibly reflected in the petition, was regarded by some 
communist newspapers as a mistake and the result of a lack of clear apprehension of the 
situation in the country. For example Nahzat, published in Berlin, argued a few months after 
the strike that “the Vatan Factory strike showed that workers did not understand the link 
between the present government in Iran and the capitalists”.
163
 Moreover, it was also argued 
that workers were mistaken by going to the state attorney in order to ask for the release of 
their fellow colleagues and by surmising that the attorney would defend their rights. After all, 
argued the newspaper, not only the state attorney but also the Shah, the Majles, the 
government and the judiciary were entirely on the side of the capitalists and were inimical to 
workers.
164
 Many of the striking workers, however, were well aware of the balance of power 
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and carefully made a clear distinction between Reza Shah, whom they called “the helper of 
the oppressed and the weak”, and the local authorities whom they regarded as corrupt. Strike 
leaders and workers, too, knew that Reza Shah was in favour of keeping order and 
apprehensive about any independent labour movement and in fact, societal movements of any 
sort. The striking oil workers had followed in 1929 with a similar strategy by distinguishing 
between the “Crowned Father” and the hostile Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but to no avail.
165
 
The communists thought therefore that the Vatan Factory workers had made a similar 
mistake. In almost every labour movement during the 1920’s and 1930’s this ‘everybody-but-
the Shah’ attitude was prevalent. That “all the responsibility must fall upon persons and 
positions of lower standing (corrupt officials), while the relationship of trust and of filial 
obedience with the prince is to be preserved and confirmed” was a universal strategy adopted 
by subalterns in various corners of the world throughout history.
166
 For workers, their 
immediate concerns and working the system “to their minimum disadvantage”, to use 
Hobsbawm’s phraseology, ranked first.
167
 This did not mean that workers lacked any 
comprehension of the political context. It meant instead that workers were cautious about 
taking the risks of confronting the Shah. Thus, by assuring the Shah of their obedience and of 
the fact that their action did not tarnish his legitimacy, workers emphasized their certain and 
concrete grievances. Following the Vatan Factory strike the anti-communist law was passed 
by the Majles which forbade all trade union activities.  
 
Workers as Petitioners: Discursive Practices  
Iranian workers slowly developed, from the early 20
th
 century onwards, a language of their 
own through their discursive engagements and negotiations with the state, just as other classes 
did. Their discourse was far from revolutionary and was usually rather deferential. This 
discourse was not unchanging either. From the inception of the constitutional system in 1906 
until the coming to power of Reza Shah, workers stressed the effort they spent and the 
sacrifices they made for the Constitutional Revolution. Afterwards, they employed a 
predominantly nationalistic language often in line with Reza Shah’s policies. Although the 
anti-communist law of 1931 effectively prevented the organization of strikes and trade unions, 
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the state continued to promote petitioning by workers for various reasons. The first reason 
stemmed from the fact that petitioning consolidated the relationship between the ruling 
establishment and the workers, and the legitimacy of the former, for historically the addressee 
of petitions was regarded in Iran, as anywhere else in the world, as the legitimate source of 
authority. Secondly, the Pahlavi regime discouraged and forbade any collective actions from 
any social group including, but not limited to, workers since feminists, intellectuals, tribal 
elements or religious groups were also seen as a threat to state power. Nonetheless, 
petitioning allowed for the ruling classes, and for Reza Shah, to remain aware of the 
perceptions of the people, local politics, and local rulers, on a scale difficult to attain by other 
means. In fact “even the most autocratic of governments used petitions as a source of 
information about popular feeling”.
168
 Thirdly, by addressing their petitions directly to the 
central establishments, often after their local initiatives had proved a failure, petitioners in a 
sense consolidated the centralization process in Iran. Finally, Reza Shah regarded himself as 
the father of the nation and cautiously maintained his image as a just ruler while liability for 
injustices and improper policies rested with those around him. Thus, by stimulating people to 
write petitions Reza Shah effectively established and consolidated his image as the protector 
of the nation as well as the “reference point of justice and of fairness”.
169
 The petitioning 
workers were well aware of these discursive tools. Through petitions one can possible verify 
certain forms and modes of communication between society and the institutions and to 
“reconstruct the procedures of mediation, repression, acceptance, and agreement” adopted by 
the authorities in response to social demands.
170
 Certainly in almost any petition there is a 
tension, and therefore protest, negotiation and so on, for people hardly wrote petitions when 
things went satisfactorily. In no other realm can one so efficiently follow the trail of this 
process, and of state-society interaction for that matter, in terms of labour relations in Iran. In 
this sense as Cecila Nubola argues in her study on petitions in northern and central Italian 
states in the early modern age, “‘petitioning’ refers to different concepts of authority and 
sovereignty as well as to specific power relations between rulers and those ruled”.
171
 It was 
within the frame of these different concepts that Iranian workers expressed and negotiated 
their demands and grievances with the state.  
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From the mid-1920’s onwards industrialization gained speed in Iran and turned into an 
ambitious state policy by the early 1930’s. During this period the number of petitions seems 
to visibly increase, as other forms of resistance were explicitly forbidden. In their petitions 
workers voiced a variety issues such as lost limbs, irregular and unpaid wages, excessive 
working hours, unfavourable working conditions, lost jobs, mistreatment by managers, and 
work site injuries. It what follows I will analyse these petitions in terms of the labour issues 
they pertained to and the discursive tools which were used by workers. Although I will focus 
on textile workers, those from other sectors will also be mentioned when, and as much as, 
necessary.  
  
A Weeping Traveller: Mohammad Ali of Yazd and Lost Jobs 
In the early twentieth century foreign imports were perceived by workers as the main reason 
for the loss of their jobs. Already by the late 19
th
 century the negative effects of foreign 
imports on native textile manufacturing were pointed out. It was believed that ready-made 
imports not only devastated the native industries but also pushed the have-nots further into 
poverty. The contraction in craft business in the provinces led many former craftsmen to seek 
employment in larger cities such as Tehran, Tabriz and towns in Khorasan which apparently 
still provided employment opportunities.
172
 Besides, going abroad, especially to Russia, was 
still a viable option until the First World War. In addition to these options, the situation of the 
craft industries was not necessarily as dismal as it was often said to be, since while some 
traditional crafts were hard hit by imports, a number of new ones came into existence. For 
example, making of Russian shoes (orusiduz) increasingly provided employment from the late 
19th century onwards.
173
 Another success story was recorded by the cloak weaving (‘ababafi) 
industry.
174
 ‘Aba weaving was an especially rich source of employment in the countryside 
where mostly women spun and wove, but was not limited to rural areas. By 1910 there were 
120 master ‘aba weavers in the city of Isfahan.
175
 This meant alternative employment 
opportunities for those craftsmen who lost their jobs in the face of foreign imports. 
Furthermore, if foreign trade hurt the crafts which competed with imports, at the same time it 
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stimulated export-oriented production such as leather, opium, henna, and silk. For example, 
regarding the leather industry Sobotsinskii writes: 
Leather production which until now was in the hands of a large number of enterprises standing 
halfway between cottage and handicraft industry and employing 5-10 workers, is changing into 
manufactories. Thus already in 1909 in Mashhad, and Hamadan, there were 8 workshops, with up 
to 40-50 workers each. The small handicraft shops were unable to withstand the competition and 
the large enterprises, and rapidly declined… In Hamadan in 1912, there were 300 small leather 
shops, compared with 400 in 1909, and in Mashhad 50 compared with 200.
176
  
The most striking growth, however, was experienced in the carpet weaving industry. So, 
craftsmen could leave one certain trade for another in the same town or else could migrate in 
search of a living in another town or city. However, first World War I, and then the 
modernization policies which were adopted from mid-1920’s and steadily accelerated until 
1941, posed new challenges to craftsmen. In the meantime, there was a slowly-growing 
industrial proletariat. In their petitions both types of workers complained about losing their 
jobs. Those workers who were involved at craft industries lost their jobs due mainly to the 
factorization and mechanization of the textile industry or the impact of cheaper imports. This 
point was frequently criticized by craftsmen from all over the country.   
Craftsmen apparently condemned foreign investment in Iran as well as the factorization of 
Iranian industries, a point which is vividly made in the following lines from a petition sent by 
the Union of Merchants of Hamadan dated January 1926. After highlighting the unfavourable 
economic conditions in the country the petition remarked:  
All over Iran one can see the dispirited and cheerless craftsmen whose numbers are already few. If 
you can spare some time, you can even visit their crypts (dakhmeh) which are the twentieth-
century Iranian factories. Their look will answer all your questions. The most important of such 
factories are carpet-weaving factories which are under foreign control. Go and see how small boys 
and girls work there for an entire day for a few pennies. If foreigners buy Iranians carpets it is 
because of the low wages. If we compare them with workers of the industrialized nations of the 
world they earn a lot more money in a six to eight-hour workday. So we work but cannot earn and 
whatever we earn we spend it on foreign textiles and other goods.
177
 
The complaints about foreign imports and their negative effects on home manufactures were 
universal phenomena in Iran. In September 1927 silk-stuff makers of Yazd complained of 
losing their livelihood due to the cheaper imports.
178
 Following this they requested the 
adoption of measures for promoting native textiles. They also requested in the petition the 
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appointment of an instructor to teach them the use of aniline dyes. In the response from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Utilities it was stated that the law regarding 
the use of national cloth for state officials served as an effective means to promote domestic 
industries.
179
 It was also added that the manufacturer should try, to the extent possible, to 
increase the quality of their goods and lower their prices. As far as the issue of aniline dyes 
was concerned it was stated that the limited budget of the Ministry did not allow the 
appointment of an instructor, but factory owners and producers could themselves come to 
Tehran to receive training in their use. The modernization policies of the 1920’s and 1930’s 
increasingly deprived many craftsmen of their livelihoods. With the Uniform Dress Law of 
1928, for instance, traditional dresses were abandoned in state offices in favour of Western-
style clothes which were supplied by the newly founded factories. This meant for hand 
weavers such as cloak makers the loss of their jobs. Thus in 1929 the cloak makers of Isfahan 
complained in a petition about the deterioration in their craft due to this law. In response 
Mehdi Qoli Hedayat, the prime minister, suggested that they weave fabrics suitable for 
“normal clothing” (lebas-e ma‘mul) and added that the use of cloaks in winter was not 
forbidden.
180
 According to the local Akhgar newspaper published in Isfahan, in February 1929 
weavers of Tehran protested against the Vatan Factory and that weavers of Yazd lost their 
livelihood due to the mechanization of the textile industry.
181
  
Hardly anyone criticized the modernization policies of the 1920’s as harshly as Mohammad 
Ali of Yazd, himself a silk weaver who in an exceptionally long and utterly critical petition 
dated January 1929 condemned the deputies in very strong and elaborate language for not 
paying attention to the plight of the perishing craftsmen. The petition is worth quoting at 
length:  
To the Honourable Head of the National Assembly, 
When the Creator of humankind, the Instructor and the Trainer (mo‘allem va morabbi) of human 
beings, the Leader of the revolutionaries and the Rebutter of the claims of naturalists May peace be 
upon Him fought against His enemies who were also the enemies of humankind, He was defeated 
by them. When He was victimized and fell to the ground from His horse and when His enemies 
attacked His tent for plunder, he addressed their honour and said: “if you do not have religion do 
be free in your world” (in lam yakun lakum dinu kunu ahraran fi dunyakum). In order to weep 
popular preachers (rowzehkhan) translated this as “kill me and do whatever you want”. However 
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those who have a deeper understanding (ahl-e ma‘ani) know what it actually means so they do not 
restrict its meaning to that ignoble crown and to that particular day, for the real meaning addresses 
humankind in general and Muslims in particular, and is valid until the end time. The word means 
“o the worshippers of their world and desires (donya va shahvat parastan) if you do not have 
religion then work for hard for your world”. (A characteristic which Iranians lack). I am not trying 
to pretend to be a preacher here. My objective is to remind and be a witness to Iranians in general 
and particularly to the deputies who are in this time a source of emulation for the people, and I tell 
you that it would very good if you were sincere about your declarations and listen to this advice. 
[…]. You present yourselves as the proponents of toilers (tarafdaran-e ranjbar) and I wish you 
could sometimes turn this from simple words to reality. Have you ever wondered about the 
situation of this miserable folk of Yazd? […]. Have you ever thought about the consequences of 
the Uniform Dress Law for the silk-stuff makers of Yazd? Their goods are no longer purchased by 
people. I remember well that their goods were exported to Russia twenty years ago and were used 
there. Today due to lack of consideration their products are neither sold nor used. Your lack of 
consideration and attention to this community is responsible for this. Why is this? This is because 
Iranians and the entire world turned into imitators and as you know it is the ones at the top who are 
imitated. When you use European socks, pants, shirts and even staffs the lower classes try to 
become like you, as a result of which Iranian industries and handicrafts disappear just like those 
people who produce those goods. The populist gentlemen (aqayan-e surat mardom) preferred 
foreign fabrics to Iranian ones and they do not need the silk-makers of Yazd and Kashan. Iranian 
weavers wear themselves out to make the Iranian gentlemen purchase their goods and you are their 
leaders. Actually this sickness had spread a few years ago but did not receive widespread 
recognition.
182
 Also, if at least the notables (‘ayan va ashraf) wore in wintertime the ‘aba 
produced in Na‘in to protect themselves from the cold! But of course how funny would the Pahlavi 
hat appear with an ‘aba! An overcoat must be worn with it, or a jacket or a dressing gown! […]. If 
it was only to protect yourselves from the cold and to stay warm it is possible to make both from 
the ‘aba produced in Na‘in. But why bother? Instead it is easier to use the sacred cloth (parcheh-e 
mobarak) of whatever name which is produced by Monsieur Foreigner!
183
  
Following this harsh introduction Mohammad Ali then embarks upon explaining the plight of 
the silk-stuff makers of Yazd and the miseries of their families. However he was very careful 
to make sure his obedience to Reza Shah “the father of this bunch of helpless people, the 
Sultan who from the beginning ceaselessly worked for improving and developing the 
homeland and for removing the oppression coming from foreigners and their slaves inside the 
country (zolm-e ajnab va ajnab parastan)”. He then continued: 
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So I spent my valuable time to write these lines and I am reminding you that “if you do not have 
religion do be free in your world”. […]. Would it not be good if you behaved like pious people do, 
and work to make Iranians, from the lower and upper classes, from ordinary people to the notables, 
wear Iranian clothes produced in this country?        
He then claims that from the previous New Year to the day when the petition was written 
twelve or fifteen thousand people migrated from Yazd. In the meantime he not only condemns 
the Uniform Dress Law but also the monopolization of the opium trade and several other 
measures. He finally requested the adoption of necessary measures to ensure the use of native 
clothes and to develop domestic industries. He signed the petition as “a friend of the Pahlavi”. 
However, the case of Mohammad Ali of Yazd was rather exceptional. Usually the petitioners 
used deferential language to make their point, as the muslin weavers of Isfahan did. In a 
collective petition 24 December 1929 with hundreds of signatures on it, they complained of 
losing their livelihood and falling into misery because of the decline of their craft.
184
 By 
employing a deliberately dramatic language they stated that their only source of income 
depended on weaving uniforms for state employees. However, they added that this business 
had lately been given out by a contract to a certain “merciless” contractor (kontratchi) named 
Haj ‘Abbas ‘Ali Esfahani who did not pay the craftsmen their wages and deprived them of 
their livelihoods. The workers argued that they neither had the power to confront Esfahani nor 
the intention of giving up their craft. The craftsmen then requested the following: “We call 
you to redress our grievance. If you want, you can order our execution and save us from this 
misery since in this situation death is better than living. Finally we pray to God to give you 
the trustees of the nation eternal fortune and support”.  
Apparently, the official authorities worked with contractors for their orders for the sake of 
convenience, if for no other reason, and the latter mediated between the producers and the 
purchaser—in this case the local political establishment. This brought the craftsmen face to 
face with the ever-increasing penetration of state power into their lives and the threat posed by 
the nascent large scale industrial establishment. It is not known what workers meant by not 
receiving their wages. We may assume, however, that they either fulfilled their part of the 
contract but were denied their wages, or the contractor, Haj ‘Abbas ‘Ali Esfahani, 
subcontracted the order to some other individuals or to a company.  
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The reaction of the Majles reinforces the second possibility. In 22 April 1930 the President of 
the Majles responded to the petition by arguing that this case had been considered, but since 
trade was free in Iran no action could be taken about it.
185
 It appears that upon this reaction 
from the Majles the workers tried their chance with the Ministry of National Economy but to 
no avail. 
Figure 5: The petition of the muslin weavers of Isfahan who complain of deteriorating 
trade 
 
Source: LMDCIP. d7/k102/j14.2/94, 24 December 1929. 
 
The ministry replied in in 25 May 1939 that the ministry did not compel the local authorities 
in Isfahan to continue their contract with Haj ‘Abbas ‘Ali Esfahani or not to make contracts 
with other individuals.
186
 The petitioners then were advised to apply to the judicial authorities 
in Isfahan if they believed they incurred any losses because of the contractor. 
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Occasionally, the tension between the workers employed in craft industries and the nascent 
large scale industrial establishments become obvious, as in the case of the barak weavers of 
Isfahan.
187
 In a petition dated 29 March 1930 they complained in the following words of their 
and their misery and depravation, which they argued was caused by the Vatan Factory:  
To the Noble Presence of the Deputies of the Glorious Majles, May God Empower its Pillars, 
As the representatives of the barak weavers of Sadahi [?] we the minor servants, Qadam Ali ‘Ala’i 
Sadahi and Mir Ali Mokhtari Sadahi, present the following. In this period the state and the 
deputies are struggling for the advancement of national production and of the guilds. The nation 
and the homeland chose the path of progress only in order to promote the national products and to 
develop the guilds (asnaf) and the industries of the country. Therefore the Government, the 
authorities and especially the deputies of the Majles should give equal consideration to the 
guildsmen, and the industrialists and should only care about the benefit of the country and the 
development of the guilds. They should not discriminate against any person at the expense of 
another since everyone enjoys the same rights in society. The labourer (ranjbar) and the 
millionaire are the same. We the barak weavers of Sadahi are over ten thousand people, and have 
taken the contract for the manufacturing of the overcoats for the armed forces in Southern Iran and 
produced them with our labour and elbow grease (dast-ras va ranj). Each piece of our finished 
products cost the state three tumans and can be used for three years.
188
 Last year Vatan Factory 
obtained the contract for the same business and produced each piece for three tumans and a bit and 
could only be used for two years. When our products, as your servants, which are good for three 
years are compared with those of Vatan Factory which can be used only for two years the qualified 
people will confirm the tenacity of the former. Moreover since the main objective of the 
authorities is to promote national goods it should be considered that we are ten thousand citizens 
of the homeland (ahl-e vatan) while the owner of Vatan Factory is one individual. Also, once this 
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state contract is taken from us we will disappear for we have no other craft or trade, but the owner 
of Vatan Factory does not need this contract at all as he can produce different clothes of various 
colours. If we take the state budget into account, our products reach the army for three tumans 
each, to be used for three years. Our business is patriotism, our business is progress-loving, and 
our business is proper since it not only serves the interests of the state but also saves the ten 
thousand citizens of the country (nofus-e mellat) from deprivation. Vatan Factory can produce 
different goods of various colours for the army. After all the peaceful decision rests with your 
noble presence may God prolong your fortune.
189
 
Upon not receiving any response to their case, the weavers sent after about three months 
another petition in which they reproduced the same account.
190
 In this second petition written 
on behalf of “the ten thousand minor workers of the guild of barak weavers, both male and 
female” (in chakeran-e karegaran-e senf-e barakbaf-e balegh bar dah hezar nofus az zan va 
mard) the stress on labour was more deliberate. The petitioning workers particularly focused 
on the notion of the homeland (vatan) to counteract the Vatan Factory named to address the 
same patriotic feelings. Besides, as a discursive tool the workers explicitly presented the 
owner of the Vatan Factory as the sole beneficiary of the contract by dismissing altogether the 
hundreds of workers employed at the factory.   
Throughout the 1930’s the state support for large scale industrial establishments in general 
and for the Vatan Factory in particular, along with foreign imports even as late as the mid-
1930’s, continued to be held liable by the craft workers for the decline of their craft and their 
lost jobs as in the case of the cloak makers of Isfahan. In February 1934 they sent a petition in 
which they complained about the hardships they faced for the decline of their craft.
191
 They 
stated in the petition that after cloak making was no longer possible they started to produce 
different fabrics which also failed because of the cheaper imported fabrics. Thus they 
demanded the establishment of an institution where they would be educated to find 
themselves a sustainable job. Or else the cloak makers asked the government to order the 
police and other security forces to purchase from them part of the necessary clothes which 
they have been buying from Vatan Factory. The cloak makers also argued that the state could 
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Occasionally, workers lost their jobs due to the unintended consequences of the 
modernization policies of which the Uniform Dress Law is an example. In 12 July 1936 the 
drapers of Najafabad, a town in the Isfahan province, complained from their deteriorating 
business due to the Jewish peddlers from whom the veiled women who could not go out to the 
bazaars shopped.
193
 They complained that such peddlers had no shops and were subject to no 
taxes. They in turn requested that those peddlers be ordered to hire shops and get involved in 
other businesses. According to the drapers since Najafabad was an agricultural town, men 
were busy working on the land while most of the transactions in the bazaars were undertaken 
by women who since the implementation of the unveiling law could not go out at all.  In 
another petition dated 26 January 1937 the drapers operating at the bazaars in Isfahan 
complained of losing their livelihood again due to the Jewish peddlers.
194
 They stated that due 
to the Uniform Dress Law the women who no longer could go out to the bazaars chose to 
shop from peddlers. Consequently, Isfahan women increasingly preferred this type of 
shopping. As a result the business of the drapers went from bad to worse. The drapers finally 
requested the prohibition of peddlers who were not subjects to any taxes or did not have shops 
of their own.  
Factory workers too frequently complained about losing their lost jobs. Factory workers lost 
their jobs for a variety of reasons. Economic issues played a role but conflict with factory 
management was another reason for losing jobs. During the 1930’s workers were somehow 
aware of the interventionist state role in industrialization and called the official authorities to 
their help in times of economic problems. The case of the three hundred and fifty former 
workers of the Khosravi Tannery in Tabriz attests to this point. The workers stated in a 
collective petition in June 1936, that they lost their jobs because of the financial difficulties 
and increased taxes which led the factory management to close its shoe-making department.
195
 
They stated that the department had been producing military boots and had to shut down due 
to the increased customs duties on the necessary chemicals. Therefore, they asked for the 
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removal of factory`s financial difficulties in order to be able to get back to their work.
196
 
Consequently the factory was saved from its financial problems by army orders.
197 
In an undated petition which probably belonged to the mid-1930’s, the workers of Pashmbaf 
Factory in Isfahan complained of mistreatment and arbitrary practices by their manager. The 
workers criticized the powers granted to the factory management for the implementation of 
the adopted measures in the following words: 
Currently the Pashmbaf Factory management fires a worker from the factory, who wasted years of 
his life for it, every day, through various pretexts and imaginary excuses. For this they receive no 
permission from official authorities. Three days ago a worker named Mohammad Ali Mohammadi 
employed at the spinning department was dismissed for no reason…  Workers are worried from 




Sometimes the conflicts between the workers and the factory management were rather evident 
as in the case of the Zayandeh-Rud Factory in Isfahan. In an undated petition, probably from 
the late 1930’s, the workers complained about the obstinate behaviour of the manager who 
allegedly introduced unfavourable working practices.
199
 They argued that the manager 
increased the working day from eight to twelve hours; refused to pay the wages when workers 
had to wait for the repair of a broken machine although the common practice in other factories 
was payment of wages. Although in many instances we can follow the reaction of the 
authorities, in this case no such reply was attached to the file.  
 
Unpaid Wages 
Unpaid wages constituted another problem for which workers sent petitions. Such complaints 
mostly came from factory workers. The first case is from the Wool Spinning Factory in 
Mazandaran, northern Iran, which was established by the House of Industries (HI) to provide 
employment to needy women. In August 1921 three hundred female workers sent a petition to 
the Majles and to the Cabinet in which they asked for their unpaid wages for the last nine 
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months that they worked, before the factory was finally closed.
200
 They stated that they 
worked at the factory which was managed by an Armenian named Monsieur Mowl under 
utterly unfavourable conditions and that each of them had several orphans to take care of. In 
addition, they added that their previous appeals to various state authorities for a redress of 
their grievance did not yield any results. Finally after stating that they needed protection they 
wrote that the deputies should not accept that “the Iranian honour (namusha-ye irani) seeks 
protection from foreigners”. The petition was apparently forwarded by the Petitions 
Commission to the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Utilities which informed 
the Head of the Majles that HI was established in 1918 and was placed in 1920 under the 
authority of this ministry.
201
 However according to the Ministry HI was subsequently 
relegated to the Tehran Municipality. Therefore, the Ministry suggested that the female 
workers had to appeal to the municipality. Three months later on 19 November 1921 the 
workers sent a second petition which addressed all of the deputies and in which woman 
workers reproduced the same account regarding the difficulties they had to face.
202
 By using 
the same honour discourse they added “does your clemency allow you to leave a bunch of 
your women and honours (avrat va navamis-e shoma) without food and clothing?” Finally 
they stated that if their grievance was not redressed they would take sanctuary at Baharestan 
Square where the Majles was located.  
Here the female workers appealed to the patrimonial feelings of the deputies and their role as 
the protectors of the nation. However, since the issue concerned previous years, Tehran 
Municipality denied any responsibility in the matter and stated that it concerned HI.
203
 
Therefore, it was suggested that the workers should apply to Monsieur Mowl who was the 
previous manager of HI until it was abolished. Shortly afterwards the workers sent a third 
petition.
204
 The petition dated 12 December 1921 which addressed the President of the Majles, 
the Cabinet and the Petitions Commission provided further details as to their living 
conditions. The workers wrote that during the famine years between 1917 and 1919 
Americans used to support them but as the famine ended they stopped their help as well. They 
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then complained that their wages for the three months were 12 tumans for each. They also 
requested the sending of an inspector to inspect their miserable situation and verify their 
righteousness. This petition was followed by a response written by Monsieur Mowl who 
addressed the petitioning woman workers.
205
 He denied responsibility and argued that his 
“only desire was to help the helpless class (tabaqah-e bicharegan)”. According to him the 
responsibility rested with the Ministry of Commerce rather than with himself. However, for 
the women, seeking support from Monsieur Mowl was not an option for “there is a big 
difference between a woman who received twelve tumans a month and a manager whose 
monthly income is one hundred and fifty tumans”.
206
 There result of the case is not clear from 
the documents, as in the case of a former worker of the Hamadan branch of the British owned 
East Carpet Factory who complained in September 1926 that after twelve years of service at 
the factory part of his wage had remained unpaid.
207
 For this he applied to the factory but to 
no avail. He then applied to the Governorship of Hamadan but they rejected help since the 
factory was owned by the British. The worker then applied to the British Consulate in the city 
and was advised to apply to the judicial authority of Hamadan. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the inception of the constitutional system in 1906 until 1931 when the anti-communist 
law came into effect, Iranian workers took part in several strikes that characterized this 
period. Those workers employed in the services sector, such as telegraph employees and 
tramway workers, were among the first to launch collective actions which gradually received 
acceptance among those working in other industries. Nonetheless it is safe to argue that at any 
rate the greater part of the workforce in Iran remained non-organized until the end of the 
period under study. The insignificant number of large-scale industries, lack collective action 
amongst craft workers and the primarily political-oriented agendas of the leftist organizations 
determined the course of labour activism in this period. The unstable political atmosphere, 
foreign intervention, and the eruption of First World War politics, narrowly defined, and 
security issues further distracted attention from the growing labour issues. Once the war was 
over labour actions experienced a major increase. With the state’s ever-increasing grip over 
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the political, social and economic fields especially from the establishment of the Pahlavi 
regime in 1925 onwards, the frequency and the number of labour actions suffered an obvious 
setback. As the government forbade trade unions, especially CCFTU, 150 labour organizers 
were arrested between 1927 and 1932.
208
 Also upon the forced retirement of Solayman 
Eskandari the Socialist party had dissolved with its clubs having been burnt down by 
organized mobs.
209
 The recently adopted position of the Communist Party of Iran towards 
Reza Shah and the existing political establishment was one of the main reasons for the 
government’s uncompromisingly hostile attitude towards leftist movements. First in the 
party’s Second Congress in Urmiyeh in 1927 and then in the Third International in Moscow 
ten months later the 1921 coup was described as a British plot and the Shah was denounced as 
an imperialist stooge.
210
 Moreover, the Congress also called for a revolution of “peasants, 
workers, and national capitalists”.
211
  
The anti-socialist and anti-communist feelings apparently found echoes in the provinces, or 
else they were used as discursive tools to outmanoeuvre political rivals. The following 
petition sent from the workers and guilds union in Kerman in August 1927 provides an 
interesting example of this:
212
 
To the Sacred Majles May God Empower its Pillars, 
As the people of Kerman we have been waiting for the appointment of proper, pious and respectful 
members (‘aza-ye saleh va anaser-e ba diyanat va abrumand) to the ranks of the judiciary as the 
shelter of our honour and property (navamis va amval). This way we would benefit from righteous 
judges with a sense of duty. This would not only enable the consolidation of a judicial power in 
the country and people would enjoy security and justice but we could also swell with pride for 
having qualified judicial authorities with a sense of duty in a time when our state stood up against 
several states and abolished capitulations. Unfortunately the situation is far from this. We hear that 
the new members of the judiciary are people who lack piety and honour as well as religion and 
proper behaviour (nah alaqamandi beh diyanat va haysiyat darand va nah mazhab va sehhat-e 
‘amal). In addition, they are all from the Qajars and socialists with hostility and enmity to the 
people of Kerman.  […] The people of Kerman express their hatred towards the nomination to 
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judicial posts of such people as Mahmu[d] Dargahi, Dehgan, and Mo’in al-Shari‘eh, and Soleyman 
Mirza Qajar Kermani, and Monshizadeh, and Golestani.
213
        
In the rest of the petition the supplicants asked for the dismissal of these people. Nonetheless, 
the end of leftist organizations and of collective labour activism did not mean the end of 
labour activism as such. True, during the factory-based industrial leap-forward of the 1930’s 
labour issues remained a peripheral concern.
214
 No more than sporadic and unsystematic 
attempts were made to regulate workers’ working and living conditions. However, during the 
same period workers gradually developed a language of their own which was not 
confrontational but served to make their demands and complaints adequately clear. It appears 
that the number of the petitions, both individual and collective, was a lot higher during the 
1930’s than before. Petitioning served during this period as “a privileged communicative 
space” in which not transparency but dissimulation served as the main discursive tool for 
workers.
215
 Workers’ discourse “intended to be ambiguous, to have a double meaning, to be 
garbled so that they cannot be treated as a direct, open challenge and, hence, invite an equally 
direct, open retaliation”.
216
  In most cases, a relatively harsh criticism from the part of the 
workers was almost immediately softened in the following line and a clear line was cleverly 
drawn between the Shah and the lower authorities. Loyalty was so overly stressed in petitions 
that no room was left for a suspicion of rebellion or open confrontation. These petitions 
provide insights into the living and working conditions of the Iranian textile workers, as 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
This study ends with the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941, whose departure from the country 
to spend the last few years of his life in exile closed a crucial epoch in Iranian history. He had 
left behind a relatively stable political structure, a series of secular reforms and the 
consequences of a rapid industrialization process lasting more than a decade. Following the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 during nearly the first four decades of the twentieth 
century, Iran hovered between foreign domination and internal repression. On the one hand, 
foreign powers mainly exerted economic influence on Iran, as on the neighbouring Ottoman 
Empire. Particularly from the mid-19
th
 century onwards Iran was viewed by industrialized 
powers, especially Britain and Russia, as an open market for their ready-made products. 
Consequently from the 19
th
 century onwards ‘the foreigner’ had been established in popular 
opinion as an ‘enemy’ against the interests of Iranians. On the other, popular opposition 
against internal repression became more pronounced with increased economic deterioration, 
and gradually became consolidated into political opposition which culminated in the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1905. The constitutional experiment which lasted until 1911 was 
especially effective in the creation of a political community in the country, but in economic 
terms its achievements were negligible. For the first time in Iran’s history had the political 
arena become so multifaceted and multivocal, with local politics becoming far more important 
than before. However neither the insufficient infrastructure in the country nor the binding 
economic treaties which had been signed throughout the 19
th
 century with European powers, 
mainly Britain and Russia, allowed for notable economic development. The international 
developments proved to be no less unfavourable.  
Although labour organizations and collective labour actions were observed from the early 
1900’s onwards, generally speaking, workers’ voices were lost in political debates. At the turn 
of the 20
th
 century politics and economics were sufficiently intertwined to bring diverse, and 
at times conflicting, parties together. Thus, the great part of the early labour movement had 
agendas which were not necessarily directly labour-related. The experiences of such 
movements and organizations tell us a lot about the history of the period and they deserve 
close scrutiny. Nonetheless, many of the labouring people who chose to stay out of the early 
labour organizations or fell outside the predefined scope of such organizations were busy 
earning their bread and livelihood. For the most part these people remained peripheral to the 
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scholarship on early twentieth century Iranian history. Their experiences constituted one of 
the major concerns of this study. 
From the late 19
th
 century onwards the low customs-duties put by economic treaties on goods 
imported into Iran by European merchants and companies and the damages which these 
imports brought over the craft industries in the country have disillusioned many Iranian 
craftsmen, traders as well as other people from the political establishment. The chronic trade 
deficit and the declining craft industries have, thus, been a matter of debate from the 
nineteenth century onwards. Throughout the 1920’s major steps were taken to establish 
security in the country and to minimize foreign economic domination. This way, the 
groundwork had been laid down for the economic leap-forward of the 1930’s. Political and 
economic developments were discussed in chapters two and three, respectively, and I will not 
reproduce those accounts here. It should be noted, however, that the resolution of many 
previous problems gradually served to crystallize the differences of previously allied social 
groups, such as the clergy, merchants, tradesmen, and workers, etc., and contributed to a 
class-based representation of Iranian society. For instance, although some of the big 
merchants, craftsmen and workers had jointly struggled against foreign imports less than a 
decade earlier, the workers and craftsmen found themselves in a disadvantaged position in the 
context of the industrialization policies during the 1930’s. Secondly, from the early 1920’s 
onwards, workers had to negotiate with a strong central power with its increasing penetration 
into the provinces.  
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had also added to labour radicalism and to the formation 
of nationwide labour activism which was also facilitated by improved transportation and 
communications. While the main concern of many of the Communist Party of Iran and the 
leftist organizations was to struggle against the ever-increasing power of the state and its 
macroeconomic policies, the mass of workers tried to accommodate and cope with the new 
conditions.   
With increased factory-based industrialization, the manufacturing scene in Iran, especially at 
the textile industry and hence of the workforce involved in it, changed as well. It appears that 
throughout the nearly four decades investigated in this study a great variety and number of 
manufacturing activities existed in Iran, both in urban settings and the countryside, and they 
fell outside the purview of guilds. In other words, for the period under investigation guilds 
ceased to be the major manufacturing units for the textile industry, and probably for many 
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others too. Nonetheless as Quataert observed for nineteenth and twentieth century Ottoman 
guilds, in Iran too it is not clear at all what these surviving guilds had become.
1
 This point 
requires further investigation. Having been stripped throughout the 1910’s and 1920’s of their 
economic and political significance many of them retained their existence due to their social 
functions. We know that many of the former craftsmen have gradually and increasingly been 
integrated into the proletariat. The relationship between these guilds, factories and the rise of 
unregulated, extra-guild production in terms of the workforce involved in them can 
significantly contribute to our knowledge of the diversified nature of Iranian labour. Also, the 
relationship between the guilds and the newly emerging small-scale manufacturing needs to 
be studied. It appears that lack of any proper documentation of their activities renders a 
comprehensive study of the labour involved in artisanal industries nearly impossible. 
Nonetheless, any work devoted to the study of Iranian labour during this period must at least 
attempt to accommodate the experiences and struggles of labour involved in such diverse 
manufacturing activities.  
By focusing on petitions this study dealt with industrialization and labour issues in Iran from 
1906 to 1941. It offered a new dimension in reconceptualizing Iranian labour history. In the 
main, the study tried to trace the discursive formation of the Iranian working class and 
explained how workers came to identify themselves as such. For this it discussed how a 
genuine class identity emerged from a general subaltern discourse. The study also called into 
question the traditional distinction made between organized and non-organized labour and 
problematized the teleological role attributed to factory workers. The relationship between the 
working people and the ruling classes constituted another concern of this study. Nonetheless, 
I encountered two main problems while conducting my research. First of all, due to the 
disproportionate number of petitions from the first to the twelfth parliaments investigated in 
this study, it was not possible to reach an equally comprehensive discussion of each period. 
Thus, although we have comparatively fewer petitions from 1906 to 1925 the number of 
petitions for the years between 1925 and 1941, particularly during the 1930’s, is substantially 
higher. This difference may have two main causes. First, we can assume that with the 
increased bureaucratization from the mid-1920’s onwards, petitions were more effectively 
administered and preserved. Second, workers used petitioning especially “in the situation 
where workers’ organizations were not yet formed or recognized” or “where other forms of 
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resistance were explicitly forbidden”.
2
 Until the late 1920’s workers enjoyed such direct 
means of expressing and demonstrating their grievances as trade unions and collective action. 
Yet, with such organized activity having been explicitly forbidden, workers used petitions for 
this purpose. This does not mean that petitioning was absent in freer political settings. Quite 
the contrary, what Swarnalatha observed for colonial Andhra applies to the Iranian workers, 
too. That is to say, workers “resorted to other methods only in the event of the failure of 
petitioning to yield results”.
3
 However, during the 1930’s, petitioning served as the only 
viable means of expressing their demands and grievances, which significantly added to the 
number of petitions from this period.  
 
The second problem in this study is the absence of a predefined geographical focus. This 
might have resulted in understating regional differences which were significant in Iran 
especially for the period under study. For example, while in some regions craft industries 
related to textiles suffered an almost steady decline from the nineteenth century onwards, in 
some others where European goods could not reach, or reached in comparatively insignificant 
amounts, craft industries remained intact for a longer period of time. Similar observations can 
be made for industrialization too. It would be wrong to assume that industrialization 
developed at the same speed and scale all over Iran. Regional studies can better illustrate such 
differences. For the lack of a geographical focus, too, I have two basic explanations. First, for 
the main concerns of this study I chose to focus more generally on petitioning practices of 
workers by referring to the textile labour which was among the largest sectors in the country 
and remained so throughout the period thus analysed. While doing so, I wanted to refer to 
crafts industries as well as to factories. An interregional approach served my purposes better, 
for while craft industries continued in some regions to be the dominant type of manufacturing, 
in some others large-scale industrial establishments became the principle production centres. 
Thus by referring to various regions throughout the work I discussed the experiences of textile 
workers who were employed at different manufacturing sites. Second, as the number of 
petitions for each period was disproportionate so was their geographical scope. For instance, 
while I was able during my archival research in Tehran to find many petitions from Isfahan, 
this was not the case for every city.   
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Throughout the period investigated in this study Iranian workers had to deal with distressing 
living and working conditions. From the start, I agreed with Barrington Moor’s following 
remarks:  
“For all students of human society sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the 
victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology. A scholar who 
tries to be objective needs these feelings as part of his working equipment.”
4
  
My purpose here is not to portray Iranian workers as victims which, I believe, would be just 
as unfounded as seeing them as a revolutionary force. Nonetheless, theirs was a life full of 
challenges as they were caught between a rock and a hard place. There was, on the one hand, 
the challenge posed by foreign imports which deprived many craftsmen of their livelihood. 
True, Iranian craft industries did not decline overnight in the face of increasing imports and 
developed various survival strategies which enabled them to gradually reclaim some of their 
lost territory. Yet, working conditions and workers’ wages were among the first to be 
compromised. The more manufacturing moved to the less monitored areas, such as cottage 
and putting-out industries, the lesser workers were able to obtain favourable working 
conditions. The foreign import was not only dominant but also attractive and was preferred by 
many, who could afford it, to home manufactures. On the other, there was the increasing 
factorization, particularly during the 1930’s, which paid little, if any, attention to labour 
issues. The Iranian working class was made amidst these conditions. Their petitions are 
proofs of a sophisticated engagement with the ruling classes as well as their superiors.    
There is no doubt that there is a growing literature on Iranian labour history. The working 
people who constitute the majority of Iranian society, like any other society, have already 
been historical subjects. What we need to do is to challenge our previous opinions about the 
working people and to focus on diverse aspect of Iranian labour history. to this ends, and for 
others, petitions which provided the main source material of this study deserve further 
attention. Petition-writing was a familiar and effective practice for most Iranians who had 
diverse objectives. It was not unaffordable for most but it was not without risks either. People 
used petitioning when they needed it. By using petitions we can gain insight not only into the 
experiences and perceptions of Iranian workers but also of the public at large. Also, I think we 
need more monographs on workers who were employed in various industries from tanning to 
carpet-making, and from match-making to the services sector. Although there were some 
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common characteristics shared by industries in general, there were at the same time sector-
based developments which can only be revealed by focusing on various industries. Our 
apprehension of the past will remain incomplete without due attention paid in our historical 
inquiry to the experiences and perception of the working people. As far as labour history is 
concerned this apprehension needs, first and foremost, to overcome the erroneous tendencies 
which either equate labour history with that of the formal communist and socialist 
organizations or else label any class-based labour claims as foreign imports and harmful. This 
can only be achieved via a concerted effort and only through such an effort can we gain 
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1. Representatives of the Guilds in the First Majles
1
 
 Name Electoral District Representative 
1 Hajj Agha Tirforush Tehran Wood sellers, carpenters, chair makers, turners, mat weavers
2
 
2 Hajj Mohammad Ebrahim Vares Tehran Mercers, silk sellers, peddlers 
3  Hajj Mohammad Taqi Bonakdar  Tehran Mercers 
4 Hajj Mirza Ebrahim Khayyatbashi Tehran Tailors, fine-drawers, cloakmakers, dressmakers, embroiderers   
5 Seyyed Ahmad Zargarbashi Tehran Goldsmiths, braziers, blacksmiths, tinsmiths  
6 Hajj Sheikh Esma‘il Bolurfurush Tehran Crystal sellers, glass makers 
7 Mir ‘Abd al-Mottaleb Kordestani Amin al-
Tojjar 
Tehran Butchers, tanners, chicken sellers, lamb sellers 
                                                          
1
 The list is largely based on the following: Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, “Dowreh-e Jadid-e Mashrutiyat dar Iran-4,” Kaveh. 15 July 1918. However, Taqizadeh does 
not provide detailed information on the guilds represented by these deputies. Thus, other secondary sources mainly the following are also used: Fallah-Tootcar, 
“Social and Political,” 146 and Afary, Iranian, 73. Guilds of Tehran were allocated thirty two representatives but in the end twenty nine were elected due to the 
number of guilds members. A number of problems about this list should be addressed. First of all, the Electoral Law of 1906 introduced an electorate consisting 
of six societal strata but they did not have to elect one from among themselves. In other words, guilds’ representatives were not necessarily guilds members. For 
that matter, that Fallah-Tootcar includes Hajj Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Wail al-Ra‘aya in the list of guilds representatives should be met with caution. He was a 
leading merchant of Hamadan and his election should be regarded as an alliance of different groups rather than being an act of guilds alone. The same hold true 
for Taqizadeh too. The reason behind this is well explained by Sa’d al-Dowleh on 30 December 1906 in the twenty third session of the newly founded parliament. 
When specific issues regarding elections came about he made the following observation: “in big cities where there are many guilds with lots of members the issue 
of elections is not complicated. However, in small towns and villages where guilds have members from all groups of society yet not with many members they too 
have the full right to elections but in the following manner: each class and guilds should write the names of their candidates to be put on streets and bazaars and 
drew lots and whoever received the majority of votes will be elected as deputy’ Luh-e Mashruh, 30 December 1906.  Another problem originates from the power 
of anjomans. Apparently, where they were powerful enough anjomans played determining roles in the election. Mansureh Ettehadiyeh-Nezammafi argues, for 
example, that in Tabriz the law was not implemented and the Anjum of Tabriz elected the deputies. Ettehadiyeh-Nezammafi, Majls va Intikhabat. P. 8.     
2
 For the glossary of the guilds the following work is used: H. E. Wulff, The Traditional Crafts of Persia (Cambridge: The M. I. T Press, 1966), 331-385. Also, 
especially about the crafts related to textiles the following work is used: Willem Floor, The Persian Textile Industry in Historical Perspective 1500-1925 (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1999), 129-206. 
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8 Mashhadi Baqir Baqqal Tehran Grocers, wholesalers, nuts sellers, fruit sellers, fodder sellers, rice sellers 
9 Hajj Sheikh Hasan ‘Ali ‘Alaqeband  Tehran Braid makers,
3
 gold embroiderers,  galloon sewers, galloon weavers, gold 
wire-drawers   
10 Hasan Me‘marbashi Panjeh ‘Ali Tehran Well-sinkers, builders, brick-kiln makers, tile-makers, jar sellers  
11 Hajj Mollah Hasan Vares Tehran Broadcloth sellers 
12 Seyyed Hosayn Borujerdi Tehran Blacksmiths, farriers, horseshoe makers, nail makers,  balustrade makers 
13 Sheikh Hasan Tehrani Saqatforush Tehran Perfume-sellers, drug-sellers, tea-sellers, sugar seller 
14 Hajj Sheikh Hosayn ‘Ali Dallal  Tehran Shoemakers, sole-makers  
15 Hajj ‘Abbas Qoli Nanva Tehran Bakers, fodder sellers 




sellers    
17 Hajj Seyyed Mohammad Sa‘atforush Tehran Cobblers, watchmakers 
18 Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Herati Tehran Copper makers, pistol makers, carriage makers,   
19 Mirza Mahmud Ketabforush Khvansari Tehran Bookbinders, gilders, paper sellers, books sellers 
20 Seyyed Mostafa Semsar Tehran Brokers, cotton ginners, quilt makers, old cloth sellers 
21 Seyyed Mahdi Saqatforush Tehran Coffee-house keepers  
22 Seyyed Valiullah Khan Nasr Tehran Barbers, bath attendants, ice sellers, water bailiffs 
23 Hajj Mohammad Taqi Tajer Dahbendeh  Tehran Cloth shoe (giveh) makers, takhtfurush
6
, sock weavers 
24 Mirza Hosayn ‘Ali Mahruzadeh Tehran Mat weavers, tirfurush
7
 
25 Hajj Hosayn ‘Ali Va‘iz Tehran He was elected but did not join the Assembly and Hajj Sheikh Hosayn Ali 
Dallal )14
th
 on the list) was elected instead.
8
 
26 Agha Mirza Hasan Tehran Following his resignation Mirza Hosayn Ali Arsidouz was elected.
9
 
                                                          
3
 ‘Alaqehband is someone who twists braids (qeitan), using silk and cotton yarn: Floor, The Persian Textile Industry, 131.     
4
 One who dresses and sells the head, feet and tripe of cattle: F Staingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 
2005), 1045. 
5
 A rich stew of meat: Steingass, Persian-English Dictionary, 1529. 
6
 Cloth shoe sole: Wulff, Traditional Crafts, 379. 
7
 The one who sells axels of spinning wheels: Wulff, Traditional Crafts, 381. 
8
 Fallah-Tootcar, “Social and Political,” 146. 
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27 Mirza Hosayn ‘Ali Sigari Tehran Cigarette sellers 
28 Sheikh Hosayn ‘Ali Urusiduz   Tehran Cloth sellers  
29 Mirza Mohammad Khan Sadeq Hazrat Tehran  
30 Hajj ‘Ali Akbar  Tehran  Cooks  
31 Ostad Gholam Reza Yakhdansaz  Tehran Saddlers, trunk makers 
32 Hajj Mohammad Baqer  Tehran Soap makers 
33 Hajj Mirza Agha Farshforush Tabriz Carpet sellers 
34 Mirza Hadi Jawaheri Esfahani  Isfahan Jewellery makers 













                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
9
 Fallah-Tootcar, “Social and Political,” 146. 
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2.The List of the Items Proposed by the Merchants Union of Tehran to be Banned from Importation 
 Name     
1 Candle, 28 Gum, plaster, rubber and … products    55 Writing material  
2 Cacao  29 Sewn clothes 56 Makeup items 
3 Coffee 30 Music instruments 57 Travel itemsf 
4 Sugar 31 Various items  58 Goatskin products  
5 All sorts of items made of lead, tin, 
spelter/zinc, copper and nickel 
32 Jewelleries 59 Replica jewellery  
6 Plants and all sorts of plant products 33 Various stones of all kinds  60 Wand and … 
7 Cotton fabrics with the exception of muslin 
and …  
34 Cleaned and un-cleaned cottons 61 Gambling instruments made of paper or 
other stuff 
8 Fabrics made of wool and all sorts yarn 35 Cotton and silk fabrics 62 Toys 
9 Fabrics made of pure wool 36 Yarn and pure or mixed silk velvet  63 … 
10 Liquid glues 37 Lace 64 Gramophone … 
11 Phaeton, carriage, cart and automobile with 
the exception of trolley and bus 
38 Felt 65 All kinds of cobbler items 
12 Wood stuff 39 Carpet 66 Buzzer 
13 Drinks 40 Kashmiri and Sherwani shawls  67 Furniture and mirror  
14 Coal and charcoal 41 Woollen fabrics mixed with silk 68 Gold watch 
15 Wax  42 Woollen fabrics mixed with cotton and 
linen 
69 Artistic and collection fabrics  
16 Fruits 43 Raw linen and hemp 70 Opium 
17 Milk 44 Linen fabrics mixed with silk 71 Rosy papers for writing  
18 Vegetables 45 Woven and unwoven silk mixed with 
linen and yarn or pure silk 
72 Wallpapers 
19 Honey 46 Tapestry and stripe 73 All sorts of perfumery 
20 Eggs 47 Lacework  74 Un-tanned skins 
21 Starch 48 Various kinds from number 20 which are 
not named in the table  
75 … 
22 Macaroni 49 Rag for giveh 76 Porcelain and …  
23 Biscuit 50 Wooden box 77 Gold pitch 
24 Cheese 51 Wax and oil 78 Sugar essence 
25 Salt 52 Silver products  79 All sorts of soap 
26 Fish 53 Tobacco products  80 All sorts of tobacco 
27 Meat 54 Button 81 All sorts of glass and crystal products.  
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3. The Declaration of the Merchants Union of Hamadan Issued on 23 February 1927 




                                                          
1
 LMDCIP. dore6-k46-j22, ‘From the Merchants’ Union of Hamadan to the Majles’, 14 April 1927. Emphases are in 




The proposal of the Merchants Union of Hamadan as to the definitive prevention of the 
importation of luxuries and decorative items into Iran: 
The wish of those who are concerned about the happiness of the country and the nation is the 
unconditional prohibition of the importation of unnecessary items into the country by the 
government.
2
 In this way, the remaining craftsmen who suffered enormously from this terrifying 
storm can in the future earn bread with their honour by the encouragement of the government and 
the nation. Based on the debates we conducted on the issue, we are against 100% customs duties. 
Because, if the purpose of such a decision is to provide employment to the jobless and to keep 
wealth within the country, neither of these can be obtained by 100% customs dues, rather, it will 
only further poverty, misery, and moral turpitude (fesad-e akhlaq). The main purpose should be 
to prevent this poor and miserable nation from the use of and inclination to inappropriate 
unnecessary goods.  
We think that to put 100% duties on these goods will not bring any results, and people will not 
give up their bad consumption habits. The following example will suffice to prove our point. The 
preliminary goal behind the law for the restriction of opium passed in 1911 was the prohibition of 
the use of this mortal poison after eight years in Iran. Eight years later people paid four times the 
real price to buy it, so they paid 400% taxes and even sacrificed themselves to be able to use it, 
and the government received those taxes. We are still watering this unfortunate and lethal tree.  
Based on this bitter experience, will 100% dues prevent the use of unnecessary articles? Being 
always in search of the truth we call all the high authorities of the country to unconditionally 
prohibit the importation of luxuries and decorative items and of anything whose raw material is 
available in Iran.      
                                                          
2
 Emphases are in the original as bold emphases 
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4. The List of Textile Factories in Iran in 1940
1
  
a. Cotton Weaving and Spinning Factories 
 Annual Production  






Fabric (m.) Capital No. of 
workers 
Note Daily Production 
1 Shahi Spinning&Weaving 
Fact. 
Shahi 1930 36,400 280  4000,000     
2 Bushahr Printed Cotton 
Fact. 
Bushar 1938 32,000 1,200  12,000,000     
3 Risbaf Weaving and 
Spinning Joint Stock Co. 
Fact. 





2,270 kg. Cotton yarn 
4 Wool Industry Joint Stock 
Co. Fact.  





660 kg. Cotton yarn 
and 7530 meters of 
cloth 
5 Wool Weaving  Joint 
Stock Co. Fact.  





80 kilo yarn 
6 Zayandeh Rud Joint Stock 
Co. Fact. 
Esfahan 1936 8096 163 523,120 2,894,746 12201241 1340  1743 kg. yarn 9649 
meters of cloth 
7 Shahreza Joint Stock Co. 
Fact. 
Isfahan 1937 4824 130 239116 700,000 9,495,638 785  797 kg. yarns and 233 
meter clothes 
8 Rahimzadeh and Partners 
Spinning Fact. 
Esfahan 1936 4,996  375,000  6099798 340  1025 kg. yarns 
9 Barq-e Dahsh Spinning Isfahan 1936 4,608  271526  3881139 262  905 kg. yarns 
                                                          
1





10 E‘temadiyeh Weaving 
and Spinning Fact. in 
Bushehr 
Bushahr 1938 3800 120 202500 132976 4195845 495  975 kg. yarns and 443 
m. cloths. 
11 Khorasan Khosrovi Yarn 
Spinning and Textile Joint 
Stock Co. Fact. 
Mashhad 1938 10,120 150 337,500 600,000 114,338,22 448  1125 kg. yarns and 
2000 m. cloths  
12 Ettehadiyeh spinning and 
weaving  Fact. in 
Shahreza  
Shahreza 1938 6,046 --- 163,580 --- 5779077 350  5,491 kg. yarns. 
13 Tehran spinning and 
weaving Joint Stock Co. 
Fact.  
Tehran 1935 3,200 60 202,500 120,000 3,000,000 250  400 m. fabrics and 216 
kg. knits 
14 Azerbaijan Facric 
Weaving Fact. 
Kazvin 1937  100  100,000 4,890,000 200  333 m. fabrics 
15 Qazvini Spinning Fact. Kazvin 1910 5,000 --- 173,000 --- 4,000,000 200  500 kg. yarns 
16 Khoi Kalkatachi Spinning 
and Weaving Fact. 





130 kg. yarns and 220 
m. fabrics 
17 Eqbal Yarn Spinning 
Joint Stock Co. Fact. 
Yazd 1934 7,000 --- 288,430 --- 50,70,000 272  961 kg. yarns 
18 Hosaynali Harati Fact. Yazd 1935 3240 --- 192432 --- 3,000,000 212  941 kg. yarns 
19 Samnan Thread Joint 
Stock Co. Fact. 
Samnan 1932 9,480 --- 830,000 --- 9446122 450  2766 kg. yarns 
20 Kashan Spinning Fact. Kashan 1936 6,760 --- 487768 --- 6923773 256  1,986 kg. yarns 
21 Fars Textile Joint Stock 
Co. Fact. 
Shiraz 1934 5,376 --- 277,645 --- 4,575,150 253  925 kg. yarns 
22 Fars Ltd. Co. Fact. Shiraz 1936 6,000 --- 158,044 --- 6567608 255  526 kg. yarns 
23 Khuzestan Spinning Fact. Ahvaz 1936 8,800 --- 475,318  6,384,233 360  1,840 kg. yarns 
24 Khorshid Joint Stock 
Co.Spinning Fact. 
Kerman 1937 4,992 --- 255,753 --- 3690314 171  1,000 kg. yarns 




1935 5,000  298,215 --- 1718030 370  1,000 kg. yarns 
26 Qom yarn Spinning Fact. Qom 1938 4,608 --- 270,000 --- 5520229 230  900 kg. yarns 
27 Isfahan Spinning Fact. Isfahan 1938 2,488  3398952 
pieces of 
reel 





 Rasht 1938         
 
 
  Total 205,580 2,203 6,827,155 20,547,722 185042295 10241   
Explanation: With the exception of a small amount, the rest of the yarn is used in the factory in fabric making. 
 
b. Wool Spinning and Weaving Factories 
 Annual Production  
N
o 
Name of the factory Location SD Spindles  Looms Wool yarn 
(kg.) 
Fabric (m.) Capital Number 
workers 
Note Daily Production 
1 Vatan  Isfahan 1925 5,220 118 600,000 849,723 20,0532,94 1153  20,000 kg. wool yarns and 
2,810 meters fabrics 
2 Risbaf Spinning and 
weaving Joint Co. 
Fact. 
Isfahan 1934 5,400 80 276,800 322770 26,5690,78 1270  923 kg. wool yarns and 
1090 meters fabrics 
3 Isfahan Wool Industry 
Joint Stock Co. Fact. 
Isfahan 1938 3240 60 --- 225,900 144,38000 553 * 115,582 kg. wool yarns and 
2109700 m. fabrics 
4 Wool Spinning Joint 
Stock Co. Fact. 
Isfahan 1938 4,480 10 --- 708,130 13238594 70   
5 Haj Rahim Agha 
Qazvini Spinning and 
weaving Fact. 
Qazvin 1929 3,200 156 59,454 66,800 6,512,820 200  500 m. fabrics 
6 Koroghlu Fabric 
weaving Fact.  
Kazvin 1936 680 100 200,000 290,000 3,246,294 340  550 m. fabrics and 200 
pieces of blankets 
7 Derakhshan Fact. Yazd 1933 1328 15 50,978 85,758 4,500,000 123  169 kg [wool yarn?] and 
280 meters fabrics 
8 Khoi Kalkatachi 
Spinning and 
Weaving Fact. 
Tabriz 1936 1500 32 33,000 101,92 8,868,754 534  130 kg [wool yarn?] and 
230 m. fabrics 
9 Hartunian Factor.
3
 Mashhad 1933 500  140-300 
avg. 220 
  30   
   Total 255,48 571 1,220,452 2,559,273 97,426,834 4,273   
Explanation: The factories numbered 3,3,4, and 8 whose combined capital is 26,114,425 rls. With a total of 2427 workers are considered together with their data 
on the list of the cotton spinning and weaving factories. 
                                                          
2
 Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moessasat, 124. 
3
 Ardakani, Tarikh-e Moessasat, 119-120. 
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c. Knit and Sock Weaving 
No Name  Location Erection 
Date 
Annual Production Number of 
Workers 
Note  Daily Production 
1 Qods Chorabchi Co.  
Fact. 
Tehran 1905 180 thousands various kinds of 
cotton and fluffy knits; and 280,000 
pairs of socks 
138  600 cotton and fluffy  shirts and 
jackets; 900 pairs of socks 
2 Ltd Co. Sock  Fact. Tehran 1931 7,154 dozens of sock 107  272 pairs of socks 
3 Saba Co. Fact. Tehran 1929 20,000 shirts and 400,000 pairs of 
socks 
70  66 shirts and 133 pairs of sock 
4 Jurabchi Brothers Fact. Tehran 1921 54050 meters of shirt fabrics; and 
1000,22 socks 
85  166 knit fabric; 72 pieces of shirts; 
and 933 pairs of socks 
5 Kazi Jurabchi Fact. Tehran 1901 20,000 pieces of socks and 240000 
pieces of knits  
65  66 pieces of athletes; 100 pieces of 
jumpers and ascots; and 333 pairs 
of socks 
6 Mansurian Fact. Tehran 1913 24,000 kg knits 110  33 pieces of jackets and 400 pairs 
of socks 
7 Arjomand Weaving Fact. Tehran 1935 5000 m. knits 7  17 m. of knit fabrics; one dozen of 
cotton shawls; and 33 dozens of 
socks; and 833 rls. of various 
goods 
8 Iran Knit Fact. Tehran 1935 36,000 m. of knits 15  120 m. of knits 
9 Haqiqat Knit Weaving 
Fact. 
Tehran 1932 1,000 dozens of knits  14  3 dozens of knits 
10 Shahpur Weaving Co. 
Fact. 
Tehran 1937 90,000 pairs of socks; and 90,000 
pieces of jacket 
25  42 m. of knits; 360 pairs of socks; 
3 pieces of jackets; and knit shirt 
11 Shayan Joint Stock Co. 
Fact. 
Tabriz 1932 85,000 meters woollen and cotton 
knits  
70  267 pieces of various athletes, 
jackets and jampers  
12 Abu al-Qasem Gorji 
Fact. 
Yazd 1911 140,000 rls. woollen and cotton 20  108 athletes; 23 jackets; 13 shirts 
with fluffy background; 144 shirts 
and jackets; and 47 pairs of socks  
13 San‘at Knit Fact. Tehran 1933 40,000 rls woollen and cotton goods 20  8 woollen shorts 
14 Khosrovi Khomeini Knit 
Fact. 
Tehran 1927 150,000 rls. woollen and cotton 
goods 
16  500 rls. Knit fabrics 
15 Zarifi Co. Fact. Isfahan 1933 5,000 dozens of woollen and cotton 
goods 
65  12 dozens of shirts and 234 pairs of 
socks 
16 Ostovar/Ostovaran Joint 
Stock Co. Fact. 
Isfahan 1936 200,000 rls. of woollen and cotton 
goods 




17 Fernan Jackman Fact. Isfahan 1929 25,000 meters towels and fabrics 35  83 meters of towels and fabrics 
18 Javid Weaving Joint 
Stock Co. Fact. 
Isfahan 1927 About 20,000 kg of knits  45  21 dozens of shirts 
19 Hajj Agha Mohajer Mashhad 1925 About 300,000 rls. 17 Manual 500 rls 
20 Mohammad Javad 
Jorabchi Fact. 
Mashhad 1921 About 46,800 pairs of socks and 
10,500 shirts and ascots 
45 Manual 150 pairs of socks and 35 shirts  
21 Hajj Mohammad Jakatchi 
Fact. 
Kermanshah 1913 About 40,000 rls 30  133 rls 
22 Soraya Joint Stock Co. 
Fact. 
Tabriz 1937 About 4,320 kg knits and socks 22  14 kg knits 
23 Shams Weaving Tabriz    Manual 66 shirts and 500 pairs of sock. It is 
manual 
24 Ettefaq Weaving Rasht     Manual 600 pairs of socks. It is manual. 
25 Farhangiyan Broth. Sock 
Weaving 
Rasht    Manual 60 shirts 60 dozens of sock. It is 
manual. 
26 Zomrodi Brothers Sock 
weaving 
Rasht    Manual 187 pairs of sock. It is manual. 
27 Jurabchi Brothers  Sock 
Weaving 
Rasht    Manual 400 pairs of sock. It is manual. 
28 Sharq Weaving Mashhad    Manual 600 rials. It is manual. 
29 Vahdat Jurabchi Mashhad    Manual 80 rials 
30 Payandeh Weaving Esfahan    Manual 120 cotton shirts 300 woollen 
shirts. It is manual. 
 
d. Silk Weaving Factory 
No Name of the 
Factory 
Location SD Spindles Looms Capital Annual Production in tons Daily Production 
(m.) 
Note 
1 Chalus Silk 
Weaving Fact. 
Chalus 1937  220
4
  1,000,000 m. of fabrics; 27,000 kg of silk thread; 





                                                          
4
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40. The figures provided by Zahedi are from around 1943-44. 
5
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 42. 
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e. Bag and Sack Weaving 
No Name of the Factory Location SD Spindles Looms Capital Daily production (m.)  Note 




 16670 meters  






 11944 meter 
646 kg. Sugar yarn 
 
                                                          
6
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40.  
7
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40. 
8
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40. 
9
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40. 
10
 Zahedi, Sanaye-e Iran, 40. 
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5. The List of the Workers of the ‘Etemadiyeh Weaving and Spinning Factory in 
Bushehr in 1935. 







1 Yusef Hosayn Dehgai 1 1309 1316 7 
2 Nasrollah Asad Karbor 12 1300 1316 16 
3 Hosayn Khezr Purbagi (?) 71 1306 1316 10 
4 Jaddollah  ‘Ali Puladtan 13 1298 1316 18 
5 Ahmad  Karam Ahmadpur 30 1302 1316 14 
6 Karam ‘Abd al-Reza Razai 43 1304 1316 12 
7 Ahmad Hosayn Sheikhzad 4 1303 1316 13 
8 Ahmad Gholamhosayn Honarbakhsh 212 1274 1316 40 
9 Khalil Mohammad  Hashem  Niksarasht  312 1285 1316 31 
10 ‘Abdollah Hosayn Deyanat  11 1297 1316 19 

















13 ‘Abdollah Ahmad [???] 118 1301 1316 15 
14 Najaf Hosayn Qaidi 10 1293 1316 23 
15 Esma‘il ‘Abd al-Reza Khoshkhiram 126 1282 1316 34 
16 Ahmad Aghajan Mohammadi 127 1309 1316 7 
17 ‘Abdollah Ahmad Birteh 129 1307 1316 9 
18 Khalil Ja‘far Farzandai 236 1300 1316 16 
19 Hosayn Gholamhosayn ‘Alizadeh 595 1300 1316 16 
20 Gholamreza ‘Abbas Mirshakari 593 1289 1316 27 
21 Khodadad Ghul‘amali Bakhtiyari 241 1295 1316 21 
22 Haji Reza Sheikhabuli 249 1291 1316 25 
22 Ghorghali ‘Ali Kakizadeh 93 1306 1316 10 
23 Gholamhoseyn ‘Ali Tangruzi 37 1275 1316 41 
24 ‘Ali Mohammad Barghoman 79 1305 1316 11 
25 Reza ‘Abd al-Hoseyn Sertelian (?) 237 1284 1316 32 
26 ‘Ali Yusef Kananitariq 150 1295 1316 21 
27 Khezr Khodagharm Mollai 31 1308 1316 8 
29 ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Maleksarqoli 261 1309 1316 7 
30 ‘Abd al-Hoseyn ‘Ali Mahin 255 1298 1316 18 
31 Mohammad Hosayn Deyanat 254 1294 1316 22 
32 ‘Abd al-Karim Hosayn […] 48 1305 1316 11 
33 Reza Ahmad Bakhtiyari 263 1290 1316 26 
34 ‘Abbas Gholamhosayn […] 259 1297 1316 19 
35 Gholam‘ali Mohammad […] 33 1302 1316 14 
36 ‘Ali Hosayn Shams al-Din 24 1284 1316 32 
37 Rahman Abu Qasem Moradzadeh 152 1303 1316 13 
38 Haydar Hosayn […] 153 1307 1316 9 
39 ‘Abbas ‘Ali Zendehbudi  (?) 154 1303 1316 13 
40 Ja‘far Mohammad Sheikhabuli 644 1276 1316 40 
41 Jahanghir Reza […] 258 1297 1316 19 
42 Hosayn Mohammad Hosayn Mohammadi 262 1278 1316 38 
42 Haidar Mohammad […] 44 1303 1316 13 
43 Ahmad Ebrahim Ebrahimi 48 1292 1316 24 
44 Seyyed Ibrahim  Seyyed Hosayn Hosayni 35 1300 1316 16 
45 Safar Gholam […] 337 1290 
(?) 
1316 26 
46 Esma‘il Karam […] 84 1306 1316 10 
47 Salman ‘Abbas […] 300 1311 1316 5 
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48 Khezr Khodadad Mansurinajad 57 1307 1316 9 
49 Reza Khodadad Abadi 76 1279 1316 37 
50 Gholamhosayn […] […] 277 1302 1316 14 
51 Mohammadhosayn Najaf Abadi 746 1289 1316 27 
52 Hosayn ‘Ali […] 276 1301 1316 15 
53 Hosayn Hashem […] 324 1277 1316 39 
54 Hosayn Haji Hajipur 335 1264 1316 52 
55 Husayn Gholamreza Charghusheh 336 1276 1316 40 
56 Haidar Khezr Jangju 713 1280 1316 36 
57 ‘Araz Hasan […] 544 1303 1316 13 
58 ‘Abd al-Rasol ‘Ali Simurgh 387 1277 1316 39 
59 ‘Abbas ‘Ali […] 500 1299 1316 17 
60 Shah ‘Abbas Haji Dorakhshandeh 501 1285 1316 31 
61 Esma‘il Qanbar Muqim (?) 514 1307 1316 9 
61 Abd al-Hoseyn ‘Abbas […] 506 1295 1316 21 
62 Mohammad ‘Abbas […] 511 1305 1316 11 
63 Namdar Baqer […] 536 1297 1316 19 
64 ‘Ali Khezr Gharghuri 499 1303 1316 13 
65 ‘Alibaz Mohammad …bahmani 498 1293 1316 23 
66 Haji Asadullah …bahsi 579 1300 1316 16 
67 Rasul  Rahim […] 544 1300 1316 16 
68 […] Bahram Zendeh… 549 1308 1316 8 
69 Setareh Haidar […] 578 1304 1316 12 
70 […] Abu al-Qasem […] 548 1303 1316 13 
71 ‘Abbas Gholamhosayn […] 449 1299 1316 17 
72 Agashah Shah… […] 631 1285 1316 31 
73 Mohammad Mustafa … 636 1273 1316 43 
74 Javad Haji Zayn al-‘Abidin 634 1300 1316 16 
75 Mahmud Rasul […] 637 1278 1316 38 
76 ‘Ali […] Azari 650 1263 1316 53 
77 Ebrahim Mohammad ‘Ali Mustafapur 630 1284 1316 32 
78 Seyyed Abdullahi Seyyed Ali … 655 1305 1316 11 
79 Habib Ahmad …zadeh 644 1295 1316 21 
80 […] Shahibrahimi […] 652 1291 1316 25 
81 Mohammad ‘Ali […] 641 1284 1316 32 
82 Seyyed Abdullah Seyyed ‘Askar …najad 654 1282 1316 34 
83 ‘Ali […] […] 651 1290 1316 26 
84 Shah… Shah ‘Ataullah Safavi 681 1305 1316 11 
85 Mohammad Gholamreza Moradi 226 1298 1316 18 
86 Habib Haydar Qana‘atpisheh 545 1290 1316 26 
87 Jabir Mohammad […] 674 1291 1316 25 
88 Mohammad Ali ‘Abbas […] 676 1292 1316 24 
89 Ne‘matullah Abd al-Ghani … 677 1300 1316 16 
90 Naser  Reza  Ansari 667 1297 1316 19 
91 Khezr Rotsam Ebrahimi 682 1307 1316 9 
92 […] Ibrahim Rasulzadeh 72 1300 1316 16 
93 […] […] Haydarpour 94 1300 1316 16 
94 […] Hosayn Mohammadi 701 1297 1316 19 
95 Reza Gholamhoseyn Darvai 700 1304 1316 12 
96 Abdullah Asadullah […] 702 1303 1316 13 
97 ‘Abbas ‘Ali… […] 707 1302 1316 14 
98 […] […] […] 669 1298 1316 18 
99 […] […] Safavi  689 1301 1316 15 
100 […] ‘Ali Havadzadeh 687 1305 1316 11 
101 […] […] Khosh … 1286 1316 32 
102 Mohammad Gholam‘ali […] 1131 1277 1316 39 
103 […] […] Bayatzadeh 691 1276 1316 40 
104 Seyyed Anzali  Seyyed Haydar Nukari 693 1295 1316 21 
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105 […] Gholam Shabaneh  591 1295 1316 21 
106 ‘Abdullah Haydar Honarpisheh  592 1288 1316 28 
107 […] […] Ansari 597 1288 1316 28 
108 Gholamreza Hoseyn Qanbari 243 1298 1316 28 
109 […] Mohammad Bakhtiyari 146 1295 1316 21 
110 […] Haji Zayn al-Abidin 594 1293 1316 23 
111 […] Gholamhosayn […] 603 1289 1316 27 
112 […] Mohammad […] 608 1286 1316 30 
113 Hosayn ‘Ali Sangari 618 1284 1316 32 
114 Ali AAskar […] […] 617 1275 1316 41 
115 […] […] […] 620 1297 1316 19 
116 […] […] […] 718 1316 1316 0 
117 […] […] […] 71- 1285 1316 31 
118 […] […] […] 570 1286 1316 30 
119 Mohammad … Khwajaghan(?) 670 1272 1316 44 
120 Hosayn Hosayn Baqi (?) 753 1280 1316 36 
121 […] […] […] 7-- 1284 1316 32 
122 […] Taymur […] 606 1269 1316 47 
123 Anzali (?) Gholamreza Rouzgar 800 1296 1316 20 
124 ‘Ali Ebrahim […] 801 1278 1316 38 
125 Hosayn Haji […] 711 1302 1316 14 
126 Haydar Gholam […] 805 1294 1316 22 
127 Jaber Hasan […] 733 1277 1316 39 
128 Gholam‘ali ‘Abd al-Hosayn […] 745 1303 1316 13 
129 Haydar Qasem […] 715 1274 1316 42 
130 Khodakaram Haji […] 744 1273 1316 43 
131 Hosayn ‘Abbas Zendeh… 232 1284 1316 32 
132 Amanallah Khayrallah Shojakermani 731 1279 1316 37 
133 Bakhsh ‘Ali […] 739 1274 1316 42 
134 ‘Abdullah Solayman […] 782 1278 1316 38 
135 […] Hashem Dahqan 798 1284 1316 32 
136 Abdullah Mohammad Ansari 520 1301 1316 15 
137 Bakhsh Gholamhoseyn […] 721 1284 1316 32 
138 Seyyed Hashem Seyyed Ali Ali begh Shah 619 1284 1316 32 
139 Kazem Ahmad Bakhtiyari 822 1304 1316 12 
140 Gholamreza […] […] 825 1307 1316 9 
141 Shah Mohammad Shah Karim Mosawi 846 1300 1316 16 
142 […] Ramazan […] 838 1307 1316 9 
143 […] […] […] 852 1312 1316 4 
144 ‘Ali Hosayn […] 856 1306 1316 10 
145 […] Hosayn Hajipour 860 1307 1316 9 
146 Zahra […] Boshahri 862 1308 1316 8 
147 Kazem Mohammad […] 884 1302 1316 14 
148 Mohsen ‘Abb al-Hoseyn  Ebrahimi 885 1307 1316 9 
149 ‘Abbas Mohammad Khalifeh  886 1299 1316 17 
150 ‘Abbas Ahmad Khalifeh 890 1307 1316 9 
151 Ahmad Mohammad ‘Ali Asba‘i 892 1307 1316  
152 […] ‘Ali […] 894 1308 1316  
153 Abdullah Abbas […] 900 1306 1316  
154 Mokhtar (?) Gholamali […] 905 1300 1316  
155 […] Mohammad Abadi 909 1301 1316  
156 […] Gholamhosayn […] 910 1302 1316  
157 Mohammad İbrahim […] 917 1304 1316  
158 ‘Abd al-Rahim Gholamhosayn Na‘mati 933 1302 1316  
159 ‘Abdullah ‘Ali Zare‘i 957 1300 1316  
160 Jani ‘Ali Pishani  958 1310 1316  
161 Ebrahim Gholamreza […] 960 1294 1316  
162 Bakhtiyar Mohammad Khalili 965 1304 1316  
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163 ‘Abdullah Hosayn […] 966 1306 1316  
164 Khezr Baqer […] 973 1284 1316  
165 ‘Abd al-Rasul  Gholamhosayn Qadimi 976 1299 1316  
166 Rajab ‘Ali […] 977 1300 1316  
167 Gholamreza Ahmad Shanidi 984 1302 1316  
168 ‘Abd al-Reza Baqir Sarkhosh 985 1289 1316  
169 Qasem Safar  Bahai  986 1284 1316  
170 Hosayn ‘Abd al-Hoseyn […] 989 1296 1316  
171 Hasan […] Hasan Ahmadi  990 1310 1316  
172 […] Gholamhosayn […] 1030 1302 1316  
173 Hashem Khodadad Bozorg 1036 1285 1316  
174 Hosayn […] […] 1046 1299 1316  
175 Darwish Hosayn […] 1047 1284 1316  
176 Gholamreza […]  Pursaleh 1049 1305 1316  
177 […] […] […] 1055 1305 1316  
178 Gholamhoseyn Karam ‘Ali… 1057 1307 1316  
179 Shapur […] Safawi 1058 1274 1316  
180 […] Khodabakhsh Alizadeh 1064 1301 1316  
181 Khadijeh ‘Ali Jawharzadeh  1071 1307 1316  
182 Zahra Seyyed Hosayn […] 1070 1308 1316  
183 Latifeh Abu al-Qasem Soleyman 1080 1304 1316  
184 …khan Hosayni Deyanat 1082 1308 1316  
185 Khayri Reza Banghari 1086 1307 1316  
186 […] Hosayn Deyanat 1088 1302 1316  
187 Manijeh (?) Mahmud […] 1092 1302 1316  
188 Zahra Karam […] 1095 1276 1316  
189 ‘Abdullah Karim Dahqani  1116 1309 1316  
190 --- --- --- --- --- ---  
191 Ahmad ‘Ali akbar Risi  553 1286 1316  
192 ‘Abu al-Qasem Qanbar Tayyari 557 1274 1316  

















6. The Results of the Medical Inspection on the Vatan Factory Workers 
NO ILLNESS NUMBER OF THE INSPECTIONS TOTAL 
  1934 1936  
  MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST   
1 Various wounds   39 139 72 250 
2 Abnormal heart rhythms     3 3 
3 Syphilis 29 121 59 70 75 354 
4 Indigestion 8 13 29 25 4 79 
5 Urinary retention  23 46  61 130 
6 [?] 6 7   4 17 
7 Pinkeye     13 13 
8 Malaria  100 132 145 41 418 
9 Liver abscess     4 5 
10 Eczema 2 22 17 16 5 63 
11 Swollen nose     3 3 
12 Pulmonary oedema     4 4 
13 Partial paralysis     3 3 
14 Atrophy     18 18 
15 Cutaneous leishmaniasis 6 8 5 6 2 25 
16 Ringworm 15 42 41 16 22 136 
17 Taenia  3  8 4 15 
18 Hysteria 8 13 16 2 2 41 
19 Hematomunia     5 5 
20 Rheumatism 36 113   42 191 
21 Ear swelling 7 16 16 10 2 51 
22 Asthma 8  6 5 4 23 
23 Heart diseases 20 111 9 20 5 165 
24 Haemorrhoid 4 8 23 13 2 50 
25 Tuberculosis 4 12 14 24 2 56 
26 Sour stomach 29   96 4 129 
27 Mental disorder 6 12 37 17 2 74 
28 Influenza     4 4 
29 Typhoid fever    4 3 7 
30 Catarrh     5 5 
31 Thunderclap headache     4 4 
32 Gonorrhoea 13 52 41 58 33 197 
33 Scab 3 18 3 4 4 32 
34 Lung congestion     5 5 
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35 Bone tuberculosis 6  14 30 3 53 
36 Diarrhoea  7  12 12 31 
37 Enlarged uterus     4 4 
38 Gingivitis 5 12 4  3 24 
39 Corneal oedema 4 15 13 4 5 41 
40 Breast abscess     6 6 
41 Swollen eyelid 4    3 7 
42 Dysentery  16  10 5 31 
43 [?]   21  4 25 
44 Gland tumour   11 20 3 34 
45 Nephritis    2 5 7 
46 Malta fever     2 2 
47 Cystitis     2 2 
48 Lymphedema [?]  6   4 10 
49 Trachoma     8 8 
50 Osteoarthritis 12    3 15 
51 Croup     2 2 
52 Hernia 5  2 4 3 14 
53 Enteritis     4 4 
54 [?]  11  15 8 34 
55 Adenitis     5 5 
56 Gout     3 3 
57 Diabetes     4 4 
58 [?]     3 3 
59 Dermatitis     5 5 
60 Syphilitic arthritis  13 45 65 4 127 
61 [?] 13  54 41 7 115 
63 Sciatic nerve  14   4 18 
64 Schizophrenia  13   3 16 
65 Jaundice 2  3  7 12 
66 Chancre     6 6 
67 [?]     7 7 
68 Burns 10 4 19 7 4 34 
69 White plague 7    4 11 
70 Pruritus 10  15 14 5 44 
71 Chronic Constipation     3 3 
72 Head fractures     4 4 
73 Paratyphoid fevers 4  9 8  21 
74 Foot ulcer 8 12    20 
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75 Paronychia 4 9 22 22  57 
76 Smallpox 4  2 12  18 
77 Back pain 12 13 18   43 
78 Strangulation of the Uterus 4     4 
79 Finger ulcers 2     2 
80 Gastric distention 14  4 5  23 
81 Swallowed dental crowns 1     1 
82 [?] 23     23 
83 Hepatomegaly 6 12 5 22  45 
84 Anaemia 5  20 25  50 
85 Heart valve disease 2 5 2 8  17 
86 Crassulacean 12 8 23   43 
87 Infective endocarditis 13 16    29 
88 [?] 12     12 
89 Myocarditis 5 11 4 6  26 
90 Bronchitis 13 52 28 27  120 
91 Aggressiveness 13   11  24 
92 Common cold 8  3 6  17 
93 Syncope 19 14  41  74 
94 Hypochromic anaemia 10  9 5  24 
95 Bone pain 6 11 9 4  30 
96 [?] 4  4 10  18 
97 Bleeding 9  10 18  37 
98 Papilledema 2  2   4 
99 Mouth swelling 6  4 5  15 
100 Pertussis 7 8 6 4  25 
101 Neuritis 4 4 17 16  41 
102 Pneumonia 6 4  4  14 
103 Headache caused by syphilis 23     23 
104 Foot pain  6    6 
105 [?] 13     13 
106 Gastritis  4    4 
107 Cerebral haemorrhage  12    12 
108 Lumbar fractures  5    5 
109 Osteitis  9 3   12 
110 Haematuria  5    5 
111 Periodontitis  7    7 
112 Bone Lesions  11    11 
113 Body swelling  13    13 
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114 Toothache  3    3 
115 Sore throat  11    11 
116 Vitiligo  3    3 
117 [?]  14    14 
118 [?]  12    12 
119 Chalazion  3    3 
120 [?]  3    3 
121 [?] syphilis  4    4 
122 Breast tuberculosis   15 17  32 
123 Love   11   11 
124 Neurasthenia   13   13 
125 [?]   5   5 
126 Conjunctivitis   24 62  86 
127 Swelling of female ovules    18  18 
128 Cancer    6  6 
129 [?]    20  20 
130 Mental retardation    14  14 
131 Cataract    9  9 
132 [?]    4  4 
133 [?]    6  6 





This study deals with the social history of industrialization and labour in Iran from the 
inception of the constitutional system in 1906 until the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. In 
the main, I seek to discuss the Iranian industries before and after the large scale industrial 
leap-forward of 1930s in order to examine the conditions of the working people. The study 
consists of six chapters. In the introductory Chapter One I explain the main three concerns 
and the theoretical framework of the research. The first of these concerns is that I try to 
answer how Iranian workers came to see themselves primarily as workers since ‘workerness’ 
was one of the several identities and affiliations that people had. For doing this, workers’ 
petitions are analysed in order to gain insight into their self-perception. This point is of utmost 
significance for an ample study of Iranian labour history since Iranian workers, as those in 
any part of the world for that matter, developed a peculiar working class identity through a 
gradual and complex process. By tracing the making of this process I call into question a 
purely objective and structural understanding of class formation in Iran. The second main 
concern which preoccupies me in this study is to go beyond the traditional concerns of labour 
history. For a long time, formal labour organizations and collective labour actions constituted 
the main areas of investigation in labour history writing. Although this started to change from 
1960s due especially, if not exclusively, to E. P. Thompson’s seminal work The Making of the 
English Working Class the Iranian labour history writing continued to be dominated by rather 
traditional themes. Thompson’s work was particularly influential in convincingly drawing 
attention to examining not only factory workers by also artisans. In this study, I try to restore 
the agency of those workers too who were employed at craft industries. Besides, attention was 
also paid throughout the study to the diverse aspects of workers’ lives other than their 
worksite experiences. My third concern is the establishment of a proper link between the 
workers’ agenda and political processes. I needed to relate workers’ experiences to the state, 
and vice versa, without necessarily suggesting a tug-of-war between the two. My engagement 
with Iranian workers’ history showed me that the risk of a total decline of the state power was 
perceived by the majority of workers to be at least as precarious as the uncompromisingly 
repressive state authority. Throughput the period under investigation Iranian workers 
struggled, in one way or the other, to prevent any of these two possibilities from happening. 
Instead, they tried to draw the state to their side when they needed it and kept aloof from it 
otherwise. Yet, if the state was roughly from 1906 until early 1920s hardly able to pay much 
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attention to workers’ plight, from early 1920s to the end of the period discussed in this study 
it proved ambitiously determined to extend its power in almost every imaginable way. This 
equation required workers to develop careful strategies and a balanced discourse to work the 
system ‘to their minimum disadvantage’, to use Eric Hobsbawm’s phraseology.            
In Chapter Two I present an historical background of the 19
th
 century, insofar as it relates to 
the period investigated in this work. Here, mention is made of the reform movement which 
mainly started in the military sphere as a reaction of successive defeats at the hands of Russia, 
but then extended, in the following decades, to include the political, economic and social 
spheres as well. The economic and social aspects of the reforms are particularly emphasized 
here. It is argued in this chapter that the popular support for the Constitutional Revolution in 
1906 was due to epidemic diseases, famines, unpopular economic policies of the Court as 
well as stifling foreign economic domination. A coalition of merchants, tradesmen, craftsmen, 
religious groups and intellectuals were responsible for the uncompromising movement against 
arbitrary Qajar rule. This was most clearly reflected in the Tobacco Protest of 1891. The 
significance of this protest for labouring people stemmed from the fact that the craft workers 
experienced or witnessed for the first time the possibility of affecting the Government’s 
policies through resistance. 
Chapter Three deals with an overview of the period which extends from the Constitutional 
Revolution in 1906 to the end of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. Here attention is especially paid 
to the emergence of a new political community in Iran, particularly among labouring people, 
in its shifting forms. In the First National Assembly opened for the first time in country’s 
history in 1906, six classes (tabaqat), including guild members, were represented in the 
Parliament. Their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities are discussed in this 
chapter. The class-based election system was abolished before the elections for the Second 
Parliament in 1909. This however did not mean the end of the participation of the labouring 
people in the making of the political community in Iran. To this end, mention is also made of 
petitioning a peculiar channel of state-society interaction in Iran from the Constitutional 
Revolution onwards, although petitioning as such had been a centuries-old established 
tradition in the country. Also, the failure of the constitutional experiment in 1911 and the 
emergence of authoritarian modernization within about a decade are analysed from a 
grassroots perspective. In the main, it is argued in this chapter that, disillusioned by the 
constitutional experiment's failure to provide employment, establish security and form a 
national economy with minimum foreign influence, Iranian subaltern groups, along with other 
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classes, had become receptive to a strong, though not necessarily despotic, state. The steady 
rise to power of Reza Khan from 1921 until his coronation as the Shah in 1925 partly met 
some of these expectations. However his uncompromising centralization policies claimed the 
previously more or less autonomous realms from which Iranian subalterns made their living 
with little state intervention. Combined with the mechanized factory-based economic policies 
from the mid-1925s on, Iranian subalterns increasingly felt uneasy with the new regime and 
enjoyed almost no betterment in their living and working conditions.  
Chapter Four examines Iranian industrialization between 1906 and 1941. In this chapter I first 
analyse popular perceptions of economic development and reactions to foreign ready-made 
imports. These reactions do not only show how popular classes perceived economic 
development in Iran but also curiously illustrate the working of the state society interaction.  
Following this, Iranian industries until the industrial leap-forward of 1903s are discussed by 
emphasizing small-scale and artisanal industries. The tension between promoting the craft 
industries and introducing factory-based industrialization is referred to in the chapter. It then 
discusses the factory-based industrialization which started in the late 1920’s and gained 
unprecedented speed during the 1930’s. Along the way, however, attention is paid to how 
workers, as well as other classes, were involved in this process and how they perceived 
industrialization policies. Throughout the chapter, emphasis is pun on the textile industry, 
while other industries are also mentioned when relevant.  Chapter-5 deals with labour issues. 
It first discusses the discursive formation of the Iranian working class and how Iranian 
workers perceived themselves primarily as workers and how they gradually developed a 
language of their own. Following this, the nature of the Iranian labour was discussed. Here 
such issues as the total number of workers in Iran, male and female workers as well as the 
distribution of workers to those who were employed factories and those who worked at craft 
industries. This is followed by an examination of legislative attempt to regulate labour issues 
in Iran. In the rest of the chapter working hours, sanitary conditions and workers’ attempts at 
improving their conditions were discussed. These attempts did not only include collective 
actions but also petitioning which workers used as a way of conveying their grievances and 
demands. Attention is paid, in this context, to workers’ impact on and reactions to the labour 
policies adopted by the state. Throughout the chapter not only central politics, but also 
provincial politics are considered. Chapter 6 contains some concluding assessments and 




STAAT, MAATSCHAPPIJ EN ARBEID IN IRAN, 1906-1941: EEN SOCIALE 
HISTORIE VAN IRAANSE INDUSTRIALISATIE EN ARBEID MET BETREKKING 
TOT DE TEXTIEL INDUSTRIE 
Samenvatting 
 
Deze studie behandelt de sociale geschiedenis van industrialisatie en arbeid in Iran vanaf de 
invoering van het constitutionele systeem in 1906 tot het einde van de regering van Reza Shah 
in 1941. Ik bespreek de Iraanse industrieën vóór en na de grootschalige industriële 
ontwikkeling in de jaren '30 om de omstandigheden van de werkende klasse te onderzoeken. 
Deze studie bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. 
 In het eerste hoofdstuk behandel ik ter inleiding de belangrijkste drie vragen en het 
theoretische kader van dit onderzoek. (1) De eerste vraag luidt hoe Iraanse arbeiders zichzelf 
als zodanig gingen zien, aangezien 'arbeider' slechts één van de identiteiten en banden was die 
mensen hadden. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden onderzoek ik petities van arbeiders om 
inzicht te krijgen in de manier waarop zij zichzelf zagen. Voor een uitvoerige studie van de 
Iraanse arbeidsgeschiedenis is dit inzicht van groot belang. Iraanse arbeiders ontwikkelden – 
zoals overal ter wereld –  hun identiteit als werkende klasse geleidelijk en op complexe wijze. 
Door deze ontwikkeling na te gaan trek ik een zuiver objectief en structureel begrip van 
klassenvorming in Iran in twijfel. (2) Ten tweede probeert deze studie de gebruikelijke 
thema's van de arbeidsgeschiedenis achter zich te laten. Arbeidsorganisaties en gezamenlijke 
acties van arbeiders waren lange tijd de voornaamste onderzoeksgebieden in de 
arbeidsgeschiedenis. Hoewel deze situatie in de jaren '60 begon te veranderen, in het 
bijzonder door het verschijnen van The Making of the English Working Class van E.P. 
Thompson, bleef de Iraanse arbeidsgeschiedenis overheerst worden door traditionele 
vraagstukken. Het werk van Thompson was vooral invloedrijk omdat het de aandacht niet 
alleen op fabrieksarbeiders, maar ook op ambachtslieden  vestigde. In deze studie probeer ik 
ook de arbeiders die in de ambachtsindustrie werkzaam waren te betrekken. Daarnaast besteed 
ik niet alleen aandacht aan werkervaringen van arbeiders, maar ook aan andere aspecten van 
hun leven. (3) Ten derde wil ik het verband  tussen de doelstellingen van arbeiders en 
politieke processen aantonen. Ik moest de ervaringen van arbeiders relateren aan de staat en 
omgekeerd, zonder noodzakelijkerwijs een strijd tussen beide te suggereren. Mijn onderzoek 
naar de Iraanse arbeidsgeschiedenis toont aan dat de meerderheid van de arbeiders een 
minstens zo groot gevaar zag in het wegvallen van de staatsmacht als in een onderdrukkende 
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staat waarmee niet te onderhandelen viel. In de periode die hier onderzocht wordt deden 
arbeiders op allerlei manieren moeite om beide mogelijkheden te voorkomen. Zij probeerden 
de staat aan hun kant te krijgen als dat nodig was, maar bewaarden in andere gevallen afstand. 
Maar hoewel de staat vanaf ongeveer 1906 tot de vroege jaren '20 nauwelijks aandacht 
besteedde aan de netelige positie van de arbeiders, bleek hij vanaf de jaren '20 tot het einde 
van de periode die in deze studie behandeld wordt opvallend vastberaden om zijn macht op 
elke denkbare manier te vergroten. Deze situatie noodzaakte arbeiders tot zorgvuldige 
strategieën en een evenwichtig vertoog om het systeem 'tot het minste nadeel voor henzelf' 
(Eric Hobsbawm) te beïnvloeden. 
 
In hoofdstuk twee schets ik de historische achtergrond van de 19
e
 eeuw, voor zover deze van 
belang is voor de periode die ik onderzoek. Ik vermeld de hervormingsbeweging die, vooral 
in militaire kringen, als een reactie op meerdere nederlagen tegen Rusland begon. In de 
volgende decennia breidde deze beweging zich op politiek, economisch en sociaal gebied uit. 
Ik benadruk vooral de economische en sociale aspecten van de hervormingen. In dit 
hoofdstuk betoog ik dat de Constitutionele Revolutie van 1906 haar oorzaken vond in 
epidemieën, hongersnood, impopulair economisch beleid van het Hof en verstikkende 
economische overheersing door het buitenland. Een coalitie van handelaren, vaklieden, 
ambachtslieden, religieuze groepen en intellectuelen was verantwoordelijk voor de 
compromisloze beweging tegen de willekeurige heerschappij van de Qajaren. Het 
Tabakprotest in 1891 is hiervan het duidelijkste voorbeeld. De betekenis van dit protest lag in 
het feit dat arbeiders voor het eerst ervoeren dat zij het beleid van de regering middels verzet 
konden beïnvloeden. 
 
Hoofdstuk drie geeft een overzicht van de periode tussen de Constitutionele Revolutie in 1906 
en het einde van de regering van Reza Shah in 1941. Ik besteed vooral aandacht aan de 
opkomst, met name onder arbeiders, van een nieuwe politieke gemeenschap in Iran, die 
verschillende vormen aannam. De Eerste Nationale Vergadering werd in 1906 voor het eerst 
in de geschiedenis van het land geopend. Er waren zes klassen (tabaqat) in het Parlement 
vertegenwoordigd, waaronder gildeleden. In dit hoofdstuk worden hun parlementaire en 
buitenparlementaire activiteiten besproken. Het op klasse gebaseerde kiesstelsel werd nog 
vóór de verkiezingen voor het Tweede Parlement in 1909 afgeschaft. Dit betekende echter niet 
het einde van de deelname van arbeiders aan de vorming van een politieke gemeenschap in 
Iran. Ik vermeld ook petities als een karakteristiek medium voor de interactie tussen staat en 
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maatschappij vanaf de Constitutionele Revolutie, hoewel het aanbieden van petities in Iran 
een eeuwenoude traditie kende. Ook wordt het falen van het constitutionele experiment in 
1911 en de opkomst van autoritaire modernisering binnen ongeveer tien jaar vanuit een 
grassroots perspectief geanalyseerd. In hoofdzaak betoog ik in dit hoofdstuk dat Iraanse 
ondergeschikte groepen samen met andere klassen gedesillusioneerd raakten door het falen 
van het constitutionele experiment om werk te verschaffen, veiligheid te garanderen en een 
nationale economie met een minimum aan buitenlandse invloed te ontwikkelen. Daarom 
waren zij ontvankelijk geworden voor een sterke, hoewel niet noodzakelijkerwijs despotische 
staat. De gestage groei van de macht van Reza Khan van 1921 tot zijn kroning tot sjah in 1925 
voldeed ten dele aan deze verwachtingen. Zijn compromisloze beleid van centralisering eiste 
echter de min of meer autonome gebieden op waarbinnen Iraanse ondergeschikten zonder 
veel staatsbemoeienis in hun levensonderhoud voorzagen. In combinatie met het 
gemechaniseerde en op fabrieken gebaseerde economische beleid vanaf het midden van de 
jaren '20 voelden Iraanse ondergeschikten zich steeds ongemakkelijker bij het nieuwe regime 
en verbeterden hun levens- en werkomstandigheden nauwelijks. 
 
Hoofdstuk vier onderzoekt de Iraanse industrialisatie tussen 1906 en 1941. In dit hoofdstuk 
analyseer ik eerst de manier waarop de bevolking de economische vooruitgang zag, evenals 
de reacties op de kant en klare importproducten uit het buitenland. Deze reacties laten niet 
alleen zien hoe de werkende klassen de economische vooruitgang in Iran zagen, maar 
illustreren ook de interactie tussen staat en maatschappij. Vervolgens bespreek ik de Iraanse 
industrieën tot de industriële sprong voorwaarts in de jaren '30, waarbij de nadruk ligt op 
kleinschalige en ambachtelijke industrieën. Ook verwijs ik naar de spanning tussen de 
bevordering van de ambachtelijke industrie en de invoering van op fabrieken gebaseerde 
industrialisatie. Hierna bespreek ik de op fabrieken gebaseerde industrialisatie, die begon aan 
het einde van de jaren '20 en in de jaren '30 een ongekende snelheid bereikte. Ik laat daarbij 
zien hoe arbeiders, evenals andere klassen, in dit proces betrokken waren en hoe zij het beleid 
van industrialisatie zagen. De nadruk ligt in dit hoofdstuk op de textielindustrie, hoewel 
andere relevante industrieën ook worden genoemd. 
 
Hoofdstuk vijf behandelt arbeidskwesties. Ik bespreek eerst de discursieve formatie van de 
Iraanse werkende klasse, de manier waarop Iraanse arbeiders zichzelf eerst en vooral als 
arbeiders zagen en hoe zij geleidelijk een eigen taal ontwikkelden. Daarna onderzoek ik het 
karakter van de Iraanse arbeid. Ik bespreek het aantal arbeiders in Iran, de verhouding tussen 
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mannelijke en vrouwelijke arbeiders en de verdeling van arbeiders die in fabrieken en in de 
ambachtelijke industrie werkten. Daarop volgt een beschouwing van wettelijke pogingen om 
arbeidskwesties in Iran te reguleren. Verder bespreek ik in dit hoofdstuk werkuren, sanitaire 
voorzieningen en de pogingen van arbeiders om hun omstandigheden te verbeteren. Tot deze 
pogingen behoorden niet alleen gezamenlijke acties, maar ook petities, die de arbeiders 
gebruikten om hun grieven en eisen over te brengen. In deze context besteed ik ook aandacht 
aan de invloed en reacties van arbeiders op het arbeidsbeleid dat de staat voerde. In dit 
hoofdstuk betrek ik zowel de landelijke als de provinciale politiek. Hoofdstuk zes bevat 
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